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The Determinants and Effects of Effective Investor 
Relations (IR) 
Abstract 
This research concerns relationships between effective IR and stock pricing and 
stock liquidity and analyst coverage. This thesis develops the IR literature by 
using an original and focused measure of IR performance, numbers of firms' 
nominations for the Investor Relations Magazine IR awards 1999-2002, and by 
testing for any direct relationships between firms' number of award nominations 
and stock price, liquidity and analyst coverage over periods surrounding these 
awards and by exploring a wider range of firm characteristics compared to 
existing research. 
It is motivated by a seminal paper claiming that effective IR indirectly reduces the 
cost of equity capital, based a chain of existing research (Brennan and 
Tamaronski, 2000). Firstly, effective IR increases analyst coverage by reducing 
analysts' information-search costs, (Bhushan, 1989b, Lang and Lundholm, 1996, 
Francis, Hannah and Philbrick, 1997, Holland 1998b). Higher coverage can 
directly reduce information asymmetry and trading costs, increasing liquidity and 
indirectly increasing equity trading volumes (Brennan and Subrahmanyan, 1996). 
Finally, Amihud, Mendelson and Lauterbach (1997) show a direct inverse 
relationship between stock liquidity and stock prices, thus completing the putative 
chain between effective IR and a reduced cost of equity. 
However, any research showing a direct relationship between effective IR and 
the cost of capital is limited, with Botosan (1997) only finding a direct negative 
relationship for a sample of US firms with effective annual reports and low 
analyst coverage, and more recent research by Botosan and Plumlee (2002) 
shows no relationship to firms' IR ratings from analysts of the Association of 
Investment Management and Research (AIMR). 
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I find, firstly, that prior to the IR awards the smaller-sized firms earn excess 
equity returns and a positive relationship between the number of firms' IR award 
nominations and prior analyst coverage. Secondly, I find that subsequent to the 
IR awards the firms continue to have high levels of analyst coverage, but do not 
earn excess stock returns. These findings suggest that analysts cover high 
momentum small-firm stocks and generally follow firms with effective IR, and also 
contributes to other research on prior factors that appear to influence firms' 
ratings in subjective firm-surveys, which behavioural finance attributes to the 
survey respondents' psychological preferences and biases. 
Finally, I find that effective IR is associated with a subsequent significant 
increase in stock liquidity and a reduced cost of equity, consistent with 
information risk and agency theories, which predict that effective IR will reduce 
risks attached to stocks due to high information asymmetry. 
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Chapter 1. 
Research Summary 
1.1 Motivations for this research 
Efficiently functioning capital markets require a free flow of relevant information to 
ensure fair and unbiased asset pricing. However, until recently, little attention was 
paid in the literature as to whether firms' communication strategies can affect market 
prices. This thesis contributes to this literature, by testing whether a firm's investor 
relations (IR) strategy can affect its stock pricing, stock liquidity and analyst coverage 
and whether these factors also appear to determine or influence market' opinions on 
firms' IR strategies. 
It is primarily motivated by a recent research paper, which demonstrates "... a direct 
link between a firm's investor relations policy and its stock price" (Brennan & 
Tamaronski, 2000). In this paper Brennan and Tamaronski put forward a set of 
propositions, based on the findings of some existing empirical research, that together 
establish an indirect, but clear, causal chain between effective IR and a reduced cost 
of equity capital. This chain of causation is demonstrated in the following parallel 
strands of empirical research. 
Firstly, there is research showing that effective IR communication strategies can 
reduce the costs of info rmation-sea rch for security analysts, and thereby directly 
increase analyst following (Bhushan, 1989b; Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Francis, 
Hannah and Philbrick, 1997; Holland 1998b). Then there is evidence that higher 
analyst coverage has a significant positive impact on stock liquidity directly, due to 
reduced trading costs for investors and market makers, and can indirectly lead to 
increased equity trading volumes (Brennan and Subrahmanyan, 1996). Also, 
increased liquidity has been shown to be a major determinant of a firm's cost of 
capital, and therefore to directly affect stock prices (Amihud, Mendelson and 
Lauterbach, 1997). 
A second key driver for this thesis is Botosan's (1997) seminal study, which offers 
evidence of a more direct link between a firm's IR activities and its stock price. 
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Botosan finds weak, but significant, evidence of a direct negative relationship 
between the level of firms' financial disclosures and cost of equity capital for a 
sample of 122 US firms in the metals and machinery industry in one year in the early 
1990's. In this study, Botosan rates the firms' level of disclosure using a subjective 
disclosure index that measures how much discretionary financial information is 
disclosed by the firms in their 1991 annual report. Botosan generalises a firm's 
disclosure index score to the quality of the firm's overall communications, by relying 
on the fact that "firms that opt to disclose more information in their annual report 
generally rank highly on other measures of information disclosure and investor 
relations" However, because the index does not actually focus on the firm's IR 
performance, Botosan's (1997) findings are probably only relevant to the quality of 
the more formal corporate communications measured by her disclosure index. 
Further, Botosan finds that a negative relationship between disclosure quality and 
the firm's cost of equity depends on the firms' level of analyst following. For firms 
followed by many analysts (above the median number in her sample) no relationship 
is found, but firms with low analyst following and a higher disclosure index score 
experience an almost 10% reduction in their cost of equity capital. Botosan suggests 
that this is because firms with high analyst following are able to rely on informal 
communications with their analysts as a more effective and efficient means of 
managing the cost of equity capital, rather than by communicating via formal 
financial reporting. This proposition and the findings of this study largely motivate 
my thesis to further explore relationships between effective IR and levels of analyst 
coverage. 
IR is still a relatively nascent and growing industry, perhaps because only since the 
1950s has the body of external stockholders been large enough to encourage the 
development of an IR industry that can provide this more specialised channel of 
corporate communications. In fact, not until 1953 was the first dedicated corporate 
IR department formed, by General Electric Co. in the US. Then, following a series of 
conferences held by the American Management Association, the US National 
Investor Relations Institute (NIRI) was formed in 1969, and the UK Investor Relations 
Society (IRS) in 1980, which both aim to provide a professional forum of guidance 
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and support for a growing body of in-house IR managers. Indeed, a recent survey of 
90 quoted European firms across 18 different countries, published by the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) (Marston, 2004), finds that 90% of these 
firms now have a full-time IR officer in a separate IR department that had been 
established on average for 7 years and that on up to E609k on their annual IR 
budget. 
Therefore, a further reason for this research is that, despite this recent substantial 
growth in the importance placed by firms on their IR function that they presumably 
perceive to add value in capital markets, the body of literature providing empirical 
evidence of the value of effective IR remains substantially under-developed. To this 
aim, my research seeks to more fully explore the value of effective IR. 
Firstly, this research seeks to test whether stock prices and analyst coverage levels 
can determine and/or influence opinions on a firm's IR performance. Secondly, I test 
whether effective IR performance leads to future excess equity returns, a reduced 
cost of equity capital, increased stock liquidity and higher analyst coverage. 
Thereby, my research asks the following questions, which concern relationships 
based on the findings drawn from a review of the limited existing literature on IR, and 
by reference to the relevant literature on information risk theory, agency theory and 
behavioural finance. 
1.2 Research questions 
1. Do the following factors significantly determine/drive effective IR? 
- Excess equity returns; 
- High analyst coverage. 
2. Do the following factors appear to be significantly affected by /result from 
effective IR? 
- Excess equity returns; 
- High analyst coverage; 
-A reduced cost of equity capital, and; 
- Increased stock liquidity. 
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1.3 Critique of the existing literature on IR 
There are only three empirical studies that have found evidence of a direct link 
between a firm's disclosure policy and its market pricing and which I critique here. 
The first is the aforementioned 1997 study by Botosan, which is one of the main 
drivers of this thesis. However, it is actually only based on a subjective disclosure 
measure of information in annual reports, treated implicitly as a proxy for the 
effectiveness of the firm's overall market communications. Meanwhile, the role of IR 
is much more than just the mechanics of conveying formal financial information, 
requiring the successful combination of several specialised formal an informal 
communication methods and the possession of a complex set of 'hard' and 'soft' 
skills (see Marcus and Wallace, 1997), and so Botosan's findings make only a 
tangential direct contribution to the IR literature. 
Also its findings are based only on a small sample of firms from a single industry 
sector and only in the US capital market in the early 1990s, so are probably not 
generally and currently still applicable. This is because during the 1990s the US 
capital markets were experiencing bull market conditions that are perhaps less 
relevant in the current bear climate of global equity markets, where firms face 
increased competition to obtain low-cost equity financing and increasingly attempt to 
attract investors using methods to differentiate themselves, such as by placing a 
higher priority on the quality of their corporate communications. Also since the 
1990s a range of new legislation governing the activities of security analysts and the 
communications and corporate governance of listed firms in both the US and UK 
have radically transformed equity market information environments. The most 
notable and controversial of these are the US Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg. F. D. ) 
in 0 ctober 2000 and the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, which together establish a 
strengthened and new regulatory framework with punitive penalties and heavy fines 
for contraventions. Likewise UK has seen the formation of the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) as an umbrella market regulator and new industry legislation and 
guidance, particularly in the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) of 
December 2001 and in the recommendations made in the Myners Report in March 
2001, have together also resulted in a new, although less rigid than the US, UK 
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framework of regulation and guidance for communications between analysts and the 
wider market and firms. A more comprehensive description of these reformed 
regulatory environments, to the extent they affect IR, is set out in chapter 2 of this 
thesis. 
In a second key study, Botosan and Plumlee (2002), using a large sample of firms 
(2,706 firm-year observations over 11 years) representing a wide cross-section of 
industry sectors, find no significant relationship between the quality of investor 
relations and the cost of equity capital. In their study IR performance is measured by 
annual ratings of firms by analysts and fund managers for the quality of the firms' IR 
from 1986-1996, which was one category of communications rated annually in the, 
now defunct, survey of corporate communications by the Association of 
Management and Research (AIMR)l. Botosan and Plumlee do not provide any 
explanations for their findings on IR, which are only reported for the pooled sample 
of firms over the whole 11-year period studied and not for any particular annual 
sample of firms or for any individual annual period for the pooled sample. Also, quite 
apart from current market conditions again being very different to those prevailing 
during the period of this study, the AIMR ceased performing their communications 
survey in 1997, and so the research by Botosan and Plumlee (2002) is now out-of- 
date and is probably not still relevant today. In addition, the AIMR disclosure rating 
was a composite score, of which a firm's IR performance only comprised a maximum 
30% weighting, and so did not provide a 'pure' measure that specifically reflects the 
value of only a firm's IR activities. Further, Botosan and Plumlee (2002) only test for 
a relationship with the cost of equity capital and not with any other variables that may 
be related to disclosure policy quality. 
In the third key paper looking at IR, Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) test the stock 
performance of the 97 firms with the largest three-year consecutive increases in 
AIMR overall disclosure ratings in the 1990s. They find that on average these firms' 
stocks earned excess risk-adjusted returns of approximately 5% over this period. 
1 In July 2004 the AIMR changed its name to the Chartered Financial Analyst Institute (CFA Institute) 
with the stated aim of raising the profile of its analysts' professional qualification, which it governs. 
Throughout this thesis the CFA is still referred to as the AIMR, because this is how it is referred to the 
existing literature. The AlMR survey is fully described in section 6.1 of this thesis. 
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However, Healy et al. restrict their 1999 study to testing only for any relationship 
between the AIMR rating and equity returns, and not for relationships with any other 
firm' characteristics, and for only a small group of firms with a sustained 
improvement in overall disclosure ratings. These firms are not necessarily 
representative of the typical listed firm, and the findings in this paper once again may 
be only specific to the bull market conditions that existed then in the US market 
during the 1990s. Critically though, the separate IR disclosure category in the AIMR 
composite rating was not separately tested, and so Healy, Hutton and Palepus' 
results can only at best be a reflection of a relationship associated with a firm's 
market communications more generally defined. 
Finally, in a more recent paper, Bushee and Miller (2005) test 184 small and mid- 
cap. companies that initiate IR programs between 1999 and 2004 by hiring 
professional IR agencies and find that these firms significantly increase their level of 
disclosure and press coverage, stock trading activity, institutional ownership, analyst 
following and market valuations after hiring IR agencies, both in absolute terms and 
relative to a control sample of firms matched by exchange, industry, time listed and 
prior investor following. Bushee and Miller thus show how IR can increase the 
visibility and stock performance of smaller firms that choose to initiate an IR 
program. However, my research is distinguished from this because it does not only 
focus on small firms and tests firms that presumably have more established IR 
programs because they are nominated for key IR industry awards. 
In summary, there is therefore a significant deficiency in the empirical literature 
specifically relating to the effectiveness of IR. There is a need to build on this 
limited past research to establish more general and conclusive results, whilst 
adequately reflecting the dynamic, complex and sensitive communication 'game'that 
firms appear to play with security analysts and other information intermediaries and 
with the fund managers at institutions that hold their stock. 
1.4 Contributions of this thesis 
I believe this thesis represents a significant development in the literature on IR. 
Firstly, this is because it extends the current literature that has largely focused on the 
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extent of formal information releases, such as provided in annual reports. my 
research focuses purely on IR activities, which go well beyond information disclosure 
per se, involving skills in both formal and informal relationship-building and the 
establishment of the credibility of the firm's managers and business strategy with 
investors and information intermediaries. Because my thesis also highlights the 
important role that analysts play as key information intermediaries between firms and 
other participants in the capital markets, its findings also contribute to the literature 
on security analyst' behaviour. 
In addition, my research tests for a much wider set of relationships compared to the 
existing literature, by testing the impact of effective IR on a firm's equity returns, 
analyst coverage, equity trading volumes and also on the cost of equity capital and 
thereby explores the value of IR in a much wider sense. Also, because it uses more 
recent data (1999 to 2002) it is also perhaps a better reflection of the role of IR in a 
more current institutional and regulatory environment. 
Further, IR performance is measured using a measure of effective IR that has not 
previously been used in any published research; the number of firms' nominations in 
key award categories of both the US and UK Investor Relations Magazine IR 
Awards. These are 'pure' measures of a firm's IR activities that have a high profile in 
the IR industry and are recognised by the National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI) 
in the US and by the Investor Relations Society (IRS) in the UK as the main IR 
industry awards. They are robust measures because they have been produced on a 
consistent and professional basis in the US since 1995 and in the UK since 1990. 
These measures are also superior to the AIMR ratings because, unlike the AIMR, 
the IR Magazine does not predefined the range of firms to be rated but instead asks 
the respondents to name any one firm they consider to have the "best" IR in specific 
categories, and so does not have any pre-selection bias that may have affected 
research using the AIIVIR ratings. 
have access to data on the number of nominations for all firms in the US awards 
2000-2002 and in the UK awards 1999- 2002, so this means I am able to work with 
large samples (US firms total approximately 3,000 firm-years and UK firms total 
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approximately 1,500 firm-years) over a period spanning several recent years. Also, 
because the US IR Magazine explicitly compiles a separate IR rating for small firms 
and large firms, the US data allows for explicit tests of how the value of IR is affected 
by firm size. In addition, my research tests the UK firms IR ratings for specific forms 
of IR communication (Best IR Officer, Best Results Meetings with Analysts and Fund 
Managers and Best Annual Report) and so also tests for the importance of different 
forms of communications within the wide-ranging role of IR. 
Established research methods are used to test my research hypotheses, relating to 
relationships between IR performance ratings and firms' characteristics in the 
existing literature and that are also relationships that would be predicted by agency 
theory, information risk theory and behavioural finance. Together these theories 
reflect the complex way that the capital markets appear to be affected by the supply 
of, and demand for, corporate information from firms and other information 
intermediaries and how participants in these two sides of the information 
environment interact and how their actions and decisions may influence a firm's 
capital market variables. 
1.5 Key findings 
In summary, my research finds some significant relationships between effective IR 
and equity returns, the cost of equity capital, equity trading volumes and levels of 
analyst coverage. Firstly, my empirical analyses show that the stocks of smaller- 
sized firms judged in the US IR Magazine IR awards to have the most effective IR 
have significant prior excess risk-adjusted returns and that there is a significant 
positive relationship for all the firms between their IR ratings and pre-existing level of 
analyst coverage. These findings are consistent with those in some of the existing 
literature and with industry anecdote, which both indicate that more analysts follow 
large firm stocks and only cover on a small percentage of high growth small firm 
stocks. In addition, these findings suggest that the respondents to the IR award 
surveys are influenced by the behavioural biases of representativeness and 
availability, described in the behavioural finance literature. This literature predicts, 
firstly, that high financial performance can cast a 'financial halo' over a firm in the 
minds of decision makers, which they may 'mentally transfer' to their opinions about 
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other characteristics of the firm or its management. Secondly, behavioural finance 
suggests that enhanced familiarity with a firm from a larger set of information and 
research by analysts may increase the firms' availability in the minds of investors 
and decision makers in the capital markets and that this may also positively bias 
ratings given to firms by the respondents to the IR award surveys. On the basis of 
this, my thesis concludes that superior equity returns of small firms and higher 
exposure in security analyst' coverage appear to determine which firms are 
perceived to have the most effective IR programmes. 
My research results also show that firms with effective IR do not earn future 
significant excess equity returns over the periods following the IR awards. This is 
contrary to the outcomes predicted by agency and information risk theories, which 
predict that effective IR should reduce information asymmetries and increase market 
values. However, my findings of insignificant future equity returns are consistent 
with those in some existing literature referred to above, that prior factors appear to 
influence some subjective ratings of firms in surveys but that the ratings are not 
necessarily associated with future superior financial performance. 
Further, because I find that all firms deemed to have the most effective IR continue 
to attract higher analyst following over the periods following the IR awards, my 
research suggests that the continuity of information-intermediation activities of 
analysts may provide a critical link in the communications between firms and the 
wider market, and in fact may be a deciding factor for the degree to which a firm is 
regarded as having effective IR. This concept of firms gaining access to a 'virtuous 
circle of analyst coverage' is consistent with the opinions expressed during my 
discussions with IR managers (summarised in chapter 2). This is an expressed 
need for listed firms to "manage the expectations" of their analysts, which requires 
the maintenance of an on-going and two-way relationship, whereby management 
feel obliged to provide a consistent and reliable source of information for its analysts, 
which the analyst comes to at least expect to receive in future. 
Finally, my findings show that the firms nominated for effective IR exhibit significantly 
increased equity trading activity and a reduced cost of equity capital over periods 
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following their nominations for the IR awards, indicating that high quality IR is directly 
associated with increased stock liquidity and with a lower cost of capital, as predicted 
by agency and information risk theories and also in accordance with findings in the 
existing empirical research. 
1.6 Summary of research methodologies 
My research methodologies, in summary, are as follows: 
* Equity returns are tested using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor 
regression model, augmented by inclusion of the momentum factor.. 
9 Cost of equity capital is tested using the Gordon and Gordon (1997) finite horizon 
dividend growth model. 
The volume of equity trading provides the basis for measuring liquidity, following 
Amihud, Mendelson and Lauterbach (1997). 
Analyst coverage is measured by the number of analysts publishing earnings 
forecasts in the Thomson Financial FirstCall and I/B/E/S databases, following a 
method established in existing research (e. g. Bhushan, 1989b). 
1.7 Summary review of literature relating to security analysts 
Because analyst' opinions and their proclivity to cover a firm are integral to this 
research, and because there has been much research suggesting that security 
analysts' and brokers' recommendations and reports may be biased, some of this 
research is described below. Firstly, some research in the 1990s found that the 
majority of US analysts' positive stock recommendations were for well-followed, high 
value shares and the overall ratio of buy to sell recommendations was 
disproportionately high (Womack, 1996). Whether this is still the case is an 
empirical matter but that partially motivated the substantially strengthened framework 
of industry regulation and law in the US and UK since this time, which is largely 
aimed at addressing the risk that analysts may be biased in this way, amongst other 
aims that I describe in chapter 2. However, even during the 1990s, there was still 
evidence that analysts played a vital role in the capital markets as key information 
intermediaries. For example, Holland (1998a) found, in interviews with executives 
and their largest shareholders, that meetings between analysts and firm executives 
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were then considered by both parties to be one of their most important channels of 
communication. 
There is also research that shows why firms continue to appear concerned with their 
levels of analyst coverage. For example, the research of Walmsley, Yadav and 
Rees (1992) finds evidence of a significant positive impact on stock prices shortly 
after analyst-firm meetings, suggesting that the meetings are an important source of 
new information for investors using analysts' research. Also, other research finds 
that previously undervalued shares earn positive abnormal returns immediately after 
firms give presentations to their analysts and brokers and that the number of analyst' 
earnings forecasts for these firms also increases (Francis, Hanna and Philbrick, 
1997). 
This literature is relevant because my thesis employs a pure proxy to measure IR 
performance, compiled from ratings given by fund managers and by security 
analysts and buy-side brokers, who are the key intermediaries between listed firms 
and the capital markets and follows a methodology similar to that used in prior 
research (Botosan and Plumlee, 2002). This is a valid method for measuring the 
effectiveness of IR, because these ratings reflect the opinions of those who are also 
the main target audience of the IR function and who are therefore probably in the 
best position to judge how well an IR department has performed. This view is also 
supported by evidence. For example, Lang and Lundholm (1993) conducted 
seminal research on the relationship between firms' disclosure quality and analyst 
behaviour, finding a significant positive relationship between the disclosure ratings 
and levels of analyst following. 
1.8 Theory 
A full description of the theories upon which this thesis draws is in chapter 4. A 
summary of the two main areas of theory from which I draw is as follows: 
1.8.1 Information risk theory and agency theory 
Information risk theory and the closely related agency theory together provide a 
framework whereby the level of information asymmetry can directly influence market 
pricing. The role of IR is to provide information to the market and these theories 
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provide reasons to explain why, by providing higher quality information, more 
effective IR could reduce any stock price discount that equity investors associate 
with high information asymmetry and so whereby effective IR can reduce firms' cost 
of equity capital. Information risk theory is based on the tenets of the Efficient 
Markets Hypothesis (EMH), which defines the level of information efficiency in the 
capital markets by how quickly market prices move in reaction to new information 
(Fama, 1970) and there is a large body of empirical research using an 'event study' 
methodology to test the speed by which security prices react to news events. 
Several pricing 'anomalies' have been detected by this research that are not 
predicted in traditional finance valuation models, starting, probably, with Ball and 
Brown (1968), who found evidence of market inefficiencies in the form of post- 
earnings announcement price 'drift' reaction to bad earnings news in particular. 
Related to this, Barry and Brown (1985) find that stocks with higher 'information-risk', 
measured by the dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts for the firms, is 
associated with higher required equity returns. Whilst these studies essentially 
involve a joint-test of both the specific model they employ and of the assumptions 
underlying the EMH, which may not actually be representative of the real 
mechanisms of the capital markets, they do show that there may be a direct 
relationship between the quality of a firm's communications and market prices. 
Agency theory focuses on information asymmetry resulting from an inherent 
divergence in the interests of managers (the 'agent') and shareholders (the 
sprincipal') due to a separation of the ownership and control of a firm. The theory 
predicts that more effective IR will reduce investors' expectations that managers will 
not necessarily act in their interests, and so reduce expected future agency costs for 
shareholders and result in a higher current share valuation and so a lower cost of 
equity capital. If more effective IR reduces perceived risk associated with the 
&agency problem', there will be a positive impact on share price and a reduced cost 
of equity. Further relevant literature on these theories is described in section 4.1. 
1.8.2 Behavioural finance 
Behavioural finance provides a framework of theory to explain why some existing 
research finds that subjective ratings of firms given by analysts, fund managers and 
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peer firm executives appear to be primarily driven by prior factors such as high 
financial performance and high familiarity. Behavioural finance applies concepts 
from psychology to seek to understand how individual's underlying psychological 
preferences towards or away from these prior factors can influence their actual 
behaviours and judgements and result in observed systematic financial market 
reactions (Taffler, 2001). Some specific behavioural traits have been formally 
recognised in the seminal psychology literature (e. g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) 
that, it has been argued, can be directly applied to investors. 
For example, research by Lang and Lundholm (1993) explores the relationship 
between firms' discretionary disclosure decisions and the firms' characteristics and 
their ratings given by the respondents in the US Association of Investment 
Management and Research (AIMR) survey on the quality of corporate 
communications, to which I refer above. Lang and Lundholm (1993) test the 
hypothesis that the ratings, which are aimed at measuring disclosure quality, are 
biased by the survey respondents' perceptions of other firm' characteristics and so 
are not necessarily a direct and accurate measure disclosure quality. They test for 
six potential explanatory characteristics, the size of equity returns, the magnitude of 
analyst earnings forecast error, firm size, equity return variability, the correlation 
between annual stock returns and earnings and, finally, the extent to which a firm is 
active in issuing securities. Lang and Lundholm find that analyst' ratings are 
positively correlated with firm size (market value), past earnings performance and 
with low equity returns variability, and are negatively related to the correlation 
between earnings and stock returns and that higher ratings are given to firms issuing 
more securities in the present or in future periods. The implication is that the ratings 
are biased by any of these factors. Although this paper does not refer explicitly to 
behavioural finance to explain these results, it is easy to apply some biases specified 
in the behavioural finance literature to understand how the respondents' biases to 
these other variables may affect the ratings they give in the AIMR survey. 
Related concepts of importance to my research are described in other literature 
applying behavioural finance to help to understand the value of various published 
firm surveys for equity investors. Specifically, this literature addresses whether such 
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surveys contain valuable information for investors for investment decision-making. 
The over-whelming conclusion from this literature is that surveys of this type are of 
little value to investors as a guide for future returns and appear more to resemble a 
Icongratulatory slap on the back for a job well done' for the highly rated firms. This 
does not undermine my use of the IR Magazine survey to measure IR performance, 
because this survey merely provides the samples of firm with effective IR for my 
research tests and the number of nominations each firm receives provides a 
measure of IR effectiveness, which is a construct otherwise very difficult to 
objectively measure. Also, the prime aim of this existing literature, briefly described 
further below, was not to test the ability of surveys to accurately measuring a stated 
construct, but to test for the financial performance of the firms surrounding the time 
the survey was compiled. 
Of the surveys tested by this literature, one is the well-known 'Most Admired Firms' 
list, published annually by Fortune Magazine in the US and another is Management 
Today's 'Britain's Most Admired Firms' in the UK. Research testing the financial 
performance of firms rated in these surveys finds that, whilst with a paucity of 
adequate information from other sources investors might believe that stocks of firms 
lauded in such public surveys are also good future investments, the firms do not earn 
superior future equity returns (e. g. Agarwal, Brown and Taffler, 2004). These 
findings suggest that, instead of these surveys depicting 'winning' firms representing 
'winning' investments for the future, they may merely provide a reflection of how the 
current opinions of analysts and investors have been biased by prior factors. A full 
review of the relevant behavioural finance literature is described in section 4.2. 
1.9 Dissemination and future publications 
1 have written a case study and accompanying teaching notes on Marconi pic for 
a Senior Investor Relations Master Class, held at Cranfield University in 
conjunction with the Investor Relations Society (IRS) in November 2001, titled 
"They're Only Human - Understanding Fund Management and Investor 
Psychology" 
Conferences I have attended and/or I have presented by research: 
- British Accoliting Association (BAA) Conference, Jerseý02002 
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Manchester Business School Doctoral Colloquium, April 2002 
Australian Academy of Management Annual Conference, November 2003 
Cranfield University Doctoral Colloquium May 2003 and January 2004 
Seminar on Corporate Disclosure, XR, Exeter University, September 2004 
The UK Investor Relations Society (IRS), joint-sponsor of my research plan to 
publish extracts from my research. 
I have drafted a research paper based on my findings and I plan to submit this to 
The Journal of Accounting & Economics, The Accounting Review, The Journal of 
Business Finance and Accounting and IR Magazine (US and UK). This paper 
has been presented at the BAA Conference, Edinburgh 2005 (R. Taff ler) 
1.10 Organisation of this thesis 
This thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides background information on 
the IR industry and on regulations governing the IR industry and the relevant 
regulations surrounding the capital markets and activities of security analysts. It also 
summarises discussions held at the commencement of this research with senior IR 
managers of some UK listed firms. In chapter 31 review the relevant existing 
empirical literature on IR and chapter 4 explains the two main areas of theory I draw 
from. Chapter 5 explains how I develop my research hypotheses from the 
predictions made by these theories and from the relationships found in the empirical 
literature. Chapter 6 describes the research methodologies for constructing the 
samples of firms with effective IR, and the methods I use to test for any putative 
relationship between effective IR and equity returns, analyst coverage, equity trading 
volumes and cost of capital. Chapter 7 describes the research results and also 
contains the test result tables. Each of the research hypotheses are discussed in 
turn and the issues discussed in the final section of this chapter relate these findings 
to my research questions. Chapter 8 reviews my empirical results on factors that I 
find appear to be the 'determinants' and 'effects' of effective IR and the extent to 
which my findings compare and/or contrast with those in the key relevant existing 
literature. The final chapter is chapter 9, which reviews and concludes the thesis 
and raises some remaining unanswered questions and suggested areas for further 
research in this area. The final sections of the thesis hold the appendices and my 
references. 
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Chapter 2. Introduction to the IR Industry 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the context in which my research is set. Section 2.1 
describes the IR industry, the varied role of the IR manager and the methods by 
which an IR manager can interact with the firm's investors and analysts in the capital 
markets information environment. Section 2.2 describes the regulatory and legal 
context surrounding the IR industry and in section 2.3 is a summary of discussions I 
held with the IR managers of six large UK listed firms and describes the issues that 
they consider to be of key and current importance in the IR industry. 
2.1 The Investor Relations (IR) Industry 
The development of the IR industry in the US and UK was primarily driven by a 
growth in the demand from multiple stakeholders for listed firms to supply them with 
an ever-increasing degree of information transparency and to be generally more 
accountable to their investors. The pressures on firms to do so is reflected in the 
following citation: 
"Everything we do, and the way we do it, has become a subject of dissection and 
analysis in the cockpit theatre of public opinion. " (Lord John Brown, Group Chief 
Executive, BP p1c, April 2004). 
2.1.1 Defining IR 
The US National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI) defines IR as: 
"A corporate marketing activity, combining the disciplines of communications and 
finance, providing current and potential investors with an accurate portrayal of a 
firm's performance and prospects, therefore having a positive effect on total value 
relative to the overall market and the firm's cost of capital. " 
And, according to Buchanan Communication/London Stock Exchange, Investor 
Relations: a practical guide (2004), "IR encompasses the broad range of activities 
through which a quoted firm communicates with its current and potential investors. " 
'Effective IR' is defined in this publication as "designed to achieve a fair market 
valuation for the firm, easier and cheaper access to capital in the future, a 
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reasonable level of liquidity in its shares and a strong group of supporters and 
believers. " IR therefore has a wide remit but is centred on the how the perception of 
the firm in the market affects the value of its equity. 
2.1.2 The 'fair market value' 
Probably the most important element of any IR programme is ensuring that the 
market is informed of events that may influence the market price of a share, i. e. of 
any price sensitive information (PSI), which if not released to the market, as well as 
potentially incurring regulatory action, may mean that the stock is not 'fairly valued'. 
A stock may be said to be 'fairly' valued when its price accurately and correctly 
reflects current market' expectations of the stock's future the cash flows. However, 
the formation of these expectations depends upon receiving sufficient, accurate and 
up-to-date information about current and future events likely to affect the firms' future 
cash flows. 
Because some shareholders invest primarily for short-term gains and others may 
look for longer-term capital growth or a longer-term income stream, the type and the 
form of information that each requires will probably reflect these individual 
investment styles. However, regardless of investment style, the magnitude of a 
firm's capital costs affects both the long-term and short-term returns available to all 
investors. 
IR is a continuous and on-going process of communication and not a short-term 
effort to raise the share price as high as possible. Attempts to do so may only be 
short-lived and are probably illegal. In addition, if a firm has this aim and fails to live 
up to expectations the share price may be punished severely, more likely to result in 
a depleted share price and a long struggle to win back the trust of the market. An 
example of the importance of winning investors' trust are the recent re-assessments 
of oil reserves by Royal Dutch Shell, which have probably severely affected not only 
its share price but also the longer-term reputation of its management. 
However, it is not hard to see why the level of the share price is very important to 
listed firms, because misunderstandings over, or poor interpretation of, the 
26 
fundamental value of a business can lead to difficulties in raising equity finance in 
the future and to increased vulnerability to hostile takeovers. 
2.1.3 An effective IR officer (IRO) 
IR is not in fact a bona fide 'profession' and an IR manager is normally qualified only 
by experience, gained either within a business or from exposure to the workings of 
the information environment in a related role. Again according to Buchanan 
CommunicationlLondon Stock Exchange, Investor Relations: a practical guide 
(2004), an effective IR officer requires good business and industry knowledge, but is 
also required to have the communication skills and an ability to effectively convey 
that knowledge to the market through a range of channels and by using up-to-date 
communication technologies. Therefore IR straddles a range of disciplines, although 
it is normally located in a firm's finance function because it requires a thorough 
understanding of financial reporting regulations and close contact with up-to-date 
financial performance of the firm. 
IR is also not a one-way flow of communications from the firm to the market, 
because by interacting with the market the IR manager can also provide senior 
management with invaluable feedback on how they and the firm are perceived in the 
financial community. Therefore, perhaps most importantly, the effective IR manager 
must develop good personal relationships with both his own senior managers and 
with key investors and analysts. In fact, the IR manager at Unilever pIc states that 
"Investors can't value what they can't see -a successful IR programme requires 
transparency, the ability to bring business performance to life and clarity in 
communication. It must be underpinned by the highest standards of corporate 
behaviour. " - IR manager, Unilever p1c; winner of the Grand Prix for Best Overall 
Investor Relations, IR Magazine UK IR Awards Report 2003. 
2.1.4 Measuring IR performance 
it is difficult to quantify the success of an IR programme since stock prices, stock 
trading levels and levels of analyst following are influenced by a wide range of 
factors that are all acting at the same time, and in which IR probably only plays a 
part. However, faced with a limited, although sometimes substantial, cost budget it 
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is not surprising that firms want to measure the success of their IR programmes. 
Methods that are often used to measure IR performance include: 
9 Analysing the ease with which equity capital is raised and the relative cost of 
raising it, which is sometimes referred to as the 'litmus'test for IR success; 
& Monitoring how the shareholder register changes over time in line with 
management's desired shareholder-profile; 
9 Assessing any improvements in the financial community's understanding of the 
firm's 'story', from feedback obtained during fund manager and analyst meetings; 
* Recording the number of times the firm is nominated and wins IR and other 
industry awards; 
" Monitoring the number of analysts and institutions visited in a year; 
" Monitoring the level of analyst coverage over time; 
" From informal commentary and feedback from various capital market audiences. 
(source: a summary of guidance on the US National Investor Relations Institute 
(NIRI) website, http: //www. niri. org/) 
2.1.5 The growing practice of IR* 
IR is a growing industry. Some evidence of the growth in the importance placed by 
both investors and firms on IR is seen in the findings of the Thomson Financial Extel 
Pan European Sutvey (2004), in which 1,007 fund managers, 155 brokerage firms 
and senior managers of 298 of Europe's largest listed firms identify three key trends: 
1. IR contact with buy-side analysts compared to sell-side analysts has increased, is 
increasing and will increase further. This direct contact with the buy-side is also 
more frequent, more sophisticated and considered more essential for effective 
investor relations. 
2. The priority placed on the IR function by firms has grown, giving the IR role and 
responsibilities a higher internal profile, in some cases involving Board 
representation and making it more central to the firm's on-going procedures and 
integral to the firm's finance functions and processes. 
3. Both firms and IR practitioners are still looking for independent, rigorous and 
recognised methods of 'rating' IR performance to benchmark their performance 
with peers, to enhance and what they do and to publicise their IR achievements. 
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2.1.6 The audiences and contacts of IR 
An IR programme traditionally focused on four main external audiences: institutional 
investors, private investors, the financial media and security analysts (Buchanan 
Communications & London Stock Exchange, 2004). But the responsibilities of IR 
now normally extend to a wider group of stakeholders, such as lobby groups, local 
communities and environmental activists, driven by a more recent trend towards 
socially responsible investing (SRI) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) for 
example. This expansion in the IR remit is reflected by an extract from 
Finance Talking. com, a web site dedicated to financial public relations and investor 
relations: "Investor Relations and financial public relations concern the many ways 
that a firm communicates with those who have a financial interest in the firm. The 
prime audiences for most firms will be investors, potential investors and those who 
influence them. However, financial communications also impacts on other 
stakeholders such as customers and suppliers, banks, Governments and employees 
(July, 2004). 
The main audiences of IR are more fully described below. 
2.1.6.1. Financial institutions 
Also referred to as the 'buy-side', this term covers a wide range of professional 
investors and financial institutions, including life assurance firms, insurance firms, 
pension funds, unit trusts, investment trusts and other funds and investment 
management groups who manage money on their own behalf or on behalf of another 
fund. A more recent type of institutional investor is the hedge fund, which uses a 
different form of investment strategy from traditional investment firms. The strategy 
of most hedge funds is to profit from speculating against short-term stock market 
movements, which makes it difficult for a firm to assess whether they are moving into 
or out of their stock. However, hedge fund managers are likely to expect to receive 
the same level of information from a firm as does any other institutional shareholder. 
Financial institutions normally maintain close and direct contact with the firms in 
which they invest, through company presentations and meetings, to which analysts 
are often also invited, as well as on the telephone and by email. This need for a 
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regular flow of information means that the IR manager must ensure that senior 
management are made available at key times. 
A firm's investors may also be located overseas. However the Internet and web- 
based communications are now widely used to disseminate corporate results and 
news on a global and immediate basis to all investors equally, which as well as 
saving the time of senior managers by reducing the need for personal presentations 
and visits, assist a firm in meeting more recent legislation requiring equal and 
unbiased dissemination of events that may affect the stock price (see section 2.2 for 
a review of this legislation). 
2.1.6.2. Retail investors 
Despite declining in number since a peak before the 1990s, retail or private investors 
continue to represent an important element of many firms' investor-profiles and they 
are probably a particularly important source of finance for the smaller quoted firms, 
who may struggle to attract financial institutions into their stock. Also, although the 
overall percentage of equity held by retail investors remains small, because they 
may out-number a firm's institutional investors, they can be a more time-consuming 
audience for information from an IR department. 
However, private investors can be a more loyal group of shareholders than 
institutions and may hold stock for longer periods of time, because trading is often 
less easy and more costly for them compared to professional investors. Because 
they will generally not have access to broker research, private investors must rely on 
media comment and direct contact with firms or the advise of a bank, broker or other 
representative. Therefore effective communications between a firm and a few major 
private client brokers could be a more efficient way of communicating a large number 
of private investors, via pro-forma data packs sent to a few key regional brokers. 
Finally, a firm's own employees are also often shareholders, in company share 
option schemes and other share schemes, and represent an IR audience with their 
own unique information requirements (source: Buchanan Communications & London 
Stock Exchange, 2004). 
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2.1.6.3. Security analysts 
There are two main types of analyst; sell-side and buy-side. Although their roles are 
broadly similar, their information needs are different. 
Sell-side: 
These analysts and brokers tend to have an expert knowledge of a specific industry 
sector or geographical region. One of their key roles is to publish research based on 
publicly available information and any other information obtained directly from a firm. 
They generally make their research publicly available for the use of both institutional 
and private investors when making investment decisions. Although they are likely to 
request regular access to senior management at the firms they follow, they cannot 
be granted any information advantage over other audiences because the provision of 
price-sensitive information incurs serious penalties from the UK Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) and US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the respective 
industry regulating bodies. However, because their opinions can have a significant 
impact on the buying and selling of large tranches of stock by institutions, sell-side 
analysts are a key target audience for IR practitioners 
Buy-side: 
Buy-side analysts are employed by financial institutions and the past few years has 
seen a growth in their number, as institutions have sought to produce their own 
research rather than rely on research from the sell-side. This is probably because of 
a heightened awareness of the risk of conflicts of interest surrounding sell-side 
research. Because their research is not made available outside their own institution, 
it is normally tailored to the institution's investment style and sector/geographical 
preferences. However, a buy-side analyst is as likely as the sell-side to request 
meetings with the IR personnel or senior managers, and to have a similar access to 
company information for use by his employing investing institution (Buchanan 
Communications & London Stock Exchange, 2004). 
2.1.6.4. Financial media 
Use of an eager group of financial journalists is an effective method for 
disseminating information to a wide audience, and also the establishment of good 
relationships with financial journalists, can be crucial to ensuring that a firm's 'story' 
is portrayed accurately and in a timely way. Wide media coverage can also sway the 
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opinions of institutional and private investors who read, see or hear compelling 
media comment and/or 'stories'. Relationships with the media may sometimes be 
mediated by financial PR firms, who advise on developing relationships with 
journalists and sell-side analysts and give strategy advice for gaining press coverage 
(Buchanan Communications & London Stock Exchange, 2004). 
2.1.6.5. Other stakeholders 
The IR function is also required to provide information to may other external parties, 
including corporate financial advisors at merchant banks, independent financial 
advisors, lending institutions, brokers from smaller broking houses, IR consultants, 
firm registrars, legal advisors, primary information providers (P. I. P. ), industry 
regulators and government bodies, and even the firm's auditors and the financial 
designers and printers who may be used to produce financial literature (Buchanan 
Communications & London Stock Exchange, 2004). 
in summary, this section has described the wide-ranging role and responsibilities of 
IR and in the following section I review 'best practice IR' and the main IR industry 
regulations. 
2.2 Regulation and the Best Practice IR 
2.2.1 Best practice IR 
Although best practice IR naturally incorporates compliance with all relevant laws 
and regulations, this probably represents a minimum threshold of IR performance. 
'Best practice IR' is defined by meeting the requirements of regulations but also 
largely by what the market has come to expect, which means that best practice IR is 
a constantly changing concept. For example, five years ago it was still common for 
firms to invite analysts to a closed, one-to-one results presentation and pay little 
regard to the information advantage that this gave the professional investment 
community over private investors. Today such an approach is likely to be viewed as 
selective disclosure and is prohibited in the US by Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg. 
F. D. ) and by similar legislation introduced by the UK Financial Services Authority 
(FSA), which are both described below. 
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IR per se is not yet itself a regulated industry. However, in a recent study of IR 
practice by European quoted firms, Marston (2004) finds that most company 
executives, whilst not seeing a need for greater regulation of IR, are in favour of the 
profession itself formulating international IR best practice guidelines rather than 
relying on local guidelines issued by the national stock exchanges and local investor 
relations societies. To this effect, the UK Investor Relations Society (IRS) launched 
the first recognised Certificate in Investor Relations in 2003, with the aim of 
establishing a minimum level of knowledge for UK IR managers, although to date it 
appears that take-up has been slow, probably because its introduction lags the 
establishment of a dedicated IR function in most quoted firms in the US and UK. 
2.2.2 Regulation 
It is important to understand the wealth of laws and regulations governing the 
disclosures made by listed firms in the UK and US, in order to appreciate the high 
standards in communications that is now expected beyond meeting traditional 
financial reporting requirements. As noted above, although the practice of IR is not 
itself regulated, corporate communications are subject to a large and growing range 
of regulations, with which IR personnel must remain up-to-date in order avoid 
regulatory penalties, but also to continue to meet the high information-expectations 
of the market. 
In the UK the main legislation and regulations include various Company Law Acts, 
the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA), the Takeover Code, AIM rules, the 
UK Listing Rules and the corporate governance Combined Code and New Combined 
Code. Firms should also keep informed about, and comply with, other guidance and 
requirements from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA). There are also a number of European directives that have 
an impact on UK IR Best Practice and if a firm has an overseas listing, then local 
regulations must also be met. In the wake of the 'Enron Era' corporate governance 
initiatives are probably near the top of the regulatory agenda and there are a number 
of on-going debates about issues such as the independence of directors and 
auditors. The Combined Code on Corporate Governance was revised in July 2003 
to take into account the Higgs Report on non-executive directors and the Smith 
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Report on audit committees and the European Commission are also currently 
finalising their Transparency Directive that will apply to all European firms equally. 
2.2.2.1 Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg. F. D. ) 
Introduced by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in October 2000, 
Reg. F. D. has had a significant impact on IR across the globe, although it technically 
only applies to US-listed firms. In short, this legislation governs how firms 
communicate with their analysts. It is an attempt to eliminate so-called 'selective 
disclosures', by which firms formerly gave advance or 'closed' briefings to select 
institutional investors and analysts. US-listed firms are now required to widely 
disseminate the same level of information as disclosed during such briefings with the 
financial community. 
Reg. FID is actually hardly more onerous than the UK market's long-standing 
requirements on disclosure, but it reflects the high expectations of market regulators 
and its introduction was very widely debated and discussed in the corporate 
communications community. It has also led a move towards a wider use of 
corporate websites for communicating with investors, because in order to meet its 
requirements firms have used Internet technologies to give equal access to the same 
information to all investors at the same time. 
The longer-term effect of how firms' communication policies are affected by Reg. 
F. D. remains to be seen, but some research has already been conducted that 
attempts to measure its impact. For example, Mohanram (2002) tests how Reg. F. D. 
has affected the accuracy of analyst' earnings forecasts and finds that absolute 
forecast error and forecast dispersion have increased since it was released, perhaps 
providing preliminary evidence that firms now are less-forthcoming when 
communicating with analysts compared to prior to Reg. F. D.. Any resulting reduction 
in firms' transparency lies behind some criticisms raised in the IR industry and 
financial media, that corporate communications, especially in the US, is now over- 
regulated and that the legislation may have 'back-fired' because it tends to 
encourage firms to be over cautious in their external communications and to result in 
a reduction in the quality of information in the market (IR Magazine, August 2004). 
34 
2.2.2.2 The Myners Report 
In the 2000 UK budget, the Government made clear its concern that there may be 
factors encouraging institutional investors to follow industry-standard investment 
patterns that focus overwhelmingly on large-firm equities and gilts and avoid 
investing in small and medium-sized enterprises and other smaller firms. It therefore 
commissioned Paul Myners, the chairman of Gartmore Investment Management, to 
conduct a thorough review of the investment banking industry and to consider 
whether there were such factors distorting the investment decision-making of 
institutions. The resulting Myners Report represents a UK industry milestone 
because, although the report essentially veered away from imposing strict and 
obligatory requirements, it probably marks the start of a recent more interventionist 
regulatory environment surrounding the investment industry in the UK than had 
existed previously. The stated purpose of the review was: "... as a legitimate issue 
of policy 'concern, to establish the extent to which institutions' approaches to 
investment decisions are rational, well-informed, subject to the correct incentives and 
as far as possible, undistorted". The Myners Report, published in March 2001, made 
some detailed and focused suggestions for structural and policy changes for UK 
financial institutions that are beyond the scope of this thesis. However, Paul Myners 
surnmarised the report as follows: 
"The problems the review describes are complex. They are essentially to do with 
incentives and behaviour. Diagnosis of such problems is easier than cure. I do 
make a number of suggestions ... but 
I do not suggest that these alone are enough . 
Further change is needed. My strong preference, however, is for the industry - if it is 
willing - to drive change forward itself. Legislation, though it might in the end prove 
necessary, is likely to be a blunt instrument to tackle the kinds of problem I have 
described. The approach I have in mind is consciously based on the precedent of the 
Combined Code of the Committee on Corporate Governance and the various codes 
that preceded it. On any reasonable analysis, these codes have done their job. I 
believe it should be possible to apply a parallel approach to pension funds and other 
institutional investors, and that such an approach could be a proportionate response 
to the problems the review describes". 0 
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2.2.2.3 The UK Financial Services and Market Act (FSMA) 
This major piece of UK legislation came into force in December 2001. It lays down 
new rules on market abuse and updated the FSA's Price-Sensitive Information (PSI) 
Guide. Both of these Acts address the issue of 'selective disclosure' of information 
and are therefore crucial to IR. 
Market Abuse: 
The FSIVIA increases the likelihood of prosecutions for market abuse by introducing 
a new civil offence to supplement the existing criminal offence of insider dealing. 
This means that the FSA need now only show that the 'balance of probability' points 
to an offence having been committed rather than proving 'beyond reasonable doubt' 
that is required for a criminal prosecution. The new civil offences for market abuse 
are: 
e 'Misuse of information', which is broadly equivalent to the former insider dealing 
offence; 
e Creating a false or misleading impression relating to the disclosure of information; 
'Market distortion', whereby actions and behaviours relating to the disclosure of 
information may distort the market. 
Price Sensitive Information (PSI) Guide: 
The up-dated PSI Guide by the UK Listing Authority (UKLA) defines PSI as 
"Information that may, or would be likely to, lead to a substantial movement in the 
price of a firm's shares" However, it is largely left to firms and their legal advisors to 
interpret this. The key points of the new PSI Guide are as follows: 
" Briefings to analysts should be also be made available to the public; 
" Analysts should not be given any preferential treatment in the release of PSI; 
" Firms should review their procedures for meetings with analysts to ensure that no 
PSI is revealed; 
Firms are encouraged to publish information over the Internet but should not view 
putting it on their website as necessarily equivalent to wide dissemination to the 
market. PSI must also be sent to the market via an approved news service 
(called Primary Information Providers or P. I. P. 's). 
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2.2.2.4 The 'Global Settlement' 
In 2003 New York Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer, lead an investigation into the 
internal controls in place at major US investment banks to control their internal 
'Chinese walls' between their sell-side analyst and corporate broking departments 
and how well these controls address any potential conflicts of interest. This action 
was prompted by the discovery of internal e-mails in which some analysts privately 
derided firms for which they were issuing very favourable research reports. The 
immediate outcome of this investigation was a landmark fine for ten US Wall Street 
investment banks of $1.4 bn. (E760m) for their failure to adequately control the 
activities of analysts, referred to infamously as the 'Global Settlement'. This 
settlement came with new obligatory guidelines governing internal control 
environments at all US investment banks. A summary of these, as far as they are 
relevant, is as follows: 
" There is now a prohibition on any activities by analysts that could be seen as 
"spinning" of a new share flotation or initial public offerings. 
" The investment banks must take, and be seen to be taking, measures to 
minimise the contact between internal research and investment banking 
functions. 
" Analysts are prohibited from being paid for research by the investmenf,, banking 
arms and are prohibited from attending corporate finance 'pitches and road 
shows' to attract business. 
" Investment banks must provide retail investors with independent investment 
advice. For a five-year period each investment bank must "contract with no less 
than three independent research firms that will provide research to the brokerage 
firm's customers" and regulators with appoint an independent monitor for each 
firm. 
" Each firm must publish its analysts' recommendations and price target forecasts 
so analysts' performance can be compared. 
In the wake of this action in the US, in 2003 the UK Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) warned that it would also investigate any alleged malpractice by UK 
investment banks with regard to their internal controls over analysts. However the 
FSA stopped short of imposing the prescriptive set of 'rules' adopted in the US, 
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instead putting the onus on the banks to 'self-police' any internal conflict of interests, 
leaving the banks more flexibility to instigate their own internal control systems. 
Since this time, the FSA has actively monitored internal changes made by the UK 
investment banks and, as it has not yet issued further guidance or taken more strict 
action, it appears satisfied with any changes that have been put in place. However, 
in March 2004 the FSA did set a dead-line for UK investment banks to have 
developed and reported on measures taken to prevent potential analyst' conflicts of 
interest by July 1- It also recommended that analysts be prohibited from attending 
investment bank road shows with potential clients and that failure to provide 
evidence that they were taking satisfactory action would prompt the FSA to enforce 
more prescriptive action and to enforce heavy fines for contraventions. Again the 
longer-term impacts of these actions, and whether any further action is to be taken 
by the UK FSA and the US SEC, remain to be seen. However, the overall result of 
these regulatory changes and a new environment of increasingly sceptical investors 
may mean that any cause of sell-side analyst bias that was present prior to 2003 is 
at least now minimised. Meanwhile, probably as a direct result of these events, 
there has been a consolidation of the sell-side analyst industry in both the UK and 
US that has resulted in an overall reduction in number of sell-side analysts, as 
institutions are increasingly relying more on their own in-house brokers for research 
and information or using research from independent research analysts (IR Magazine, 
August 2004). 
2.2.2.5 US Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2003 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (referred to as 'SOX) applies to all firms listed in the US 
and even to foreign subsidiaries of US listed firms, although some exemptions have 
been granted for non-US domiciled firms listed in the US. However the ramifications 
of SOX have probably extended beyond just the US, because market regulators in 
many other countries have since introduced similar rules. SOX is wide ranging but 
overall requires firms to comply with several new and enhanced internal control 
procedures, along with controversial new requirements that directors personally 'sign 
off' on the adequacy of these controls in the firm's annual report, thus potentially 
exposing them to future liabilities should any legal action be taken on the grounds 
that any information they contain are misleading or falsely stated. 
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2.2.2.6 Corporate governance 
In 2002 the UK Government commissioned the Smith Higgs Report to look into the 
current role and the effectiveness of corporate governance procedures of the Board 
of directors and non-executive directors and to make recommendations on how to 
improve the accountability of the Board to shareholders and on methods to improve 
the effectiveness of their systems of internal controls. This lead to new legislation 
enshrined in the Combined Code on Corporate Governance, which was up-dated in 
2003 in a New Combined Code, applying to all UK listed firms with a financial year 
ending after 1 November 2003. The aim of the Code is to bring about "greater 
transparency and accountability in the board room, formal performance appraisal 
and closer relationships between non-executive directors and shareholders" The 
Code made a series of recommendations on improvements to Board constituents, 
remuneration, procedures and committees and the relationship between the Board 
and the Audit Committee. Companies are also required to state compliance or non- 
compliance with the Code and to explain reasons for non-compliance. Although the 
main proposals in the New Code only apply to the largest firms because some were 
relaxed for smaller quoted firms in certain areas (for example, firms outside the 
FTSE 350 need not have at least half their board composed of non-executive 
directors if they have at least two non-executives), this legislation marked a 
significant advance in the transparency by which UK directors operate 
2.2.2.7 European legislation 
There are currently several EU Directives being finalised that aim to harmonise the 
European financial services sector. The main new and most relevant legislation is 
that in 2005 all firms must comply with International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS), so that for the first time all European firms will be required to report in a 
consistent and comparable format. 
Other European legislation that is currently under review includes: 
The Market Transparency Directive, which is aimed at increasing the 
transparency of information released by security issuers that are listed in a 
regulated market. This will require that issuers produce an annual financial report 
within three months of the end of the financial year, a detailed semi-annual 
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financial report and quarterly financial information for the first and third quarters of 
each financial year. 
4o The Prospectus Directive, which requires that a prospectus, once approved by 
the home country authority, be accepted throughout the EU prior to the public 
offering and/or admission to trading in a regulated market. 
2.2.2.8 Corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
CSR reporting has become increasingly important to firms in the past few years. 
CSR has a range of definitions, but is probably best described as the way in which a 
firm manages the impact of its business on society and the environment. The 
communication of how firms are acting in a CSR responsible fashion, by managing 
the risks associated with poor environmental, ethical or social performance, is now 
recognised as one of the factors that can attract their consumers and investors to 
invest in the firm and the responsibility for CSR normally lies in the IR function. 
2.2.3 Section summary 
This concludes the section on the IR industry, which describes the context in which 
this thesis is set. It explains the many responsibilities involved in the role of IR and 
the growing range of industry regulation governing the information environment in 
which listed firms now operate. The next section provides a summary of some 
discussions held with six leading UK IR managers at the start of my research 
program. This provides rich information on how IR managers currently see their 
roles and the main issues they perceive to be affecting the practice of IR and which 
further illustrates the context of my research. 
2.3. Discussions with IR Managers 
2.3.1 Aim of the discussions 
The aim of these informal discussions was to gain a better understanding of the role 
of an IR manager and the context in which they operate. The outcome of the 
discussions is an up-to-date perspective of IR, which shows the 'added-value' that 
the specialised role of IR can provide in addition to more traditional and formal 
corporate communication methods, to which investors where restricted to prior to 
formation of dedicated corporate communication departments by listed firms. The 
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discussions were structured, so that the respondents discussed specific issues 
relating to the IR industry that are probably the most currently salient. I R. managers 
at the following firms were interviewed, on the following dates: 
Firm Name 
Hoare Govett/ABNAMRO 
Colt Telecom plc 
BAE Systems plc 
BP pic 
CGNU pic 
Barclays pic 
Date 
18 January 2002 
25 January 2002 
31 January 2002 
31 January 2002 
30 January 2002 
21 February 2002 
2.3.2 Respondent comments 
The discussions were organised under the main headings shown in bold below and 
are a summary of the comments made by the IR managers. 
The attributes of an effective IR manager 
- The key attributes of an effective IR manager are in "being proactive, 
approachable, honest and responding to questions quickV' and in "telling the 
truth, without exaggerations or false promises". 
- Possessing good communication skills is probably more important than having 
personal experience of working in the firm's business and industry. 
- It is useful for an IR manager to have experience "from the other side of the 
desk", by which they mean to have had a role as a security analyst or fund 
manager, to gain first hand knowledge of the type and form of information that 
analysts and investors require. This also helps to understand how the market 
can "tar firms in the same sector with the same brush" and to be better able to 
anticipate how events that impact a competitor firm may affect one's own share 
price. This brings an understanding of the importance of differentiating your firm 
from others, in order to minimise any negative effects from industry index price 
movements. 
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Internal organisation and communications 
- The effectiveness of a firm's internal communication systems is equally as 
important as that of its external communications, because the quality of the IR 
gmessage' relies on receiving accurate and up-to-date information from other 
functional areas of the firm. This is important because the perceived level of 
performance of an IR function relies largely on how effectively internal 
communications flow within a business, even though this is normally beyond the 
remit or control of the IR department itself. 
- The IR manager is the 'mouthpiece' of the firm, but investors also obtain 
information from many other sources. This means that it is vital that information 
that the market hears from different sources are consistent and do not contradict. 
The IR manager should be the first to communicate any price-sensitive 
information to the market and direct access and input from the chief executive is 
considered vital for this and to ensure that investors' and analysts' enquiries are 
answered quickly, yet accurately. 
Communication methods 
- IR managers are aware that institutional investors and sell-side analysts prefer to 
meet in person so they are able to influence the agenda of discussion on issues 
about which they are particularly concerned. It is important that during these 
meetings the IR manager gives some form of response to all questions that are 
asked even if the questions are not directly answered, in the interests of not 
revealing competitive advantages or in not releasing new price-sensitive 
information (PSI). Any PSI that is revealed during these meetings must then be 
immediately released to the market via an authorised Primary Information 
Provider (PIP) that is authorised by the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA), 
such as on the UK Regulatory News Service (RNS), or by the SEC, the 
equivalent US aut onty. 
- New technologies, especially the 
Internet, have made it easier for firms to 
communicate more widely, efficiently and quickly but have at the same time 
raised the information-expectations of the market. Despite this, telephone 
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contact is still considered to be the 'best' method for frequent communication and 
for maintaining a good relationship with analysts and investors because 
electronic communications are considered to lack the same personal element 
and to be inadequate for capturing 'nuances' that voice contact provides. 
- There is no general 'rule' about how regular interim formal announcements 
should be made, but they are generally more frequent for a business with highly 
fluctuating earnings or cash flow, or for a firm operating in a high risk or high 
profile industry, such as defence and insurance firms. 
Focusing on the shareholder profile 
- Each firm has a unique mix of type of investor, whether institutional versus retail 
or domestic versus overseas but, in general, retail and private shareholders are 
seen to present more of a "nuisance" for the IR manager, in terms of the higher 
number of information requests they make. Also, the frequency and form of 
information that each investor requires depends on their individual investment 
time horizons. 
- It is important to know the particular investment style of your largest 
shareholders, because some investors are subject to a higher degree of trading 
'inertia' than others. Some investors may be reluctant to sell or buy large 
shareholdings, partly to avoid significantly impacting the stock price, but perhaps 
also to avoid any additional reporting requirements that come for shareholdings 
over 3%. Fund managers may also be subject to internal operational risk 
management policies and internal controls and to the investment remit of the 
fund. This can mean that they maintain commitments to specific firms over the 
long term, whereas smaller 'boutique' funds and hedge funds are often more 
active traders and have a shorter-term investing time horizon. 
- It is important to focus communication efforts on the current ortarget' 
institutional 
investors, so that the firm's executives can more efficiently use their time on 
meeting with the investors that they are concerned to maintain or increase in 
weighting. 
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Increasingly IR managers are required to meet the information needs of multiple 
firm stakeholders, including customers, Government bodies and lobby groups, 
who may all also be investors in the firm. In this way the IR department manages 
the overall 'corporate reputation' in the eyes of many stakeholders. If a firm has a 
high percentage of foreign ownership, the IR manager is also required to have 
knowledge of any global issues affecting investors and to appreciate that 
communications to overseas investors should be no less effective than with local 
investors, although this is facilitated by technologies such as email, conference 
calls and web-casts. 
Managing 'good and bad'news and crisis management 
- The communication of both good and bad news is about "managing market 
expectations" and whether the news is good or bad, "honesty is the best policy'. 
The firm should consistently balance the tone of the 'message' it presents 
between optimism and enthusiasm, even when conveying negative news. 
- Although IR managers consider that any'bad news'travels faster than does good 
news, they consider that adopting an internal and external policy of at least 
quarterly reporting makes it easier to bring the market back in line with the firm's 
intrinsic current value. 
- It is important to put the 'best light'on any bad news, by giving clear information 
on the context of the news and to provide any mitigating factors and contingency 
plans that are being put in place to correct any controllable issues. Generally, 
bad 'surprises' are always to be avoided but, when there is bad news, it is better 
be provide accurate information the first time it is reported or otherwise risk an 
impression of uncertainty and lack of business knowledge. 
Credibility 
- Having credibility is regarded as "doing what you told the market you planned to 
do" and is regarded as a fundamental attribute when communicating with 
sophisticated investors and analysts, who themselves may be already very highly 
knowledgeable. An IR manger has higher credibility if she/he has obvious in- 
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depth industry knowledge, as well as knowledge about the current state of the 
equity markets, and also by maintaining effective contacts to the informal industry 
agossip' and rumour channels from third party sources and also by forming good 
personal contacts with key individuals in peer firms and with analysts and fund 
managers. 
- Credibility incorporates a complex mixture of 'hard' aspects (accurate and 
detailed and focused information) and 'soft' aspects, such as a feeling of trust 
and integrity and from having a record of delivering on former 'promises'. 
Analysts and fund managers have a long memory in regard to executives who 
have lost credibility as a result of frequent or dramatic past earnings or dividend 
'surprises' or if they make apparent strategic decisions or make business 
changes about which the market has not been adequately warned. 
- Having confident and lively presentation skills and an enthusiasm about the 
business also assist in adding to the degree of credibility. The IR function is 
more credible if the IR manager has the business "in his bloocr', perhaps from 
having risen up from a middle-management role in the firm or of a similar firm. 
- Information obtained directly from a CEO is viewed as more credible than from 
the IR manager himself, although investors will be aware from past experience of 
the degree of proximity in the relationship between the CEO and the IR manager 
and about the IR manager's ability to have access is fast and accurate 
information from the business areas. One respondent said, "A measure of 
credibility is how often the CEO speaks directly to the market". 
Credibility depends upon the reputation of particular individuals and can only 
established over a period of time. It comes from reliability and consistency, of the 
firm's message ("the worst 'sin' is to appear uncertain or to change the 
message"), of accounting methods (because a change may appear to be 
accounting 'manipulation') and also consistency in the nature of business. The 
restructuring of a business may require analysts to adjust their valuation models 
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and fund managers may need to reassess their portfolios to meet required risk 
levels, which are both time-consuming. 
IR performance measures 
- The main method used by IR managers to gauge their IR performance is to 
regularly benchmark to the IR performance of peers, because the level of 
disclosure expected by the market and IR best practice is largely determined by 
what the majority of firms actually do. Other methods include measuring the 
effect of company announcements and presentations on the P/E ratio, measuring 
the degree of analyst' earnings forecast consensus and how close this is to the 
firm's internal earnings forecasts or even in the winning or nomination in industry 
awards or rankings. More informal methods for measuring IR performance 
include informal feedback from analysts and investors and the tone of media 
coverage of, and reaction to, company events. 
Views on industry regulation 
- IR managers regard the main impact on their role from the FSA regulations to be 
over the communication of information likely to have a material impact on the 
share price. This is not assisted by a large degree of subjectivity in the 
phraseology of the FSA regulations, which does not precisely define the concept 
of 'materiality'. Firms must therefore be proactive and sometimes be over- 
cautious in their communications, to ensure they are acting within the law. 
- The increase in the number of regulations to which firms must comply over the 
past few years has generally caused some firms to be less forthcoming beyond 
making formal announcements. This is to avoid releasing 'misleading' information 
or making selective disclosures in meetings with investors and analysts. Also, 
formal announcements have probably become more lengthy and comprehensive, 
because no selective information can later be discussed or divulged during 
analyst meetings if the firm has not previously released the same information. 
- The recent FSA rules have probably resulted more in an increase in the range of 
communications channels used rather than in affecting the actual communication 
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content, due to the requirement to release information to the whole market at 
once and not to give preference to any select parties. 
Firms are not strictly permitted to issue any guidance to analysts for the process 
of forecasting future earnings, but some IR managers feel they are able to at 
least question an analyst on the size of their earnings forecast if they appear to 
be 'outliers' compared to market consensus. 
- The role of the FSA is viewed as "keeping firms on their toes" and the UK 
regulations as being more effective compared to the more restrictive framework 
in the US. The firm's relationship with the FSA is simply viewed in the same 
manner as its relationship with another external stakeholder. The longer-term 
impact of the FSA regulations can only be judged in hindsight, and as the market 
experiences the degree of severity by which they are enforced and how often 
they are enforced over the coming years. 
Firms operating in the service sectors perhaps face an additional corporate 
governance responsibility, because most other businesses and society at large 
are perhaps entirely dependent on their operations (for example, energy and 
defence services, telecommunications and to a large degree the financial 
services industry, in which the public entrust their savings). 
Summary 
This chapter has provided an overview of the IR industry and the context within 
which my thesis is located. In particular, it has described the diverse and complex 
role of the IR manager, which involves communicating effectively in different media 
and to a widely disparate audience, within a growing framework of regulations and 
guidance. In the following chapter I review the existing empirical literature relevant 
to this thesis. 
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Chapter 3. Literature Review 
Introduction 
Whilst the previous chapter provides background information about the IR industry 
and the regulatory environment surrounding the practice of IR, this chapter reviews 
the relevant empirical literature on the relationships between effective IR and equity 
returns, analyst coverage, stock liquidity and the cost of equity capital. 
Literature Review Methodology 
The body of literature that is relevant to my thesis is quite broad, so I divide my 
literature review into the following four areas: 
3.1. IR and Equity Returns 
3.2. IR and Analyst Coverage 
3.3. IR and Equity Trading Volumes 
3.4. IR and the Cost of Equity Capital 
This review of the empirical literature leads into chapter 4, in which I describe 
information risk theory, agency theory and behavioural finance. Together, the 
relevant empirical literature and these three areas of theory provide the framework 
that drives the hypotheses that I test in my thesis and that I lay out in chapter 5. 
The following diagram illustrates the overall structure of how the empirical literature 
and theory support my research hypotheses: 
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3.1 IR and Equity Returns 
This section reviews the existing literature on the relationship between effective IR 
and equity returns. 
3.1.1 Introduction 
There are strong theoretical and intuitive reasons to expect to find a relationship 
between effective IR and improved equity performance. The theories relating to this 
relationship are described fully in chapter 4. This section explores the empirical 
evidence from prior research that tests this proposed relationship. 
3.1.2 The literature 
As described in chapter 2, the IR industry is in the wake of some notable accounting 
'scandals' and events that have raised concerns over conflicts of interest within 
investment banks, which together have largely motivated a rise in institutional 
shareholder activism and also lead to the formation of a new strengthened 
framework of regulation in both the US and UK. 
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Over the past decade or so, such events have also encouraged a substantial growth 
in the number of IR service providers and in the level of expenditure by firms on IR in 
order to provide the market with information on how they are managing risks relating 
to these issues. This general growth in the importance of external corporate 
communications is presumably based on an assumption that improved IR will bring 
benefits to investors and to the workings of the capital markets in general that come 
from stock prices that better reflect 'fundamental values'. In this section of my thesis 
I review some research that provides some evidence to support these assumptions. 
Firstly, some industry studies claim to provide evidence that firms can reap direct 
cost of equity and share price benefits from improved corporate communications. A 
survey by Standard & Poors (S&P) ranks the transparency of the disclosures made 
by over 1,500 firms listed in their S&P Global indices, by assessing more than 98 
items in the annual reports of the firms, resulting in an S&P annual 'Transparency 
and Disclosure (T&D) Ranking'. A study by Patell and Dallas (2002) purports to find 
that firms with higher S&P T&D rankings have higher price-to-book ratios, lower 
market risk and a higher market valuation and, based on these findings, this study 
concludes that by providing higher quality disclosure firms can reduce their cost of 
equity capital and reduce their risk profiles. 
Another recent commercial study (Blue Rubicon/MORI, 2004) draws from 95 
interviews with UK institutional investors and fund managers and with 101 senior 
executives from FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 firms. A main finding of this study is that 
64% of the respondents stated that they consider 'good communication skills' to be 
the most important characteristic of a CEO, even ranking this quality above the 
possession of 'good leadership and management skills'. It concludes that "Firms 
seeking to distinguish themselves from their competitors, and to derive a valuation 
premium by doing so, need to learn to communicate in a different, more transparent, 
open and insightful way' and that "... there is a valuation premium for firms and Chief 
Executives that can harness the power of positive sentiment and create momentum 
behind their particular story'. 
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However, there is in fact limited empirical academic research evidence to confirm 
that these views are not just mere hyperbole. The limited relevant empirical 
research is described below. 
There is however one paper that very graphically portrays the direct impact that an 
effective disclosure policy can have on share price (Healy and Palepu, 1995). This 
is a case study of a US firm whose management considered that the market under- 
valued its shares because their accounting methods did not adequately reflect the 
quality of their business model. The managers adopted less aggressive accounting 
methods and used surplus funds to reduce the debt-to-equity ratio, but found that 
even after these actions were disclosed there was no significant change in the share 
price. Only when this policy was later combined with presentations and meetings 
with their main investors and analysts, where management could personally explain 
the company 'story', did the share price rise. This case study concisely exemplifies 
how the form of communications can be as important as its content, in affecting how 
the market assigns value to a firm. 
Further, Lang and Lundholm (2000) test the share price reaction of firms choosing to 
release a high number of trading statements just prior to a new share issue (or, as 
they state, test "whether management had hyped the stock), compared to that of 
firms that maintain a constant level of disclosure. The study finds that firms 
maintaining a consistent level of disclosure appear to successfully prevent an 
increase in perceived risk surrounding the new issue because, despite some price 
volatility surrounding the issue date, there is no abnormal share price behaviour in 
the following 18-months. However, firms that increased their disclosure activity 
suffer a much larger fall in share price at the issue announcement date. The authors 
suggest that this fall in price may be due to the market 'penalising' firms for 
increasing their disclosure frequency with the subsequently revealed intent of issuing 
equity in the future, i. e. that they were artificially "hyping" the stock. Furthermore, 
over the following 18-months these firms' shares continue to suffer negative returns, 
perhaps indicating that their attempts to "hype" were successful in artificially lowering 
their cost of equity capital at the time of the offering, but did not lead to any longer 
term benefits to the firm. These findings support the views of the IR managers, 
51 
described in chapter 2, that an effective IR policy should be consistent and have a 
long-term focus instead of aiming at short-term goals. 
Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) test the stock performance of the 97 US firms that 
received the highest percentage annual increase over three or more years in the 
overall ratings of by the US Association of Investment Management and Research 
(AIMR) survey of corporate disclosure between 1980 and 1990 (this survey is fully 
described in section 6.11). They find that the firms with these sustained 
improvements in AIMR ratings experience a cumulative average rise in their 
industry-adjusted stock returns by 5% over the period two years prior to the first 
rating increase and two years afterwards. These firms also have increased 
institutional share ownership, higher analyst following, and enhanced stock liquidity 
over the 10-year period. Healy, Hutton and Palepu suggest that, because the 
higher ratings are largely due to additional voluntary disclosures, they result from 
active management decisions. This proposition is partly confirmed by evidence that 
the 97 firms show a significant increase in number of new share issues over the 10- 
year period, indicating that the increased disclosure quality was a conscious 
management policy to maximise receipts from the future shares issues. 
Lang and Lundholm (1993), on the other hand, analyse the three separate AIMR 
disclosure category ratings that comprise the overall rating (Required Published 
Information, Other Published Information and Investor Relations). For 751 firms that 
are each rated at least once in each of these categories from 1985 to 1989, they test 
the correlation between the firms' three individual ratings and firms' market value, 
historic standard deviation of market-adjusted annual returns and the 
earn in gs/retu rns correlation, market-adjusted annual returns, analyst' -earnings 
forecast error and the number of new shares issues. Their results show that the 
'Investor Relations' category ratings are the most highly and positively correlated to 
all these variables, but particularly to the short-term financial performance variables, 
such as the market value of equity, the variability of market-adjusted annual equity 
returns and the earnings/returns correlation. The other disclosure category ratings 
are, on the other hand, most sensitive to the longer-term, structural characteristics 
such as annual equity returns, analyst' earnings forecast errors and the number of 
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new shares issues. Lang and Lundholm suggest that effective IR is more closely 
associated with short-term financial performance because, compared to a formal 
reporting policy, the IR policy is subject to a higher degree of managerial discretion 
and short-term flexibility, whereas the annual report and other mandatory published 
information are more rigid communication media and this is why they are more 
closely associated with longer-term and structural variables. 
Finally, in a recent working paper, Bushee and Miller (2005) test 184 small and mid- 
cap. companies that initiate IR programs between 1999 and 2004 by hiring 
professional IR agencies. They find that these companies significantly increase their 
level of disclosure and press coverage (sourced from Factiva), stock trading activity 
(measured by monthly share volume and by monthly percentage of days traded), 
institutional ownership (measured by the number of institutional owners and by 
percentage of institutional ownership), analyst following (measured by the number of 
analysts issuing earnings forecasts) and market valuations (measured by changes in 
book-to-market ratio) after hiring a new IR agency, both in absolute terms and 
relative to a control sample matched on exchange, industry, time listed and prior 
investor following. Overall, the authors suggest that IR activities play a significant 
role in helping small and mid-cap companies to overcome their low visibility because 
they do not generally trade on a major exchange, to attract a wider following by 
investors and information intermediaries and to improve their market valuation. 
3.1.3 Section summary 
In summary, these five empirical studies constitute the limited body of empirical 
evidence on the relationship between effective IR communications and equity 
returns. My thesis seeks to contribute to and develop on this body of literature. 
3.2 IR and Analyst Coverage 
This section reviews the existing literature on the relationship between effective IR 
and analyst coverage. 
3.2.1 Introduction 
In this section I explain the importance of analyst coverage, the information analysts 
produce and the literature on the relationship between IR and analyst coverage. 
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This section then describes some existing empirical studies that test for analyst bias, 
the value of analysts' reports for investors, and research showing that some factors 
appear to both/either determine or be affected by the level of analyst coverage. 
3.2.2 Why IR managers are concerned about analyst coverage 
Section 2.2 of this thesis summarises some the discussions I held with IR managers, 
who state that they monitor the number and identity of the analysts covering their 
firm as a means of measuring their own IR performance and that they use 
information obtained from meetings and discussions with analysts as an important 
source of market feedback to report to their senior managers. Therefore firms 
appear to be seeking to maximise their analyst coverage and the value of their 
communications with analysts. The following literature provides some empirical 
evidence for why firms probably do so. 
Firstly, a study by Botosan (1997) finds a significant negative relationship between 
enhanced corporate disclosures in annual reports and the cost of equity capital, but 
only for firms with low analyst following (below the average across the firms tested. 
Botosan proposes that this is because firms with high analyst coverage can rely 
more on analysts as an effective method of maintaining good communications with 
the market, rather than by relying on information conveyed in formal annual reports. 
This finding is extremely relevant to this thesis because it provides empirical 
evidence of the importance of the level of analyst coverage in any relationship 
between effective corporate communications and the cost of capital. 
Also, Huberman and Regev (2001) recount a case study of a headline report in the 
New York Times in 2000 that a pharmaceutical firm had found a cure for cancer. 
Although the newspaper later reports that the scure' was found to be ineffective, at 
the time the first article appeared it was met by an immediate and dramatic rise in 
the firm's stock price that spread to the entire industry index and that continued even 
beyond the second article that totally discounted the previous claim. However, the 
main point of the case study is that exactly the same story had appeared in the prior 
year in the journal Nature, a science journal with much lower readership than the 
New York Times, and was met by only a minimal stock price reaction for this one 
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firm. The issue is that, although the New York Times headline report was not 'new 
news', it was met by such a dramatic and 'contagious' price reaction purely due to its 
publication in a paper with much higher public readership and prominence, showing 
that the way a firm's 'story' is told can have a greater impact that can the actual 
story. 
In the same manner, firms can use their communications with security analysts to 
reach a wider and more influential audience because analysts act as a channel for 
the dispersion of information to the market. Ellis (1985) provides a theory to explain 
why it may be optimal for IR managers to focus on building and maintaining these 
communication channels with analysts. This is because a firm can arrange one 
meeting with many sell-side and buy-side analysts, who can then widely disseminate 
their research to the market, thus removing the need for the firm to individually 
communicate to many external parties. Ellis proposes that therefore an IR 
programme aimed at increasing analyst coverage and in ensuring that analysts have 
accurate and up-to-date information can be the most cost-benefit efficient and 
effective IR strategy. 
Other research shows that analysts also consider their meetings with firms to be 
important. For example, Holland (1998a) interviewed a large sample of UK 
executives and their largest shareholders and analysts and found that all parties 
equally considered their meetings to be one of their most important sources of 
information. Similarly, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) 
commissioned a report (Marston, 1999) to obtain the views of the sell-side analysts 
of 10 FTSE100 UK firms on the company meetings to which they were invited to 
attend. The analysts' views, which are summarised below, show how both they and 
a firm can benefit from these meetings: 
The benefits for analysts: 
Analysts find that these meetings provide important input for differentiating their 
research reports, and that their research notes are sometimes based on 
information obtained in only one company presentation. 
The meetings are an important chance to meet personally with the senior 
managers and to assess their personal qualities. 
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o The meetings act as a discussion forum and allow the analysts to learn from 
questions asked by other analysts and fund managers in attendance. 
* The meetings are a means for testing the 'mood' and the attitudes of the 
management towards their business. 
Analysts'views on the benefits to the firms: 
" Managers use the meetings to maintain contact with the market, obtain feedback 
and gauge the marketmood'. 
" General industry and regulatory issues are sometimes discussed during meetings 
and this can be a very useful knowledge forum for all parties. 
" The meetings are important for management to align the earnings expectations of 
the market with their own performance forecasts. 
A follow-up study by Marston (Marston, 2004) extends her previous study by 
exploring the IR practices' of 90 quoted firms throughout 18 different European 
countries. Marston finds that similar responses in these interviews, held in 2002, 
confirming her earlier results. The executives still consider that one-to-one meetings 
with buy and sell-side analysts to be their most important method of delivering the IR 
message, with telephone calls to analysts coming a close second. In fact, on 
average, respondents had held 112 one-to-one meetings each and they had 
personally met with representatives from 36 stock-broking firms and 110 investing 
institutions in the previous 12 months. This indicates the continued high value 
attributed by firms in communicating in a personal setting to potential investors and 
analysts. 
3.2.3 The value of security analysts' research 
Particularly over the past two decades there has been much research on the value of 
and stock market reactions to security analysts' reports. Early empirical research 
focused mainly on the market's reaction to revisions in analysts' earnings forecasts 
and stock recommendations. Most of this research shows positive (negative) 
abnormal returns for upward (downward) analyst earnings forecast revisions or new 
buy (sell) recommendations. For example Abdel-khalik and Ajinka (1982) find 
significant abnormal returns during the publication week of forecast revisions by 
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Merrill Lynch analysts and Lys and Sohn (1990) present evidence consistent with 
forecast revisions having information content that is reflected in stock prices. 
Overall, the research on analyst recommendations has generally found a positive 
association between abnormal returns and the direction of the recommendation 
change. For example, Womack (1996) uses First Call data to test price reactions to 
stock recommendation changes to (from) the most extreme buy (sell) categories. He 
finds that stocks added to 'strong buy' lists earned size-adjusted returns of 3% while 
stocks added to 'strong sell' lists earned size-adjusted returns of -4.7% in the 3-day 
event period surrounding their release. 
More recently Asquith, Mikhail and Au (2004) test the association between equity 
returns and changes in the many different elements of information contained in the 
analyst's reports issued by the Institutional Investor All-American analyst team 
members during 1997 to 1999. The information items they test include the earnings 
forecasts, stock recommendations and price targets but also the tone and strength of 
argument in the report narrative. Most of their findings are consistent with those in 
prior research. For example, they find that increases (decreases) in earnings 
forecasts are associated with positive (negative) abnormal returns over the 60-days 
post-release window and that recommendation reiterations, upgrades and 
downgrades are associated with insignificant, positive and negative abnormal returns 
respectively. They also find a significant association between increasing 
(decreasing) price targets and positive (negative) abnormal returns and, showing 
that price target revisions contain new information that is quickly impounded in 
market valuations. 
However, they also show that these findings are not affected by the 
contemporaneous release of firm information from other sources (earnings 
announcements from Zacks, dividend changes and stock splits from CRSP and 
other changes relating to the business taken from Dow Jones Newswire), showing 
that analysts' reports provide new information. Further, Asquith, Mikhail and Au 
(2004) find that slightly above 50% of price targets in analyst' reports are achieved 
by the firms and when they are missed this is not by more than 16% above or below 
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and, finally, that the market reactions to analysts reports do not depend on the 
valuation methodology used by the analysts even though their methodologies are 
disclosed openly in their reports. ýhe main contribution of this research is in 
showing how the strength of the analyst's argument in his/her report narrative can 
affect market' reaction to good and bad news portrayed in the numerical data in the 
same report. Investors appear to rely less on positive earnings forecast revisions 
and recommendation upgrades when the analyst's supporting argument in the text of 
the report contain mostly negative comments, showing that investors appear to pay 
close attention to the total content of analyst reports and especially in supporting 
information that carries 'bad' news. 
Overall, the literature described above shows that all of the information in analysts' 
reports is valued in the capital markets and that it can have a significant impact on 
stock prices. It therefore supports any concerns of the IR manager of a firm may 
have over maintaining close communications with analysts and in ensuring that the 
information analysts use to write their reports fairly represents their own. 
3.2.4 Analyst bias 
I now review the literature on analyst' bias to address potential concerns that any 
such bias by the analyst respondents to the IR Magazine IR award survey may 
weaken it as a measure of IR performance for my research. Firstly, because a sell- 
side analyst may follow a firm that is also a corporate finance client of the same 
investment bank that uses his research, there have been concerns of a heightened 
risk of conflicting interests. This is because the analyst may be biased in producing 
favourable forecasts and recommendations for the client-firm to maximise the 
proceeds from a transaction for which the bank is acting as advisor and earning 
transaction percentage fees. 
There has been a great deal of 'bad press' about the value and propriety of analyst 
reports and recommendations made recently and most notably during the 1990s 
dot. com technology stock price 'bubble' period. Research shows that during this 
period most analysts' recommendations in the US tended to be for well-followed, 
high growth shares and the ratio of buy to sell recommendations was 
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disproportionately high (Womack, 1996), suggesting that analysts may have been 
somehow 'pandering' to more liquid and profitable firms. Womack also found that 
analyst consensus share price forecasts were highly correlated with actual share 
prices and suggests that this may indicate that any biases incorporated in the 
information produced by analysts may have been absorbed by investors and have 
affected their decisions. However, since this research was conducted a range of 
new legislation in the US and the UK has been introduced aimed at eliminating the 
risk of this conflict of interest. The background and extent of the changes that have 
the most impact on IR are described in section 2.2. However, one of the impacts of 
these new regulations may be to see a rise in the number of 'independent' research 
analysts, although it is probably still too early to assess whether 'more research' 
equates to ' better research'. 
3.2.5 The determinants of high analyst coverage 
Another body of research is concerned with the variables that appear to influence 
analysts to cover a firm. Overall, this research, which I review below, shows that 
larger and less risky firms may find it 'easier' to attract analyst coverage than others, 
but that high quality corporate communications is also a significant factor that can 
determine a firm's level of analyst coverage. Firstly, a study by Bhushan (1989b) 
marked a significant advance in the understanding of factors that influence analyst 
following. Bhushan tests an econometric model in which the number of analysts 
following a firm is determined at the equilibrium of aggregate demand for, and supply 
of, analyst services, which in turn depends upon overall expenditure on analyst 
services. Empirical tests are performed to see how the following five factors 
influence the expenditure on analyst services: 
i. Ownership structure; because increased institutional holding and a higher 
percentage of shares held by institutions should increase demand for analysts' 
services, whereas increased inside share ownership should reduce dernand for 
analyst services. 
Firm size; because the benefits to the analyst from inform ation-search should be 
an increasing function of firm size, larger firms should have higher coverage. 
Stock return volatility; because higher price volatility means a higher probability of 
a deviation between the expected returns based on public information alone and 
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the expected returns based on both public and private information, higher 
volatility should increase the demand and supply of analyst services. 
iv. Task complexity; because a firm with more lines of business will require more 
effort and cost for the analyst to analyse and so reduce the demand for analyst 
coverage from their employers, who may otherwise need to pay the analyst more. 
v. The correlation between firm and market return; because a higher correlation will 
reduce the marginal cost of information acquisition and so increase the demand 
for analyst services. 
Bhushan's empirical tests confirm that the various factors operate in the directions 
he hypothesises as described above, showing that larger and less risky firms may 
find it 'easier' to attract analyst coverage than others. This conversely implies the IR 
managers of smaller, recently listed and higher risk firms may face particular 
problems in attracting analyst' attention. 
The following literature also shows that analysts may be systematically positively 
biased towards larger sized firms, referring to firms that fail to attract analyst 
coverage as 'neglected firms'. This is distinguished from other research that claims 
to identify an anomalous stock price premium on small firms stocks, known as the 
$small firm effect', whereby some firms with smaller market valuations systematically 
earn abnormal excess realised returns. For example, Banz (1981) found that 
portfolios comprising small firm stocks out-performed those of large firms and 
attributes this 'small firm effect' to capital market inefficiencies that result in lower 
stock liquidity for smaller firms, which systematically increase equity returns required 
by investors in compensation for holding illiquid stocks. However, more recent 
research suggests that any trading strategy that targets small firms may no longer be 
feasible because any small firm effect has been eliminated due to trading arbitrage. 
Meanwhile, some other more recent research now suggests that any historic small 
firm stock price premium could instead be largely caused by differences in the 
information disclosure policies of smaller firms and because smaller firms are 
6 neglected' by analysts. For example, Brown and Kim (1993) interviewed a large 
sample of security analysts on their attitude towards the communication policies of 
small firms. These analysts said that they do not expect to receive as much 
voluntary and discretionary information from the management of small firms 
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compared to the level they expect from larger firms and that any supplementary 
information from small firms is normally only concerning 'good news'. This shows 
that analysts may simply have lower information-expectations for smaller sized firms, 
but also suggests that analysts may interpret information from smaller firms 
differently from that they receive from larger firms. 
Further, Arbel and Strebel (1983) compare the equity returns of firms that are 
'neglected' because of low levels of security analyst coverage compared to a control 
sample of intensively researched firms over the period 1972-1979. They find that the 
neglected firms' shares outperformed the control sample shares throughout this 
period and because their methodology controls for firm size, they attribute this to a 
persistent 'neglected firm effect', whereby stock returns are positively and 
significantly related to analyst coverage over and above any 'size effect'. Arbel and 
Strebel suggest that the underlying factor associated with better share performance 
may be "information-availability". rather than size and that investors demand a 
premium for uncertainty caused by lack of information, requiring a higher return on 
stocks with less analyst research to compensate for a need to do their own 
fundamental analysis. 
In addition, there is some industry research concerning the relationship between firm 
size and analyst coverage. For example, each year Robson Rhodes (RSM) LLP 
produces an "Unloved UK Firms Index", which defines firms as 'unloved'when their 
3-year cash flow growth is greater than market average, but their share price to cash 
per share ratio is below market average. The key finding from the 2004 index, 
comprising 234 firms from the FTSE All Share Index, is that the 60 firms at the top of 
the unloved index (highest cash flow/lowest valuation) are also the firms in the 
bottom quartile when ranked on market value. The RSM 2004 report uses this 
finding to illustrate the "Challenges that smaller firms face, due to the ever- 
increasing size of the world's largest fund managers, and their investing focus. As of 
13 February 2004, there was an average of 17 sell-side analysts covering each 
FTSE 100 firm, compared to only 7 for each FTSE 250 firm. This fight for attention 
in the increasingly competitive capital markets makes it imperative that these firms 
distinguish themselves from their peers on a number of bases. " 
61 
Secondly, a publication by Golding (2003), who managed asset management 
research at Flemings investment bank in London from 1978 to 1989, draws on his 
industry experience to provide some reasons to explain why analysts and also 
financial institutions and retail investors may prefer covering, and investing in, larger 
and better-known firms. Golding proposes two main causes of any such biases 
towards larger firms; financial reasons and embedded investment preferences of 
financial institutions. 
Financial reasons for analysts and investors 
Firstly, larger firms tend to have a higher number of shares in issue that are traded 
more 4vely. More frequently traded shares also have a lower bid-ask spread, 
because competition 'squeezes' the trading margin. A lower spread implies a lower 
potential gain or loss on buying and selling and so investors attach a lower level of 
risk to these shares. These factors mean that higher liquidity in turn can help to 
maintain or increase liquidity and that low stock liquidity can represent a 'vicious trap' 
for smaller firms. Also, because larger firm shares tend to be traded in larger 
transaction sizes and because trading costs are fixed and so are a smaller 
percentage of the total value of a larger trade size, net returns are higher on larger 
transactions and this may also create a 'vicious circle' of preference towards larger 
firms. Finally, Golding suggests that analysts also have financial reasons for 
preferring to cover large firms, because there are lower economies of scale in 
researching smaller firms with a smaller market wiling to pay for the costs of 
research of these smaller firms. 
Financial institutionsin vestment preferences 
The presence of any institutional barriers for firms to access the capital markets was 
formally recognised in the UK by the Myners Report, March 2001, commissioned by 
the UK Government to investigate the practices of UK financial institutions and which 
refers to "factors encouraging institutional investors to follow industry-standard 
investment patterns, which focus overwhelmingly on quoted equities and gilts and 
avoid investing in small and medium-sized enterprises and other small firms" 
Golding (2003) explains that investing institutions may firstly favour larger firms 
because smaller firms account for a small percentage of the market index value, so a 
fund that benchmarks an index automatically allocates a smaller percentage of its 
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portfolio to a small-cap fund or single small firm investment. This means that 
passive index fund managers may move out of some stocks regardless of price as 
their mandate automatically excludes firms below the level of the index they track. 
Also, because a fund manager makes investment decisions in terms of the minimum 
percentage of the fund he is prepared to put into a single investment, an investment 
in a larger sized firm absorbs more 'fund units' and tends to squeeze-out investment 
in smaller firms by fund managers. Also, if a fund manager fills large fund units with 
investments in a single small firm, he may own a significant percentage of its total 
equity, which brings the burden of additional accounting and disclosures and any 
share transactions are then more likely to affect market price, meaning that the fund 
may only be able to sell large amounts of shares at a substantial discount. Finally, 
Golding highlights the more fundamental issue of the additional time that may be 
involved in evaluating and monitoring small firm investments by fund managers and 
their brokers, which may require additional labour-intensive and costly monitoring, 
Golding (2003). 
Issues over low analyst coverage of small firms also receive a deal of comment in 
the financial media, an example of which is as follows: "Since 1999 the proportion of 
stocks not covered by analysts has risen from 25% to 30% and for the first time 
fewer than half the total have any independent organisation providing forecasts. 
The bigger the firm, the more likely it is to attract interest, so the top dozen UK 
stocks are all covered by 30 or more analysts while the 400 smallest, including those 
on AIM, have no coverage at all. This has been called the 'discount for neglect'and 
has been estimated to cut some E8 billion from their (smaller firms) total stock 
market value. Yet these are shares that, despite all the hazards, have outperformed 
large-cap stocks in the past few years. Just think what they might have done if they 
received a proper slice of analysts' attention. " (The Evening Standard, "Unfair 
Shares", A Hilton, 22 June 2004). 
A separate factor that may determine the level of analyst coverage is how well a firm 
already provides the market with information. This is because analyst research can 
be viewed as partially substituting for any information gaps between management 
and the market that management's communication policy fails to fill. For example 
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Bhushan (1989a) finds that firms that release a higher number of accurate earnings 
forecasts have lower levels of analyst following. This finding implies that analyst 
information is a substitute for when firms issue less reliable information and that 
analyst coverage may therefore be higher when firms fail to issue earnings warnings 
or have a poor reputation for forecasting their performance, for example. 
Nevertheless, the apparent continued presence of a ready market for analyst 
research suggests that they still provide additional information and analyses that act 
as value-adding complements to firms' own information releases. 
Finally, Lang and Lundholm (1996) also conducted some seminal research on the 
factors determining analyst behaviours. They test the relationship between the 
AIMR disclosure ratings between 1985 and 1989 and the accuracy, dispersion and 
volatility of analyst' earnings forecasts. Their methodology controls for five variables 
that prior research suggests may affect analyst following and their earnings 
forecasts; these are firm size, the standard deviation of equity returns, the historical 
returns-earnings correlation, earnings surprise (difference between current EPS and 
prior year EPS divided by prior share price) and the number of analyst' forecast 
revisions each year. Lang and Lundholm find that the level of analyst following is 
significantly higher for firms with a higher'Overall Rating' and with a higher rating for 
the 'Investor Relations'and 'Other Published Information' AIMR categories, but is not 
higher for firms with a high rating for 'Annual Report'. On this basis, analyst- 
following appears to be higher when a firm provides high quality, frequent and more 
informal communications, but that the annual report as a form of communication 
does not contribute significantly to the effectiveness of an overall disclosure strategy. 
They further find that the dispersion of analyst' earnings forecasts is lower for larger 
sized firms and for firms given a higher 'Overall Rating', a higher rating for the 
'Investor Relations' and 'Annual Report', but not for their rating for 'Other Published 
Information'. On the other hand, forecast dispersion is higher when past earnings 
variability and 'earnings surprise' variables are higher. Lastly, they find that earnings 
forecasts are more accurate for large firms and for firms given a high overall rating 
and higher'Investor Relationsand 'Other Published Information' ratings. 
64 
Overall, this research shows that analysts find it harder to forecast earnings for more 
risky and smaller-sized firms and it provides strong evidence to suggest that high 
quality IR may be effective in increasing the convergence of opinion in the analyst 
community and, thereby, that effective IR may result in the market receiving a more 
accurate consensus opinion on a firm's future financial performance. 
3.2.6 Effects of high analyst coverage 
Research that I review in this section suggests that analyst coverage can benefit a 
firm, in terms of affecting its share price, raising the quantity of information about a 
firm in the market and by increasing a firm's share ownership. Firstly, and consistent 
with the findings in the other research described above, Chung and Ho (1996) find 
that a nalyst-fol [owing is significantly higher for larger sized firms, but suggest that 
this is prirnarily an effect of increased pressures on managers to improve the 
financial performance of their businesses from the external scrutiny of analysts and 
that investors may benefit from the way this motivates managers to act in their 
interests. 
Walmsley, Yadav and Rees (1992) find a significant impact on the stock prices of 
firms shortly after analyst-firm meetings, suggesting that the research reports 
produced by analysts following these meetings are an important source of new 
information for investors and upon which they act. Similarly, Francis, Hanna and 
Philbrick (1997) compare the equity returns of a sample of firms immediately after 
meetin g with analysts and brokers where they present their financial results with the 
returns of a matched control sample of firms. They find that the shares of the 
$presenting' firms earned significantly higher returns immediately afterwards and that 
the number of earnings forecasts produced by analysts for these firms also 
increased. And finally, Hussain (2000) find a significant association between the 
level of analyst following and institutional ownership of a firm, implying that firms with 
a higher analyst following may benefit from increased sources of equity finance and 
a more liquid share market. 
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3.2.7 Interaction between the determinants and effects of analyst coverage 
Therefore, the literature both shows that factors such as firm size, firm risk and a 
firm's communication policy can determine the level of analyst coverage, but also 
that these factors can in turn be determined by the level of analyst coverage. This 
suggests that all of these factors influence each other simultaneously and are jointly 
determined, in an endogenous circular relationship. This proposition is also 
supported by some views reported in the financial press, an example of which is 
shown as follows: "The relationship between research, valuation and liquidity 
operates directly and indirectly. A lack of research leads to lower valuations and 
reduced liquidity. At the same time, less research is called for if a stock falls in 
market capitalisation or volume of shares traded. " (Financial Times, 'Filling the Gap, 
D Blackwell, 26 th April 2004). 
Based on this premise, O'Brien and Bhushan (1990) specifically test for a symbiotic 
relationship between the level of analyst following and levels of institutional 
ownership by performing tests that separately control for each factor, using a 
simultaneous equation econometric model. They find that there appears to be an 
endogenous jointly determined relationship, whereby high levels of analyst following 
both lead and lag high levels of ownership, and vice versa. This implies that analyst 
coverage may both encourage share ownership but may also be the analysts' 
motivation for following a firm. Meanwhile, Walker and Tsalta (2001) investigate 
the relationship between the quality of firm's financial disclosures and analyst 
following and the number of earnings forecasts for UK firms and, whilst finding strong 
evidence of a positive correlation between the quality of disclosure and the number 
of forecasts, their tests of the direction of any causal link show that high levels of 
analyst coverage only appear to induce firms to increase the information content of 
their annual reports. 
3.2.8 Section summary 
Therefore, whilst prior empirical research finds that there are factors that appear to 
determine, and factors that appear to be affected by, analyst coverage, it shows no 
consensus on the question of whether analyst coverage encourages, or is a result of, 
higher quality corporate communications. My thesis seeks to contribute to this 
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existing literature relating to this question by empirically testing the levels of analyst 
coverage of firms surrounding the period when they have significantly high quality IR 
and by cross-referencing any findings to the results of my tests of the prior and 
subsequent equity returns and stock liquidity of firms with effective IR. The results of 
my tests on analyst coverage are shown in section 7.2. 
3.3 IR and Equity Trading Volumes/Liquidity 
3.3.1 Introduction 
This section describes some established methods for measuring liquidity, how firms 
monitor their equity trading levels to gauge the liquidity of their stock and keep aware 
of the identity of their shareholders, and also reviews the literature relating to any 
putative relationship between liquidity, equity returns and effective IR, which is a 
relationship that has been concisely proposed as follows, "A corporation can affect 
liquidity - and consequently its cost of capital - by the amount and quality of the 
information it releases to investors" (Amihud, 1989). 
3.3.2 Monitoring liquidity and stock ownership 
IR managers normally monitor their share-ownership profile and ownership turnover 
using a 'shareholder register' and, according to the Buchannan 
Comm un ications/London Stock Exchange, 'Investor Relations; a practical guide 
2004, managing and targeting the shareholder register is one of the key roles of IR. 
Management of the shareholder register is an important part of IR because each 
type of shareholder has particular trading patterns and preference that can differently 
affect share liquidity and about which the IR manager should be aware, and also 
because each shareholder type will probably also request a different form and 
frequency of information from a firm. 
For example, in some cases retail investors may be more 'loyal' to particular firms 
than institutional investors because they are more familiar with particular brand 
names for example, and therefore hold stock for longer periods, although it may take 
many individual private investors to match the buying power of an institution. 
Conversely, institutional shareholders can inject liquidity into the stock market 
because of the generally larger size of their transactions (Buchannan 
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Comm un ications/London Stock Exchange, 'Investor Relations; a practical guide 
2004). Therefore, although firms have no direct control over who owns their shares, 
an IR programme that successfully targets a particular shareholder type could 
significantly affect both the overall size of the shareholder base, the mix of 
shareholder type and in turn affect its stock price and stock liquidity. 
3.3.3 Measuring liquidity 
A review of the literature shows that liquidity is an elusive concept and various 
measures of liquidity have been employed in the existing research. To demonstrate 
this, i review some of the most relevant research below, which explains the two main 
methods used in the existing literature for measuring liquidity and the reasons for the 
choice of the method I use in this thesis. 
In my thesis I measure stock liquidity using equity trading volumes and test the 
relationship between a firm's IR rating and levels of, and changes in, its trading 
volume over time. However, because liquidity can also be defined as "the ease with 
which the market can absorb volume buying or selling, without dramatic fluctuation in 
price" (Amihud, Mendelson and Lauterbach, 1997), tests are also performed of how 
the firm's equity trading volumes change in relation to unit changes in share price in 
the periods surrounding their nominations in the IR awards. An alternative, and 
frequently employed, method to measure liquidity is by the size of the bid-ask 
spread. However, in addition to equity trading volumes being a natural and intuitive 
measure of stock liquidity, research provides both reasons and empirical evidence to 
support its use as a measure for liquidity. 
For example, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) empirically test a theoretical model in 
which equity trading volumes are an increasing function of liquidity and a decreasing 
function of the stock's bid-ask spread, primarily due to "increased trading friction and 
transaction outlays incurred for less liquid stocks". From empirical tests of this 
model, they find that stocks that are listed on exchanges where it is more difficult to 
buy and sell, have higher transaction costs and a higher bid-ask spread, but also 
attract a higher percentage of long-term investors. Amihud and Mendelson explain 
that long-term investors both trade less frequently and in smaller volumes, because 
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they can amortize transaction costs over a longer holding period and so are more 
willing to hold these illiquid stocks, and that this explains why there is a direct 
negative relationship between a stock's bid-ask spread and trading volumes. 
Atkins and Dyl (1997) further examine the average holding periods and bid-ask 
spreads for NASDAQ stocks from 1983 to 1991 and for NYSE stocks from 1975 to 
1989 and find that length of holding period is strongly correlated with size of bid-ask 
spread. Based on this, Atkins and Dyl also conclude that using equity trading 
volumes to measure stock liquidity is akin to using the bid-ask spread and that it may 
in fact be a preferable method because it is likely to be a measure exhibiting greater 
cross-sectional variation. 
3.3.4 Liquidity costs and stock returns 
The reason that firms are concerned over low or reduced stock liquidity is the direct 
relationship between liquidity and share price. This is because investors require a 
higher return or 'liquidity premium' for holding less liquid stock, and this premium 
represents a higher unit cost of equity for the firm. This means that a firm with low 
liquidity stock must earn a higher return on its assets in order to increase 
shareholder value, compared to a similar firm with more liquid shares. The existing 
empirical literature shows that increased stock liquidity is a major determinant of the 
cost of equity capital and thus directly affects stock prices, with both Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986) and Brennan and Subrahmanyan (1996) finding return 
differences, ceteris paribus, of nearly 7% per annurn between liquid and illiquid 
stocks. 
Amihud, Mendelson and Lauterbach (1997) show how direct the relationship is 
between stock liquidity and share price by testing changes in the prices of the stocks 
listed on the Tel Aviv stock exchange both preceding and following a month in 1996, 
when the exchange was up-graded to continuous trading, increasing both the ease 
of trading and available trading hours. Because no quote information was available 
on the exchange, liquidity is measured using the volumes of equity traded rather 
than by the size of the bid-ask spread. Amihud et al. (1997) find that, over a 30-day 
period following this structural change, the liquidity of the shares transferred to the 
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new trading platform increased significantly and cumulative average market-adjusted 
returns rose by approximately 5.5% in this 30-days, due to the increase in liquidity. 
They attribute this direct relationship between increased liquidity and stock returns to 
the reduced transaction costs for trading on the new trading platform. I explain 
further the importance of transaction costs and how effective IR can impact these 
costs, and therefore can impact liquidity and stock returns, below. 
Stock trading transaction costs come mainly in the form of charges made by market 
intermediaries, but also include any other direct costs incurred by investors when 
trading (financial advice from an independent broker or bank, for example). Market 
makers normally charge a fixed fee per trade, although they sometimes also levy a 
percentage based on trade value. Although trading costs usually represent a small 
percentage of the price of a security, because they are incurred each time a 
transaction is made, the cumulative cost of trading a certain volume of asset rises 
significantly if it is made in small sized 'bundles'. But most importantly, higher 
transaction costs are charged for less liquid shares. 
Campbell and Kyle (1993) explain that this is because some trading business is 
generated from informed traders (acting on information that motivates them to trade) 
and some by liquidity/noise traders (who target stocks based purely on current 
liquidity levels in anticipation that the stock will be traded in higher volumes in the 
future and this will drive-up the price) and market makers cannot distinguish between 
orders that are generated by informed traders from that generated by liquidity 
traders. Therefore, they charge higher transaction fees for shares with lower traded 
volumes, because this business is more likely to driven by liquidity traders who the 
market maker suspects may have privileged information that the future liquidity of 
these stocks will rise. Business generated for more liquid shares is more likely to be 
generated by informed traders, acting on publicly available information, and so the 
market maker can charge lower fees for these more liquid shares to generate an 
equivalent fee income. 
An alternative supply-side explanation is provided by Frankel, Kothari and Weber 
(2002), who propose that for a fixed total supply of shares a general increase in 
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liquidity will increase the volatility of share prices. Increased price volatility creates 
more profit opportunities for market makers, who are then more willing to charge 
lower transaction fees. Therefore, increased liquidity and lower transaction costs 
directly increase net stock returns and the price that investors are willing to pay 
because they price securities according to the return they expect to receive net of 
costs. Based on this, in the following section I explain how effective IR can affect 
the size of transaction costs charged by market makers, by both increasing liquidity 
directly and by reducing the level of perceived risks that investors associate with a 
firm's stock. 
3.3.5 IR and liquidity 
One method to manage the trading activity of a stock is by directly increasing or 
decreasing the number of shares in issue by a new share issue or share repurchase. 
However, interventions in the capital markets can be a very costly process and may 
also not actually impact on stock liquidity greatly if new shares are not taken-up or if 
the issue fails or simply dilutes share price, all of which could conversely lead to 
lower trading activity and reduced liquidity. Also, capital market transactions may 
have undesirable 'side-effects' in terms of a heightened risk associated with the 
business, or that the business has a shortage of cash or because the ownership of 
existing investors is diluted. However, a more indirect method of affecting liquidity is 
by improving the corporate communication policy to 'market' the shares in issue 
more effectively, to stimulate trade, akin to the marketing of the firm's products. This 
may involve both an IR strategy of enhancing the information released to the market 
and by targeting a particular type or nationality of investor. If this effectively reduces 
the level of risk that investors and market makers attach to the firm's stock, then this 
could both reduce investors' required returns and the size of transaction costs that 
market makers charge for dealing in the firm's shares. This is how effective IR can 
both directly and indirectly, via an impact on reduced trading costs, improve liquidity 
and stock returns. 
3.3.6 Section summary 
In summary, although the existing empirical literature shows the potential for a direct 
relationship between the level and quality of information about a stock and stock 
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liquidity, there is currently no literature that directly tests the relationship between 
enhanced IR and liquidity. It is this proposition that I test empirically in this thesis 
and the results of my tests are described in section 7.3. 
3.4 IR the Cost of Equity Capital 
3.4.1 Introduction 
This section is organised as follows. Section 3.4.2 explains the meaning of the cost 
of equity capital and in section 3.4.3 1 review literature showing that there are several 
possible methods that can be used to estimate the cost of capital. This review 
shows that the most appropriate method for estimating the cost of equity capital is 
still an issue of wide academic and practical debate and, in this vein, Kothari (2001) 
states " ... attempts to estimate the market risk premium and 
the cost of equity 
address an important question". 
As explained in section 3.4.5 below, I use the Finite Horizon Gordon Dividend 
Growth Model to estimate the cost of equity capital and my methodology for doing so 
is described in section 6.5. However, because the choice of method to calculate the 
cost of capital is critical to this thesis, I use the literature review to explain the 
reasons for using this method based on the various models used, and recommended 
by, existing research that tests the relationship between effective IR or enhanced 
corporate communications generally defined and the cost of equity capital. 
3.4.2 The cost of equity capital 
The cost of capital for financing any investment, whether for an entire firm or for a 
single stock, is a function of the minimum required rate of return that the capital 
providers expect to receive had they invested their capital elsewhere. More formally, 
the lowest boundary of the cost of equity represents the minimum return 'hurdle rate' 
that a business must generate to meet the current investment expectations of equity 
shareholders or that will attract new investors. 
Existing and potential investors will only hold a stock if it promises a high enough 
future return that accords with the level of risk they associate with receiving this 
return. The role of IR is to provide investors with information that may reduce their 
perceived risk level and, in this way, effective IR can reduce required returns and the 
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cost of equity. This is why it is important that firms with external equity financing 
understand, are able to monitor, and may attempt to influence the level of their cost 
of equity capital via an effective IR policy. 
3.4.3 Valuation models to estimate the ex-post cost of capital 
Traditional methods for estimating the cost of equity capital, or the equity risk 
premium, use mathematical models to extrapolate from past, or ex-post, 
associations between the return on a stock and return on the market index, adjusting 
for any firm-specific risk. 
The most well-known of these models is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), 
(Sharpe, 1964 and Lintner, 1965), which predicts that a stock's required return is a 
function of a risk-free rate plus an equity risk-premium that is a function of firm- 
specific risk, measured by equity beta ((I). The so-called empirical form of the CAPM 
specification is: 
Rt - Rft a+ g(R,,, t- Rft) + Et 
where: 
a =the intercept 
Rt = the return on the stock at time t, 
R .. t= the return on the relevant stock market portfolio at time t, 
Rft = the risk free rate of interest at time t. 
a= equity beta factor (If 9 is 1, stock returns are expected to move exactly in line 
with movements in the market portfolio of assets) 
Et = the error term. 
There are other ex-post cost of equity valuation models that build on the principles of 
the CAPM, but that introduce other risk factors to attempt to reflect factors that 
explain the variation in observed equity returns. For example, Fama and French 
(1992,1993) developed a three-factor model that specifies three key risk factors that 
influence required security returns, equity beta, market value and the book-to-market 
ratio. Subsequently, Carhart developed a four-factor model by adding a 'momentum' 
risk factor (Carhart, 1997). 
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The main differences between these various models are only over which factors they 
use to reflect firm-specific risk, but there has been wide academic dispute over the 
'correct' weighting of these factors, what the 'correct' market risk premium is, and 
also over the optimal period to sample past returns. And although these models are 
still currently widely in use, they have been extensively tested and are now 
considerqd "unavoidably imprecise" (Fama and French, 1997). 
Perhaps the main weaknesses of these ex-post asset-pricing models are in the 
underlying set of assumptions about the capital markets upon which they rely, which 
are essentially the same assumptions that underlie the Efficient Markets Hypothesis 
(EMH) (Fama and MacBeth, 1973). Therefore, any test of the accuracy of an ex- 
post model in explaining equity pricing involves a joint-test of the model used and of 
the degree to which the capital markets act according to EMH assumptions. Indeed, 
Roll (1977) criticises the CAPM on the basis that it is not a testable model, as any 
test of it is a joint-test of the model and the assumptions of market efficiency that 
underlie it. 
Perhaps most importantly though, all ex-post methods are built upon the premise 
that it is possible to estimate future discount rates and future required equity returns 
by inference from past performance. However, this approach fundamentally fails to 
appreciate that, in fully efficient capital markets, future stock returns should not be 
systematically related to historical returns, and so the derivation of estimates of the 
ex-ante cost of equity capital for discounting future cash flows which are based on 
past returns could be seen as intuitively 'incorrect'. 
3.4.4 Valuation models to estimate the expected (ex-ante) cost of capital 
The 'ex-ante' or 'expected' cost of capital is a current estimate of the stock return 
that investors require in the light of all past and present information that they deem 
relevant in affecting its size. So, by increasing the quality and quantity of information 
for investors, effective IR should be able to have a major impact on the ex-ante cost 
of equity capital, whereas IR should have no impact on the cost of equity calculated 
using an ex-post model. 
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However, investors' 'expectations' are, by definition, not observable or directly 
measurable and can only be estimated from currently observed stock prices set in 
the market by the impact that investors' trading has on market prices and from 
approximations about future valuations. 
There are also several future-oriented valuation models for estimating the 'ex-ante' 
or expected cost of capital that my thesis might have employed. Underlying all of 
these valuation methods is a dividend-discounting model, whereby current share 
price is equated to the present value of future dividends and future cash share re- 
sale value all discounted at the risk-adjusted expected rate of return (Williams, 
1938). When the only known variable is the current price and future dividends and 
prices can only be estimated, this formula becomes a discounted cash-flow 
calculation with the implicit discount rate being the implied cost of equity estimate. 
All ex-ante models can therefore only estimate a cost of equity capital, which is 
implied or is implicit from discounting a stream of future expected or forecasted 
values over a future period of time and by equating this to the current share price. 
The only differences between these ex-ante models lie in the type of future variable 
discounted, the assumptions made about future growth rates of these variables, how 
these growth rates vary over time and in the period over which the discount is 
performed. For clarity, I have divided the models used in the existing relevant 
literature into three general types: 
Future dividend and stock price models 
These models are all variants of the classical Gordon Growth Model (Gordon, 1962), 
which equates the current stock price to future discounted dividends and assumes a 
constant discount rate and constant growth of dividends into perpetuity. The Finite 
Horizon Gordon Growth Model makes the same assumptions, but instead discounts 
future dividends over a shorter and finite future horizon and replaces the value of all 
future dividends at a finite future date with a terminal value. 
ii, Eamings capitalisation models 
These models are identical to the first type but replace dividends and stock prices 
with earnings per share (EPS). This is possible because under certain conditions 
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and by making various assumptions it can be shown that discounted future dividends 
and share prices can be substituted with forecasts of future EPS or with return on 
equity (Fama and Miller, 1972). This concept is compelling because it accords with 
the spirit of Miller and Modigliani's Dividend Irrelevancy Theory (Miller and 
Modigliani, 1961) which proposes that, under certain conditions, the market value of 
a firm is a function only of a firm's investment policy and the returns from these 
investments and that interim dividends are irrelevant. 
HL Residual income models 
The first residual income model that became widely used in the literature follows the 
research by Edwards and Bell (1961) which was later developed by OhIson (1995) 
and Feltham and OhIson (1995). The model replaces dividends and share prices in 
the dividend discount model with only currently known accounting data. In simple 
terms this is because, under the assumption of 'clean surplus accounting', the cash 
flows of a stock in the form of dividends and future share price can be shown to be 
theoretically identical to book value profits and assets values. I do not fully describe 
this proof here, because it is beyond the scope of my thesis and my methodology 
does not use this type of valuation model. However, for completeness, this form of 
the model equates current book value to the summation of the discounted present 
value of expected abnormal earnings (where abnormal earnings are defined as 
forecasted earnings minus a capital charge equal to the forecasted book value times 
the discount rate). Solving this formula using mathematical iterations results in a 
'best fit' discount rate that is the estimated cost of equity capital. 
Although residual income models appear to be more sophisticated compared to the 
more simple discounting models, they rely on several simplifying assumptions, the 
main one that there is clean-surplus accounting. Also, these models are also only 
essentially replacing dividends and prices in the Finite Gordon Growth Model with 
accounting book values, meaning that they have the advantage of ease-of-access to 
the data required. These models have become popular in the literature that relies on 
an estimate of the cost of capital and the model is also used by Botosan in her 
seminal paper (Botosan, 1997) that I previously describe in section 1.1 and that I 
review again in brief in section 3.4.5, below. 
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3.4.5 Literature relating to the cost of equity capital 
The following literature provides the basis for my choice of method for calculating the 
ex-ante cost of equity for the firms with effective IR that I test in my thesis. I have 
divided this literature into the following two areas. 
i. Literature that compares cost of capital models 
Firstly, because there is no consensus authority on, or agreed opinion on, any one 
'best' method for calculating the cost of equity capital, I review the key literature that 
tests different models to conclude which model is 'best' for my purposes. This is 
done in these papers by comparing how well each model explains the observed 
distribution of past equity returns or risk factors that are associated with equity 
returns. 
ii. Literature using specific cost of equity models 
Secondly, I review the literature that uses specific valuation models to derive cost of 
capital estimates for a sample of firms, and then tests for any relationships between 
the resulting cost of equity estimates and other characteristics of firms, such as the 
quality of their corporate communications and levels of analyst following. 
L Literature that compares cost of capital models 
Here I review the three most relevant and recent studies that address the issue of 
which is the 'superior' model to use for estimating the expected cost of equity capital. 
The first study, by Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1999), provides an empirical 
assessment of the residual income valuation model proposed in OhIson (1995). The 
empirical results of this study generally support OhIson's model, but show that it 
provides only minor improvements over implementations of the dividend-discounting 
model, which capitalise short-term earnings' or share price and dividend forecasts. 
Meanwhile, a recent discussion paper Kothari (2001) reviews the literature on the 
cost of equity capital and concludes that this existing research generally provides 
evident to suggest that dividend discounting models do a much "poorer job of 
explaining cross-sectional variation in market values" than the simple earnings 
capitalisation models and the more "rigorous" residual income valuation models. 
However, the most recent research by Botosan and Plumlee (2005), which is purely 
aimed at comparing alternative proxies for the expected equity risk premium, 
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concludes that "We find that the rD1VPREM estimate (The Finite Horizon Gordon 
Growth Model, referred to as the Target Pricing Method in this paper) and the 
rPEGPREM estimates are consistently and predictably related to market risk, 
leverage risk, information risk, residual risk and growth. Based on these 
results, we conclude that rDlVPREM and rPEGPREM dominate the alternatives, 
and recommend that individuals requiring firm-specific estimates of expected 
cost of equity capital rely on either of these two methods as opposed to the 
alternatives we examine". 
It is on these grounds that the "rDIVPREM " model is used in this thesis. 
The five models tested are: 
- rPEGPREAf - discounted forecasted EPS based on forecasted industry average 
return on equity (ROE) 
- rDIVPREAf - the finite horizon dividend growth model based on discounted 
forecasted dividends, share prices and growth rates; 
-A model that discounts forecasted EPS and growth rates; 
-A model that discounts equity returns based on economy wide averages over the 
future 12-months; 
Simple equity buy-and-hold returns over the future 12-months. 
These models are compared by testing how well the distribution of the estimates 
produced is related to the distribution of factors reflecting firm risk and therefore are 
systematically associated with security prices and the cost of equity capital. These 
risk factors are: un-geared equity beta, leverage/gearing ratio, earnings growth, 
momentum, book-to-market ratio, and market value of equity capital. Because 
Botosan and Plumlee also recommend the rPEGPREM model I describe the model 
below. This model was also considered for this thesis, but because the data for 
calculating the rDIVPREM model was already available for the full sample of firms 
being tested, only the rDIVPREM model was used. 
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rPEGPREM Method 
This model is also derived from the dividend discount formula but replaces expected 
future dividends with future earnings per share (EPS) by imposing a series of 
assumptions related to near term earnings and 'abnormal' earnings and the rate of 
growth of short-term abnormal earnings and a finite forecast horizon. This model is 
based on the OhIson and Juettner-Nauroth (2003) model that is calculated using 
only forecasts of EPS with a five-year horizon. Then, following Gode and Mohanram 
(GIVI) (2003), Botosan and Plumlee (2005) replace the five-year EPS growth for 
short-term (2 year) analyst' EPS forecasts and assume that EPS in future grows in 
line with economy-wide growth (based on the current risk-free interest rate). Finally, 
the rPEGPREM model of Botosan and Plumlee (2005) is based on the GIVI (2003) 
model but imposes two further assumptions; future dividends are zero and there is 
no growth in abnormal earnings beyond the forecast horizon, resulting in the 
following model: 
rPEGPREM 4epS2 - eps, 
PO 
where: 
PO = current share price, eps, = forecast EPS 1 year ahead and ePS2 = forecast 
EPS 2 years ahead. 
This mirrors the 'PEG ratio' model of Easton (2004) but uses short-term forecasted 
EPS and assumes zero growth beyond the forecasts horizon and therefore will be 
very sensitive to actual growth rates and will mainly differ from other estimation 
models depending on the growth rate assumed. 
In the following section I review the literature that chooses one of these ex-ante 
valuation models and tests how this is related to disclosure quality. 
ii. Literature using specific cost of equity models 
The exact mechanism behind a potential relationship between information disclosure 
and the cost of capital is unclear. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) argue that, 
theoretically, enhanced corporate information disclosure will reduce the cost of 
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capital by its effect on reducing information asymmetries between firms and external 
investors, resulting in reduced transaction costs and higher stock liquidity. However, 
Easley and O'Hara (2001) propose that enhanced information reduces the equity risk 
premium primarily by reducing the premium that investors require to compensate for 
risk they associate with being uninformed. 
Overall in the literature, although the direction of the relationship between disclosure 
and cost of capital is normally predicted to be negative, the empirical research that 
tests this theoretical relationship does not always bear this out, as I describe below. 
Firstly, in her seminal study, referred to above, in which Botosan (1997) finds weak 
evidence of a direct negative relationship between enhanced corporate disclosure 
quality and the cost of capital, the ex-ante cost of capital is estimated by employing a 
model based on the Edwards and Bell (1961) and OhIson (1995) residual income 
valuation models, described above. Her regression equations control for firm market 
value and market beta, because "prior research documents a significant association 
between market value and both the expected cost of equity capital and disclosure 
level" and market beta is included to control for systematic risk. 
Secondly, Hail (2002) explores the relationship between disclosure quality, 
measured by a disclosure index issued by the Swiss Banking Institute (SBI), and 
cost of equity capital of 73 Swiss firms in one year (2000) and finds a significant 
negative relationship between the score in this index and the cost of equity capital. 
Hail estimates the cost of capital employing an 'earnings capitalisation model', 
discussed above, using forecasted earnings per share (EPS) over a 12-year forward 
horizon and derives the rate implicit in discounting these forecasts to current share 
price 
The findings of these two papers are in line with the direction of the relationship 
between enhanced disclosure and the cost of equity predicted by theory. I have 
previously critiqued Botosan's 1997 paper in section 1.1 and so do not further review 
it in this section, however Hail's study is also based on a small, and therefore 
perhaps unrepresentative, sample that limits the generalisability of his findings and 
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there may also be weaknesses in the methodology employed by the SBI when 
constructing their disclosure index that Hail uses to measure disclosure quality. 
Other recent empirical research tests the relationship between the cost of capital and 
the ratings in the AIIVIR corporate disclosure survey, which I describe further in 
section 6.1 when I discuss in more detail my use of the IR Magazine IR awards as a 
proxy measure of effective IR. The main relevant study using this methodology is 
Botosan and Plumlee (2002), referred to previously, who seek to test the association 
between the ratings from the AIIVIR corporate disclosure surveys 1986-1996 and 
firms' cost of equity capital during the periods over which they are rated, where 
Botosan and Plumlee estimate the cost of capital employing only the Finite Horizon 
Gordon Dividend Growth model 2. 
In their model they use the consensus of analysts' forecasted dividends, share prices 
and growth rates published in Value Line over a four/five year future time period (the 
maximum time horizon over which the forecasts are published in Value Line) and 
stock prices from CRSP. The research hypotheses are tested using Fama and 
Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional regression methodology over the 10-year period to 
test the relationship between the estimated cost of equity and each of the individual 
AIMR disclosure category ratings: 'Overall Rating', 'Required Published Information', 
'Other Published Information' and 'Investor Relations', and controlling for firm market 
value and market beta following Botosan (1997). 
Botosan and Plumlee find that the relationship between cost of equity capital and 
'Overall Rating' is insignificant, stating that, "... this is at odds with our expectations 
and theory, which suggests that greater disclosure is associated with a lower cost of 
capitaf'. Also, and most critically, contrary to both the hypothesised results and to 
theory, the relationship between the 'Investor Relations' rating and the cost of capital 
is found to be insignificant. This implies that the quality of investor relations (at least 
2 The paper notes that Botosan (1997) derives the cost of equity capital estimates from the Edwards- 
Bell-OhIson (1995) model, but states that estimates produced using these two approaches should be 
identical barring any violations of the clean-surplus accounting relation. Although the results are not 
presented by Botosan and Plumlee (2002), the findings on the relationship with the quality of 
disclosure are not altered if the cost of equity capital estimates are derived using the Edwards-Bell- 
OhIson model instead. 
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as measured in this study) makes no difference to the size of the cost of equity 
capital. Botosan and Plumlee do not provide any possible explanations or reasons 
for this result, except to state that it shows how it is important to distinguish between 
specific forms of communication when testing the association between disclosure 
level and the cost of equity. 
Further, the relationship between the rating for 'Other Published Information' 
(essentially comprising non-mandatory firm information disclosed in between annual, 
interim and quarterly reporting dates) is found to be significantly positive. These 
findings are also unexpected and contrary to the results predicted by theory. This 
result implies that higher quality information in this form is associated with a higher, 
not a lower, cost of equity capital. Botosan and Plumlee propose that this is because 
frequent and ad-hoc provision of firm information throughout the year may actually 
cause increased uncertainty for investors and result in higher price volatility, which 
would lead to higher estimates produced for the cost of equity capital that are 
calculated using future share price forecasts. 
They do however find a significant and negative relationship between the rating for 
'Required Published Information' (essentially annual report and associated annual 
mandatory filings) and the cost of equity capital, a result that is in accordance with 
those predicted by theory and consistent with the findings of Botosan (1997) for firms 
with low analyst following. 
Therefore, although Botosan and Plumlee (2002) mark a significant milestone in the 
literature on the relationship between effective IR and the cost of equity, their study 
finds no significant relationship. However, Botosan and Plumlee only report the 
overall regression coefficients for the full, pooled samples of firms across the 1 0-year 
period and do not present the coefficients from testing the relationship over any 
discrete year within this 10-year period. This raises the possibility that their findings 
may have been different, or may have varied between years, had such tests been 
performed and presented. 
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Another potential problem is the 'omitted variable' problem i. e. that there are 
correlated omitted variables that are contaminating the research results. For 
example, Gietzmann and Trombetta (2003) argue that there are other potential 
"messages upon which investors may also rationally condition their investment 
decisions" and that it may be misleading to draw inferences without recognising how 
the messages drawn from different "message spaces" may interact. Gietzmann and 
Ireland (2004) test this proposition in a more recent paper that seeks to test how 
accounting choice affects the relationship between firms' disclosure quality and the 
cost of equity capital, where 'accounting choice' is categorised as 'aggressive' for 
firms that have net positive estimated discretionary accruals (DA) and 'conservative' 
otherwise 3 and estimates of the cost of equity capital are derived using an earnings 
model, following Hail (2002). Gietzmann and Ireland find, firstly, that firms making 
aggressive accounting choices have a higher cost of capital, ceteris paribus, than 
firms making conservative accounting choices. Disclosure quality is measured only 
by the number of "timely disclosures" being the number of formal announcements 
on the UK Regulatory News Service (RNS) for a sample of 301 UK Information 
Technology (IT) industry firms over a ten-year period from 1992 to 2002, (IT sector 
firms are tested because these firms are more likely to adopt aggressive accounting 
policies and therefore to produce a sufficiently large sample size. ) 
Secondly and importantly, Gietzmann and Ireland find results that are contrary to the 
findings of Botosan and Plumlee (2002), who find that more timely disclosures 
measured by the 'Other Published Information' category of the AIMR rating are 
positively associated with the cost of equity capital. That is, consistent with theory, 
Gietzmann and Ireland find a significant negative relationship between timely 
disclosure and the cost of capital but only for firms making aggressive accounting 
choices, whereas there is no relationship between disclosure and the cost of capital 
in more conservative firms. The implication of their findings is that some prior 
research on timely disclosures (such as that characterising IR communications) that 
fails to control for relevant correlated variables, or that fails to measure disclosure 
quality using a focused and 'uncontaminated' measure, may be spurious. 
3 The estimates of DA are formed by a modified methodology following Jones J. (1991)'Earnings 
Management During import Relief Investigations'. Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 29,193-228. 
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In summary, although the direction of the relationship between disclosure and cost of 
capital is normally predicted to be negative, the results of the empirical literature do 
not always bear this out. However, because prior literature is limited it probably 
does not yet provide a sufficient basis upon which to draw conclusions on the 
existence of a relationship between effective IR and the cost of capital. In addition, 
the research study described above each employ a different model to estimate the 
ex-ante cost of capital, they use different methods for measuring the quality of 
disclosure, test different forms of disclosure and also sometimes only focus on one 
industry sector, in one market and for one time period. My thesis seeks to overcome 
some of these weaknesses and to provide further empirical evidence on the 
relationship between effective IR and the cost of equity capital by using large 
samples of US and UK firms with effective IR measured across a wide cross-section 
of industry sectors, over recent time periods, and by employing a robust method to 
measure the cost of equity. 
3.4.6 Chapter summary 
This review of the relevant literature shows that there is still a degree of academic 
debate over which method of estimating the ex-ante cost of capital to should use. 
For the reasons explained above, this thesis employs the ex-ant Finite Horizon 
Gordon Divided Growth model, following Botosan and Plumlee (2005). However, it 
is important to recognise that any model to estimate the ex-ante cost of equity will 
rely on a specific set of assumptions and, because all models essentially rely on 
forecasts of future estimates, the certainty of which cannot be currently known, there 
may not be a 'right' method of estimating the cost of equity capital. In this spirit, 
Kothari (2001) states that "It is fruitless to criticise one or more of these models on 
the basis of the realism of the assumptions". 
The following chapter reviews the literature relating to the theories upon which this 
thesis draws and, together with my review of the existing empirical literature provided 
in this chapter, supports the development of my research hypotheses in chapter 5. 
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Chapter 4. Theory 
Introduction 
The previous chapter reviews the existing empirical research that seeks to explore 
for a relationship between enhanced corporate communications/effective IR and 
equity returns, analyst coverage and stock liquidity and the cost of equity capital. 
This chapter describes the framework of theory that further supports the 
development of the research hypotheses in chapter 5. 
Section 4.1 describes the closely related theories of information risk and agency and 
section 4.2 describes behavioural finance theory. Each of these two sections 
reviews the relevant literature relating to effective IR that draw on these theories. 
4.1 Information Risk Theory and Agency Theory 
Introduction 
These theories together provide a framework for predicting that effective IR will be 
associated with future excess equity returns, higher analyst coverage, increased 
stock liquidity and in a reduced cost of equity capital. 
The section is organised as follows. Firstly, the concept of information asymmetry is 
explained. Information asymmetry is an important concept because it underlies both 
the theories of information risk and agency. These theories are then described by 
reference to the existing literature that has used the theory specifically in relation to 
corporate communications. 
4.1.1 Relevance of information asymmetry to IR 
The IR function of a firm is a dedicated channel of information from senior 
management to external shareholders and other stakeholders, and so IR 
performance is likely to have an impact on the level of information asymmetry and 
therefore on one of the sources of risk for shareholders that may affect the share 
price they are willing to pay. Thus it is expected that by reducing this source of 
perceived risk enhanced IR effectiveness should be associated with future excess 
equity returns, higher analyst coverage, increased stock liquidity and in a reduced 
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cost of equity capital and that a steady state of good quality IR should mitigate undue 
share price volatility and be associated with high stock liquidity and analyst 
coverage. 
4.1.1.1 Information asymmetry 
Information asymmetry is caused by the separation of firm' ownership and control, 
which means that managers inside the firm inherently have superior information 
about how shareholders' funds are being invested in the business. Information 
asymmetry is therefore a source of risk for shareholders, the risk that management 
are not investing their funds in order to maximise future equity returns. If the risk 
caused by information asymmetry is perceived as high, investors may accordingly 
discount the share price to compensate for a perceived risk that managers are not 
disclosing poor business performance that will affect their future returns. 
In theory, firms could fully and voluntarily disclose all relevant information to 
investors to completely eliminate information asymmetry and maximise the firm's 
share price. However there are good reasons why firms may choose to limit the 
information they disclose to shareholders. Ross (1989) argues that the level of 
information that firms actually disclose is the result of a trade-off they make between 
the related costs and benefits to the firm from doing so. 
The most obvious source of cost is the time and effort made by a firm to provide 
information. However, these costs are unlikely to be large enough alone - 
to deter the 
disclosure of information. A more important source of cost is any potential damage 
to a firm's competitive advantages that the information may reveal. Verrecchia 
(11983) develops a model where firms only have the incentive to disclose news above 
a firm-specific threshold that is primarily determined by the costs of revealing 
proprietary information to competitors. 
However there are many potential benefits for the firm in disclosing information. 
Firstly, Dye (1985) argues that a policy of providing frequent and high quality 
voluntary information may reduce the risk that shareholders perceive that managers 
are purposefully not revealing some 'bad news' and remove any price discount that 
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they are imposing to take account of this risk. Secondly, revealing information may 
reduce the risk of costly shareholder litigation and fines from regulatory bodies, 
which tend to mostly occur following large falls in share price if investors allege that 
management have misled them by failing to promptly disclose bad news. 
Shareholder litigation can also result in intangible costs such as a loss of reputation 
for both managers and for the firm, although this is hard to measure empirically. 
To support this proposition, Skinner (1994) finds evidence that firms issue warnings 
of negative earnings news more often during reporting periods in which there has 
been a significant fall in the share price, when there is a higher probability of 
shareholder litigation. And, in a later study Skinner (1997) also finds evidence that 
firms subject to shareholder litigation that had pre-empted a bad news earnings 
surprise by issuing an earnings warning incurred lower eventual costs of litigation. 
4.1.2 Information risk theory 
Information risk theory is a branch of decision theory focusing specifically on how 
information asymmetry affects decision-making under risk. Integral to the theory is 
that rational investors make risky trading decisions in the light of all available 
decision-relevant information, in order to maximise a desired output. The 'efficiency' 
of the decision outcome depends on the availability of decision-relevant information. 
New information that reduces the information asymmetry between the firm and 
investor affects the investor's decision, and therefore the decision outcome and 
information-efficiency of the decision. 
The Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) embraces this concept on a macro level. 
Fama (1970) has defined capital market information-eff iciency as, "A market in which 
prices always "fully reflect" available information is called "'efficient"' The classic 
taxonomy of levels of market efficiency is defined by the different degree by which 
prices quickly reflect the available set of new information, defined by Fama (11970) as 
follows: 'weak form efficiency', where the relevant information set includes only the 
history of prices, 'semi-strong form efficiency', where the information set includes all 
information known to all market participants (publicly available information) and 
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Fstrong form efficiency, where the information set includes all information known to 
any market participant (private information). 
For example, if the capital markets are strongly information-efficient, share prices 
should accurately and immediately impound the implications of all new relevant 
information, both public information and inside information, at all times. 
4.1.2.1 Relevance of information risk theory to IR 
If the capital markets are already strongly information-efficient, then there should be 
no role for IR activities to further affect market prices. The decision to buy or sell 
equity is a risky decision made in the light of information deemed likely to affect 
future expected equity returns. Effective IR has a role in affecting market prices only 
if it enhances market information-efficiency by providing new information or higher 
quality information beyond the level already present and known by the market. 
There is some empirical evidence showing how the quantity and quality of 
information can affect a firm's market value. For example Barry and Brown (1985) 
find that "low-information" shares (using the period since they were first listed, the 
degree of consensus in analyst earnings forecasts and return momentum to gauge 
the level of inform ation-ava i la bi I ity), have higher non-diversifiable risk and that this 
increased 'information risk' is reflected in higher required equity returns for these 
firms. Also, Amihud and Mendelson (1989) found that Merton's (1987) Capital Asset 
pricing Model (CAPM) cannot fully explain realised abnormal equity returns, but 
when the model is extended by an "information factor", measured by the number of 
security analysts producing research on the stock, the explanatory power of the 
CAPM model to explain returns was increased. By improving this "information 
factor" and enhancing the information-availability on a stock, effective IR should 
reduce perceived risk caused by information asymmetry that is associated with the 
stock and thereby affect market pricing. 
The price impact of new information depends on the quality, as well as the quantity, 
of information. Akerlof (1976) used the second hand car market (coining the phrase 
"lemons" for a bad deal on a second hand car) to demonstrate how "quality 
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uncertainty" can result in asset mis-pricing. With inadequate information about the 
real intrinsic quality of a potential purchase, the price of 'good' cars and 'bad' cars 
(lemons) will converge, since it is impossible for a buyer to tell the difference and 
assess its fair market value. Applying this concept to the equity market, without 
information that distinguishes the particular quality of a stock, relatively uninformed 
investors cannot distinguish which shares are high value or low value resulting in the 
under-valuation of high quality shares and over-valuation of low quality shares and 
inefficient investment decisions. By providing 'quality information' effective IR could 
result in share values that more accurately reflect fundamental fair values. 
In summary, information risk provides a theory for expecting that effective IR will be 
associated with lower perceived risk and a reduced required return on equity capital. 
4.1.3 Agency theory 
Agency theory concerns risk caused by the divergence of interests of the external 
owners and the managers of a firm due to information asymmetry. Agency theory 
provides a further theoretical framework for predicting effective IR activities to be 
associated with future excess equity returns, increased stock liquidity and a reduced 
cost of capital. 
4.1.3.1 Relevance of agency theory IR 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that "The relationship between shareholders and 
the manager of a corporation fits the definition of a pure agency relationship. " 
Agency Theory recognises that a source of risk for shareholders is that managers 
may act in their own interests to achieve personal goals such as job security, 
increased remuneration, career advancement and peer recognition. In the pursuance 
of these interests, which cannot be monitored by the shareholder without additional 
costs, the shareholder's return may be compromised. When this risk is perceived to 
be too high in relation to the return on equity, a shareholder may invest in an 
alternative asset with a lower risk profile, reducing the market price and liquidity of 
the more risky share. This firm must then generate a higher return in order to attract 
this shareholder, resulting in a higher cost of equity capital. 
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Agency theory is relevant to IR because effective IR should reduce information 
asymmetry by providing shareholders with information to reduce the level of 
shareholder-uncertainty and thereby the level of information risk attached to the 
shares caused by this uncertainty. 
Alternatively, effective IR could reduce agency costs for shareholders, which may be 
high if a firm fails to provide shareholders with sufficient information. To obtain 
information, shareholders may incur additional costs by using other sources, such as 
analyst research, a professional advisor or other costly acquisition media. On this 
basis, because these costs reduce net stock returns, shareholders discount the 
value of the firm's shares by the expected future agency costs. 
4.1.4 Section summary 
in summary, effective IR theoretically reduces perceived risks and costs associated 
with the 'agency problem', reducing required equity returns and the cost of equity 
capital for the firm and increase stock liquidity. 
4.2 Behavioural Finance 
Introduction 
Behavioural finance provides the theoretical background for predicting that the firms 
with effective IR are those with prior abnormal excess equity returns and high levels 
of analyst coverage. 
4.2.1 Definition of behavioural finance 
Behavioural finance "applies concepts from psychology to understand and predict 
the systematic financial market implications of the underlying psychological traits that 
drive individual investors' and other financial decision makers' actual behaviour and 
judgement. " (Taffler, 2001) 
4.2.2 Relevance of behavioural finance theory to IR 
Research described in Chapter 3. show that the equity returns of firms rated in some 
subjective firm surveys such as the IR Magazine IR Awards, show evidence of prior 
abnormal excess return momentum. Because firms are rated in the IR Magazine IR 
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Award process on their IR performance, which is a practice that largely involves 
informal relationship-building and face-to-face communications, the ratings are likely 
to be affected by some behavioural preferences and biases on the part of the 
respondents in the survey. For these reasons, some of the predictions set out in the 
theory of behavioural finance are likely to be relevant to the determination of which 
firms will be deemed to have effective IR. This section describes set of theories that 
comprise behavioural finance and the relevant literature as it applies to my research. 
The implications of behavioural finance are not confined within the boundaries of the 
discipline of psychology. Its tenets are relevant to any discipline involving decision- 
making and so it also has implications for understanding the motivations behind 
decisions made by investors and analysts in the capital markets. This is because 
behavioural finance recognises that both sophisticated and na*fve investors are 
imperfect decision makers and, when faced with risk, individuals are generally loss- 
averse and can suffer from sentiments and personal preferences that are carried 
over to financial decision-making. This means that they may rely on simplifying 
heuristicsPrules of thumb' and personal biases when making decisions under 
uncertainty to reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting 
outcomes to more simplistic judgements (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). 
As stated by Shefrin (2000), "Investors have limited abilities and certain natural 
modes of behaviour that decide their actions when unambiguous prescription for 
action is lacking. " 
Behavioural finance theory has been used to explain certain systematic equity 
market phenomena that are left unexplained and therefore deemed 'irrational' by 
traditional finance models and theory. For example, past research has found 
evidence that the behaviour of equity prices and equity trading differs from that 
predicted by traditional valuation models and theories on the workings of the capital 
markets (Core, 2001). Behavioural finance has also been used to explain the 
psychological motivations of investors during and following the dramatic share price 
dot. corn bubble in the 1990s (Shiller, 2001). 
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4.2.3 Relevant behaviours identified in the literature 
Some of the behavioural traits and predictions identified in the theory are more 
relevant to the practice of IR, so this section is limited to describing the theory, the 
literature and the behavioural tendencies, biases and preferences that are most 
relevant to research using surveys of analysts, investors and firm executives that are 
similar in nature to the IR Magazine IR Awards. 
The theory identifies many different heuristic simplifications, or 'rules-of-thumb', that 
people revert to when making a decision and cannot cope with the volume and 
complexity of information presented to them. Only the heuristics that are relevant to 
this thesis are described below. 
4.2.3.1 Representativeness 
This is the tendency to make judgements based on stereotypes or to assign a higher 
probability that something is true simply because it is seen as being typical or similar 
to some other'known' fact. This comes from a tendency to make assumptions and 
predictions on the basis of information from a potentially too small or 
unrepresentative sample. 
For example, consider the following description: 
"Peter is a streetwise extrovert who talks quickly and wears smart clothes. Young, 
bright and dynamic he has a slight East London accent. He works for a large 
investment bank. " 
When people are asked for the probability that Peter is a derivatives trader the 
typical response rate is between 20% and 50%, even though the realistic probability 
would probably be well below 0.5% based on the actual approximate percentage of 
employees that are derivatives traders. The explanation for this is that the 
respondents are relating to the representativeness of the description rather than 
standing back and making an objective assessment. 
Investors and security analysts may also exhibit this behaviour. For example, if a 
certain stock has shown a steady rise in price they may intuitively be attracted 
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towards the share and assume that the price rise is probably directly attributable to 
good management of the business. In this way the price of the share may come to 
represent 'good senior management', whereas investors and analysts are ignoring 
the fact that the quality of management and stock price performance are not 
necessarily at all related. 
Likewise, when security analysts are making stock recommendations and earnings 
forecasts for shares they follow they may be influenced by personal subjective, moral 
or ethical judgements based on stereotyped past or more recent experiences from 
investing in similar shares or in similar firms. Some dramatic and more endemic 
examples of this behaviour are the apparent'fear' of investing in any dot. com shares 
after the 'bubble' in the share prices of mainly high technology and internet-related 
firms burst in the late 1990s and in the more recent popularity of investing in funds 
that target'socially responsible' or ethical firm stocks. 
The representativeness heuristic could also explain the behaviour of some investors 
who are referred to as 'noise traders'. Noise traders do not act on fundamental 
research and are the relatively uniformed, unsophisticated investors who tend to 
choose stocks of firms that they simply regard as 'good firms' and act as if these 
firms are naturally'good investments. Their opinion of what constitutes a 'good'firm 
may often be only loosely, if at all, related to the traditional attributes that make a 
share a 'good' investment, but favoured attributes of the firm come to represent 
attributes about the stock (Shefrin and Statman, 1995). 
Investors and analysts may see 'goodness' in characteristics such as a high P/E 
ratio, low book to market ratio, growth (glamour) shares, small firm size, or even 
based on the charisma of the senior managers (one could think of Richard Branson 
for example), depending in their personal point of view or past experiences. Any 
one, or a selection, of these attributes can then be 'mentally transferred' to 
generalise about other firm' attributes that are not logically related to the first. 
Related to representativeness is the 'halo effect', which "causes an individual to 
extend a favourable evaluation of one characteristic of a person or thing to arrive at a 
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favourable evaluation of its other characteristics, even where insufficient information 
about these other characteristics is available. " (Shefrin and Statman, 1995). 
The form of halo effect that is most relevant to this thesis is the 'financial 
performance halo'. This is specifically where a firm's previous or recent good 
financial performance is carried over to 'taint' assessments of other firm' 
characteristics or attributes. This tendency is likely to be more prevalent for 
individuals who are primarily concerned about the financial performance of a firm or 
of investments because it is directly relevant to their professions, such as with fund 
managers and analysts. 
4.2.3.2 Availability 
This is the second relevant behavioural heuristic and refers to the tendency to judge 
an item or event to be more common, and hence more likely to occur or exist, 
depending on how easily it can be brought to mind (Shefrin, 2000). If something is 
very familiar, easy to imagine or readily remembered it is seen as being more salient 
to a current decision. Related to this is the heuristic of 'narrow framing' that causes 
people to frame problems into narrow, more easily processed, parts. 
For example, investors who receive more frequent and useful information about a 
firm in which they hold shares, whether from the IR function of the firm or from other 
sources such as broker research, may be more likely to favour this firm because it is 
more 'available' and easily brought to mind. 
Equally if a firm provides its analysts with consistently frequent corporate information 
the analysts are more likely to develop some preferences towards the firm when 
assessing it as an investment, simply because this firm's most recent financial 
performance is made more vivid and is more readily recalled or envisaged, which 
may lead to its importance being over-weighted in the decision-making processes of 
the analysts. The higher the number of analysts that cover a firm with more effective 
IR, the higher the likelihood that this tendency may be operating and so the larger 
the possible affect on the 'tone' of the analysts' research on this firm in the market 
place. 
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4.2.4 Literature applying concepts from behavioural finance to firm surveys 
The papers described below are primarily aimed at testing whether the opinions of 
analysts and fund managers stated in subjective firm surveys appear to show the 
operation of representativeness, availability and 'halo effects'. 
4.2.4.1 Fortune Magazine 'America's Most Admired' 
This is a highly publicised survey that was first conducted in 1983 and which claims 
to provide a list of firms that are the 'most admired'. It is based on the results of an 
annual survey of US senior executives who are asked to rate firms on several 
qualitative characteristics relating both to the firm and the current management of the 
firm. Fombrun and Shanley (1990) perform factor analysis on the different Fortune 
survey attributes comprising the 'most admired' index. They find that ratings for 
many of the attributes are strongly positively related to the firms' prior profitability and 
strongly negatively related to the firms' prior market risk. The ratings are also highly 
correlated with recent high media visibility, high levels of institutional ownership, high 
dividend yield levels and with the level of past expenditure on social and 
environmental concerns. Fornbrun and Shanley conclude that the firms in the 
Fortune list of 'most admired' are simply those that appear to have built up a good 
overall "reputation" based their past performance in some highly visible areas, but 
that inclusion in the list does not necessarily imply that the firm has performed well in 
other areas that may be deemed 'admirable' and that has no particular implication for 
their future performance. 
Fryxell and Wang (1994), also testing the Fortune data, find that the panel of 
executives who rate the firms "appear to cognitively carry over evaluations of 
quantitative prior financial performance when asked to assess a firm" They 
conclude that the panel is implicitly rating the firms in terms of their opinions of it as a 
past investment vehicle rather than for the more subjective attributes they are asked 
to assess and that this is an example of the 'financial halo' effect identified in the 
behavioural finance literature. 
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Brown and Perry (1994) also detect evidence of a 'financial halo' effect In the 
Fortune Magazine ratings. They construct a 'halo index, based on five financial 
performance variables of firms in the 1992 survey over the three prior years. They 
find that the 1991 ratings for each firm characteristic that is assessed for the survey 
are all significantly associated with the firm's index score and, in their opinion, these 
objective measures appear to explain the ratings given to the subjective factors 
subsequently rated in the survey. 
Finally, McGuire, Schneeweis and Branch (1990) test whether historical financial 
performance measures drive the Fortune ratings or whether they are more closely 
associated with subsequent performance. For the firms in the 1983 survey they 
show that the composite ratings are highly correlated with several measures of prior 
reported financial performance, both in terms of return-on-assets employed and 
debt-to-equity ratios, and are also strongly correlated with past market performance 
measures including equity returns and risk, but are un-correlated with subsequent 
performance based on any of these measures. They conclude that U... this study 
also finds little evidence that the quality of management is an important variable in 
explaining or predicting future market-based financial performance. " 
4.2.4.2 Association of Investment Management and Research (AIMR) 
The AIMR corporate communications rating survey is fully described in section 6.1.1. 
Lang and Lundholm (1993) explore the relationship between firms' overall ratings in 
the AIMR survey from 1985 to 1989 and several firm characteristics and their 
findings are similar to those in the research described above. They find that the 
AIMR ratings are significantly positively associated with prior risk-adjusted stock 
returns, the degree of analyst' earnings forecast accuracy, firm size, low equity 
return variability and are higher for firms with a high correlation between annual 
returns and earnings and for firms that are more active in issuing securities. 
Overall, these findings show that firms receive higher ratings if they are larger, less 
risky firms and are firms with high performing shares and for whom analysts have a 
sufficient quality of information enabling them to forecast the firms' earnings 
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accurately. These findings are consistent with the operation of financial halo, 
representativeness and availability heuristics. 
4.2.4.3 'Excellent firms' 
Another body of research focuses on a best-selling and highly influential book which 
compiled a list of 62 US firms deemed to be at that time the most "excellent", as 
judged by a panel of senior US executives. The possession of "excellence" was 
judged in terms of three attributes; 'continuous innovation', 'size', and 'sustained 
financial performance over the past 20-years' (Peters and Waterman, 1982). 
Clayman (1987) tested the equity returns of these firms over the five years following 
the study to see whether these 'excellent' firms would have represented good 
investments at the time the book was published. However they found that their stock 
performance was not significantly different to the performance of the Standard & 
Poor 500 Index over the same period whereas the performance of a control portfolio 
of 62 'non-excellent' firms with the worst combinations of the three attributes had 
outperformed the S&P 500 by 12% per year. 
Similarly, Kolodny, Laurence and Ghosh (1989) find no statistically significant 
difference in the market performance of the firms over the subsequent five years, by 
comparison to either a market index or to an appropriate control sample of firms. 
They conclude that the list of 'excellent' firms can be of no future value to investors 
and that the degree of 'excellence' assigned to them could only have been based on 
ex-ante information or past, rather than future, performance. 
4.2.4.4 UK Management Today'Britain's Most Admired Firms' 
Management Today magazine also publishes a 'most admired' list annually, which is 
similar to the Fortune Magazine 'Most Admired'survey, but for is only for UK firms. It 
is also based on a composite rating of factors that are allegedly 'admired' according 
to peer firm senior executives and analysts within the same industrial sector. 
Blackhurst (2001) tests whether the Management Today 'most-admired' firms 
showed superior performance according to several financial performance measures 
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over the 12-months following the date the 2000 survey was published. However no 
evidence was found of significant excess performance by any of these measures 
and the study concludes that the only value of the survey is as a "trophy for the 
senior managers of the firms for a job well done, rather than providing any objective 
financial information about the firms". 
Agarwal, Brown and Taffler (2004) also test the firms from the UK Management 
Today survey and for the firms deemed to be 'most admired' from 1990 to 2000 they 
find no evidence of ex-post excess equity returns over the 12-months after being 
included in the published survey results. In fact, they find that the firms rated highly 
in the surveyed categories of 'good management' and 'good human resources 
management' earned inferior equity returns in the 12-month ex-post period. 
Conversely these firms had earned significant excess abnormal returns in the 12- 
months immediately preceding the survey date. 
Agarwal et al. suggest that the firms' prior superior share performance may have 
largely influenced the ratings given to the firms and that any information that such 
surveys do contain regarding these firms has probably already been impounded in 
share prices when the surveys are published. 
4.2.5 Summary of behavioural finance theory 
The overwhelming conclusions that can be drawn from the findings in the literature 
described above is that ratings given to firms in these various surveys may be more 
of a reflection of the firms' past financial performance and of a higher familiarity with 
these firms by analysts, executives and fund managers giving the ratings, rather than 
necessarily a direct and accurate measure of the qualities they claim to be 
assessing. This is consistent with the operation of the 'financial halo effect' and the 
behavioural heuristics of representativeness and availability described in the theory 
of behavioural finance. 
4.3. Chapter summary 
This chapter has described information risk and agency theories that together 
provide reasons for expecting that effective IR to be associated with higher analyst 
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coverage, increased stock liquidity and stock prices and to a reduced cost of equity 
capital 
Secondly, it shows how behavioural finance suggests that factors such as prior 
superior stock performance and high analyst coverage could influence the ratings of 
firms on the quality of their IR performance given by the respondents to an opinion 
survey on these firms due to the behavioural biases of representativeness, the 
financial halo effect and of availability. 
This concludes the chapter describing the theoretical framework of my thesis. The 
following chapter explains how these theories, and the findings in the empirical 
literature described in chapter 3 are used to develop the research hypotheses. 
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Chapter 5. Development of Research Hypotheses 
5.1 Introduction 
This section explains how I develop my hypotheses to test for any relationships 
between effective IR and equity returns, stock liquidity, analyst coverage and the 
cost of equity capital. 
Firstly, I develop some hypotheses aimed at contributing to the existing literature 
described in chapter 3, which provides reasons to expect that effective IR should be 
associated with excess stock returns and stock liquidity, high analyst coverage and a 
low cost of equity capital. These are also relationships that are predicted to result 
from enhanced corporate communications by information risk and agency theories, 
which I have described in section 4.1. Specifically, these hypotheses test for any 
subsequent relationships between the number of nominations received by the firms 
for the IR Magazine IR Awards and excess equity returns, increased stock liquidity 
and analyst coverage and a reduced cost of equity in the years following the time the 
nominations are made. These four hypotheses are set out in section 5.2 below. 
Secondly, other existing literature finds a relationship between the ratings given by 
third parties in subjective firm surveys, such as the IR Magazine IR Awards, and 
prior excess returns of the firms. As described in section 4.2, these findings are 
attributed to some behavioural preferences and biases depicted in behavioural 
finance theory, also described in section 4.2. Behavioural finance also predicts that 
survey ratings may be higher for firms that have higher 'availability'. Because the 
respondents to the IR Awards survey are probably more familiar with firms that have 
high analyst coverage, I use the level of analyst coverage as a proxy indicator of 
higher 'availability'. Therefore, in order to contribute to this literature, I develop two 
further hypotheses to test for any relationship with prior high levels of analyst 
coverage and excess equity returns because these factors may determine which 
firms are subsequently deemed to have the most effective IR in the IR Magazine IR 
Awards. These hypotheses are set out in section 5.3 below. 
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5.2 The effects of effective IR 
Based on the findings of the existing literature described in chapter 3, and for the 
reasons described therein, I expect effective IR to be associated with future 
increased analyst coverage, increased stock liquidity and stock prices and with a 
reduced cost of equity capital. 
Information risk and agency theories described in chapter 4 explain that effective IR 
can reduce perceived equity risk associated with information asymmetry and the 
'agency problem', and/or can result in reduced trading costs that create rigidities in 
equity markets. These theories therefore together provide a framework to explain 
the relationships with effective IR that I expect to observe. 
Based on this, the following null hypotheses are tested in this thesis: 
HOI: There is no significant relationship between effective IR and future excess 
equity retums. 
H02: There is no significant relationship between effective IR and future increased 
levels of analyst coverage. 
H03: There is no significant relationship between effective IR and future increased 
trading volumes of equity. 
H04: There is no significant relationship between effective IR and a future reduced 
cost of equity capitaL 
5.3 The determinants of effective IR 
Secondly, other literature described in chapter 4 finds that the superior prior stock 
performance of firms can influence the firms' ratings in subjective surveys similar to 
the IR Magazine IR Awards. Also, empirical research described in section 3.2 finds 
that effective IR is associated with increased analyst coverage and, although it is 
inconclusive over whether high analyst coverage precedes or follows from more 
effective IR, it suggests that high pre-existing high coverage may also be a factor 
that can influence firms' IR performance ratings. 
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As also described in chapter 4, behavioural finance explains that any influencing pre- 
existing factors, such as high analyst coverage and superior stock performance, on 
the ratings given by respondents in surveys of this type is consistent with the biases 
of representativeness, 'halo effects' and enhanced availability by the survey 
respondents. 
Based on this existing literature and theory, the following null hypothesis are also 
tested in this research: 
H05: There is no significant relationship between effective IR and prior excess 
equity returns. 
H06: There is no significant relationship between effective IR and prior high levels 
of analyst coverage. 
This concludes the chapter on the development of the research hypotheses. The 
following chapter describes the methodologies employed to test these hypotheses. 
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Chapter 6. Research Methodologies 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I established the hypotheses to be tested. This chapter 
describes how I construct my dataset of firms with effective IR (section 6.1) and the 
empirical methods I use to test the firms' equity returns (section 6.2), analyst 
coverage (section 6.3), liquidity (section 6.4) and cost of equity capital (section 6.5). 
6.1 Construction of samples of firms with effective IR 
Introduction 
This section explains how the samples of firms with effective IR are constructed. 
Section 6.1.1 discusses the corporate disclosure rating of the US Association of 
Management and Research (AIMR) because this is the main method used in the 
existing literature to measure the quality of corporate communications, section 6.1.2 
describes the method I employ in this thesis to measure effective IR and the reasons 
why this is a good measure. Section 6.1.3 explains the units of analysis for all my 
empirical tests. Descriptive statistics of the final samples of firms nominated in all 
the IR awards are shown in appendix 1 and details of the market values of these 
firms are shown in appendix 2. 
6.1.1 The AIMR corporate disclosure rating 
Between 1978 and 1997, the AIMR commissioned an annual survey of sell-side 
analysts and buy-side brokers and fund managers to obtain ratings on the quality of 
the corporate communications of a large sample of firms listed in the US. The 
survey asked respondents to rate the quality of each firm's communications over the 
past 12-months, in terms three categories; 'Required Published Information, 'Other 
Non-Required Published Information' and 'Investor Relations'. 
Each respondent was asked to give a rating for a pre-defined sample of firms in 
these three categories of disclosure. The AIMR then calculated an overall rating 
that is a weighted average of the three category ratings (70% to 80% for Required 
Published Information, 20% to 30% for Other non-Required Published Information 
and 10% to 30% for Investor Relations; the precise percentage weighting depended 
upon a final overall assessment on a yearly basis). 
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The purpose of this process was to encourage the adoption of more transparent 
corporate disclosure by publicly announcing the names and overall ratings of the 
firms each year. 
There are several reasons why the use of the ratings in surveys such as the AIMR 
survey is a valid method to derive a proxy measure for firms' disclosure quality. 
Firstly, and primarily, it is probably otherwise impossible to obtain an objective, 
quantitative measure of a subjective concept such as the quality of corporate 
communications for a large cross-section of firms over a period of years. Although 
some researchers have attempted to construct a disclosure index (e. g. Botosan, 
1997), this method is hard to replicate, inherently involves a large degree of author- 
subjectivity and naturally limits sample sizes, due to the time involved to individually 
assess each firm. 
Other approaches rely on firms to self-nominate (e. g. the UK IRS Investor Relations 
Web-site Best Practice Awards), but this intrinsically involves a degree of self- 
selection bias and automatically excludes some firms that do not self-nominate, 
although they may nevertheless be regarded in the market as having high quality 
communication policies. 
Secondly, the ratings for the AIMR survey were given by a large number of analysts 
and fund mangers (covering approximately 1,500 in total per year). Fund managers' 
and other institutional investors hold the largest percentage of shares in both the UK 
and US markets and they are therefore one of the main audiences of the corporate 
IR function and of all forms of corporate communications and information disclosed 
by a firm. Because of their training, education and experience they normally manage 
investment portfolios containing high volumes and values of shares across a wide 
range of firms and industries and so they can be considered as highly sophisticated, 
with long experience of a wide range of corporate communication activities against 
which to benchmark. Fund managers will probably also have met personally with 
senior firm executives and so have the rare opportunity to gauge the personal 
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communication skills of management and to assess the 'tone' of their IR corporate 
policy and their attitude towards the quality of their IR function. 
Likewise buy-side brokers, employed by fund managers to produce research and/or 
obtain reports and other information produced by sell-side analysts, and sell-side 
analysts, normally employed by investment banks, obtain a large part of the 
information they use from firms' IR departments (either by telephone enquiry, by 
direct contact or from the firm IR web-site or 'information pack') and may also be 
present at meetings held for fund managers with senior executives. 
It is in this role as key information intermediaries in the capital markets that analysts 
and brokers are also perhaps in a prime position to give first-hand opinions on the 
quality of a firm's communications. 
Another justification for using the AIMR ratings as a proxy measure for quality of 
corporate communications in earlier research is that, at that time, there was probably 
no alternative similar survey that produced a measure of the precise variable that 
researchers were interested in. The AIMR survey covered a large number of firms 
over many years, and so provided researchers with a consistent measure for a large 
cross-section of listed firms. Finally, because parties who are independent of both 
the firms and the researchers gave the ratings, this reduced the risk of any biases in 
the measure due to any pre-existing relationships and of any biases that may affect 
the measure due to researcher-subjectivity. 
6.1.2 The IR Magazine IR Awards 
In this thesis the number of times a firm is nominated for the US and UK IR 
Magazine IR Awards is used as a measure of the effectiveness of their IR policy. 
Importantly, using the IR Magazine IR Awards as a proxy construct measure 
constitutes an original contribution to the IR literature, as it has never been used 
before in published research. Uniquely, it covers both US and UK firms, whereas the 
AIMR communications rating was limited to US firms only, and is a pure measure of 
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only IR performance, whereas the AIMR rating was a composite measure of which 
IR only comprised a maximum 30% weighting. 
Further, for each annual survey the AIIVIR pre-defined a population of the largest 
listed US firms to be rated by panels of analysts, whereas the IR Magazine ask a 
wide sample of respondents to name any listed firms they consider to have the best 
IR performance and these firms constitute the population of firms. The IR Magazine 
data may therefore be viewed as superior data because it does not have this intrinsic 
pre-selection bias. Also, the AIIVIR ceased the survey in 1997, the data has been 
used extensively in past research and is now also out-of-date. 
Also, use of survey data by IR Magazine to measure the quality of corporate 
disclosure is further justified because it follows the use of survey data in some of the 
key empirical research papers that have tested the relationship between effective 
corporate communications and firm performance, for example Healy et al. (1999) 
and Botosan and Plumlee (2002), which both use the US AIMR survey data. The 
use of the IR Magazine data to measure IR performance therefore follows an 
established research method for measuring a construct that is probably otherwise 
impossible to objectively measure. 
This problem of finding a reliable method to quantitatively measure a 'soft' variable 
such as IR performance is not uncommon in empirical research and is normally 
solved by using a proxy measure as a 'best estimate'. IR managers presumably 
regard the IR awards highly and may themselves use the winning of the award as a 
method of gauging and benchmarking their IR performance from year to year. Some 
support for this can be seen on the corporate websites of past winners, which testify 
to their achievements in the IR Magazine Awards and also informal feedback from 
award-winners that I have received during the process of this research testify the 
esteem they give to winning an award. 
I did consider other alternative proxy measures, but these are now not available or 
are not regarded as suitable for the purposes of my research. The Standard & Poor 
(S&P) Global Transparency and Disclosure Survey only commenced in 2002 and 
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therefore did not provide a sufficient number of years' data history. Another 
alternative was the Extel Investor Relations firm' rating but the sample sizes and 
history of the survey likewise did not match those available from the IR Magazine 
data. 
Because the methodology and process followed to derive the ratings are deemed 
robust, the IR Magazine data is also a robust and 'clean' measure of the quality of 
IR. Also, the survey process and methodology, including the number and type of 
respondents, is publicly published with the award results in a report, so there is 
further reassurance that the survey is conducted in a reliable way and consistently 
across years. Also, as the research is conducted by independent research agencies 
and so the identity of the firms who win the awards are unlikely to be biased by any 
preferences on behalf of these agencies. In addition, because the respondents 
include buy-side analysts and fund managers as well as sell-side analysts (a break- 
down of respondents is shown in tables I and J in appendix 1), there is a lower risk 
that the responses are influenced by any pressures to vote for corporate finance 
clients; a pressure that may only apply to the sell-side analyst. 
The IR Magazine only publishes the identity of the three firms with the highest 
number of nominations, whereas my research is able to use the full underlying data 
covering all survey responses in their raw form, and so enables a wider-ranging 
analysis than that possible by public scrutiny. Finally access was attained to the full 
list of firms and number of nominations for all years 2000 to 2002 from the US and 
1999 to 2002 for the UK, the result are large sample sizes of firms across a wide 
cross-section of industry and over several years. 
6.1.2.1 Derivation of the IR-effectiveness rating 
The IR rating assigned to each firm is simply the number of times each firm is 
individually nominated by different respondents. Although all nominations are for 
firms that the respondent considers to be the 'best' in a particular category of IR, 
some firms are only nominated once as being the 'best', whereas other firms may 
receive a nomination from many different respondents. The majority of the firms are 
only nominated once, although there is a sufficient range in the number of 
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nominations across the firms so that the range of IR ratings is sufficiently large to 
enable a cross-sectional analysis. 
6.1.2.2 The IR Magazine award nomination process 
For over a decade the US and UK IR Magazine have commissioned independent 
research firms to manage the process of obtaining nominations for the listed firms 
that are deemed to be the "best" in several distinct categories of IR. IR awards are 
then presented to the firm with the most nominations in each IR category, with the 
two runner-up firms being named as "commended". The identity of all other 
nominated firms is not publicly disclosed. Although firms may be nominated if they 
do not have a listing on the stock exchanges in the country in which the awards are 
made, nominations are only obtained from sell and buy-side analysts and fund 
managers operating in the awarding country. 
Because I aim to provide more up-to-date empirical evidence I only use recent 
nomination data. For the UK firms I use survey data obtained by Fulcrum Research 
from 1999 to 2002 and for the US firms I use the data obtained by the research firm 
Erdos & Morgan from 2000 to 2002 (the US research was conducted by another 
research firm prior to 2000 and access to prior data was not available). The 
methodologies used by the US and UK research firms for collecting the IR award 
nominations are very similar. Each nominee is asked to nominate a firm by 
completing a questionnaire that is sent by fax or email or completed by telephone 
interview. The aim is to obtain responses from as many respondents as possible 
amongst the US/UK fund managers and buy-side and sell-side security analyst and 
to cover a wide range of industry sectors and investment specialisations, by both 
covering as many respondents as possible but also by encouraging all interviewees 
to nominate firms outside their specialities to which they have had experience of their 
IR performance over the preceding 12-months. 
The source population respondents in both the US and the UK are fund managers 
and sell and buy-side analysts from each of the financial institutions listed in the 
Thomson Financial 11WEIS database (UK) and Barron's and W/Link databases (US). 
For all awards in both the UK and US the nomination data-collection process takes 
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place during the month of March and is finalised on 31't March. Interviewees are 
reminded that all nominations should relate to IR activity and/or events that occurred 
in the 12 months from 1't April in the prior year to the 31st March of the current year, 
although it is impossible to check whether they are able to confine their opinions in 
this way. The final number of respondents by type and by industry sector speciality 
is recorded and publicly disclosed in each of the annual published 'IR Magazine IR 
Award Reports'that are issued shortly following the awards themselves. The final 
number of nominations is constrained by time restrictions because no nominations 
are accepted after 31't March. Although the IR awards are presented to the winning 
firms in July each year in both countries, because the award nominations are 
finalised on 31't March, this is an important date because it determines the time 
periods for which I obtain the empirical data for my tests of the firms, which 
are described in chapter 6. 
6.1.2.3 UK IR rating 
Because the distribution of UK respondents' industry specialisations (which is also 
recorded as part of the survey) is very unevenly spread, the measure of effective IR 
for the UK firms is the number of nominations they receive but it re-weighted by a 
factor to 'correct' for the fact that if a firm is in an industry sector index that is covered 
by more of the respondents, it is more likely to be nominated compared to an 
industry that is followed by a small number of analysts. The re-weighting is aimed at 
removing any influence from this industry bias. This factor is the ratio of the number 
of respondents specialising in a firm's industry sector divided by the total number of 
respondents in each annual survey across all industry sectors. 
6.1.2.4 US IR rating 
The re-weighting exercise is not considered necessary for the US data because 
there is a very even distribution of industry sector representation in the respondents. 
The US IR rating is therefore simply the number of times each firm is nominated for 
each IR award category. Because the US firms and UK firms are not combined into 
one sample for any of my empirical tests, this difference in method will not affect any 
of the results. 
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6.1.2.5 The Key IR Awards 
IR Magazine awards US and UK firms in distinct categories of IR performance that 
reflect the many aspects of an effective IR program and also to recognise the IR 
efforts of firms in special circumstances, such as during a take-over. A full listing of 
all these IR award categories are set out in tables A, B and C in appendix 1 in this 
thesis. 
This research only uses the award categories considered to provide the best and key 
representations of effective IR and which have sufficiently large sample sizes so that 
the results are more generalisable. In the case of the UK firms, the samples for all 
the empirical tests relate to the firms nominated from 1999 to 2002 for the 'Best UK 
IR Officer', 'Best UK Results Meetings with Fund Managers and Analysts' and 'Best 
UK IR Communications of Information in the Annual Report'. The US samples are 
all firms nominated for the 'Best US Overall IR for a Large Firm' (over $3bn market 
capitalisation at year-end ending in the year of the award) and 'Best Overall IR for a 
Small Firm' (under $3bn market capitalisation), although as indicated above it was 
only possible to obtain access to the US IR award data from 2000 to 2002. A 
summary table of the sample sizes of US firms and UK firms I test in my thesis is set 
out below, with full descriptive statistics shown in appendix 1. 
US awards for'Best Overall IR' 
AwardNear 2000 2001 2002 Total Av. MV4 
Large Firms 361 216 482 1,059 19,320 
Small Firms 1,024 409 621 2,054 685 
Total 1,385 625 1,103 3,113 
UK IR awards 
AwardNear 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total Av. IVIV 
Best IR Officer 65 95 131 170 461 10,810 
Best Results Meetings 63 95 114 140 412 11,748 
Best Annual Report 59 81 101 140 381 13,784 
Total 187 271 346 450 1,254 
4 AV. MV is the mean market value (E'000s) across all of the firms nominated for the relevant IR 
award at 31s' March in each of the IR award years 1999-2002/2000-2002 as applicable. 
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6.1.2.6 US IR awards 
For this research the US IR Award for 'Best Overall IR' is tested because this 
category is considered to provide the best summary measure of IR-effectiveness and 
applies to the widest possible range of listed firms. Also, because it is specifically 
targeted at identifying the 'best' large and 'best' smaller firm, it allows explicit tests 
that recognise the effect that firm size may have on the effectiveness of IR. 
6.1.2.7 UK IR awards 
In the UK IR Awards there is not a category for 'Best Overall IR' and the firms 
nominated in three key IR awards form the sample firm' populations. The reasons 
for choosing these three award categories of IR are described below. 
i. Award for the Best IR OfficerlManager 
This is probably the best category for providing a measure of overall IR performance 
and is the closest UK category to the US award for 'Best Overall IR'. This is 
juýtifiable because the award for Best IR Officer is both a personal recognition for the 
IR manager who wins the award and also recognition of the efforts of the firm's 
senior management, who are responsible for determining the corporate IR policy and 
appointing the IR manager. An IR manager can only be effective with the support of 
an effective IR department, and with effective internal communication systems and 
processes. 
ii. Award for the Best Results Meetings with Fund Managers and Analysts 
This category is for an event that is perhaps one of the key IR events in an annual IR 
program. Firms normally issue final and interim financial results to the market at a 
pre-determined date through an authorised channel. In the UK this is via a Primary 
Information Provider (PIP) approved by the FSA and in the US this is to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). This mandatory formal announcement 
is normally followed-up shortly afterwards with results meetings with key investors, 
analysts and media. 
The meeting is for the senior managers (the Chief Executive, Chairman and 
Financial Director are normally always present and sometimes the IR manager in 
person) to invite their main investors, the most active security and industry analysts 
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and in some cases some key financial reporters, to a formal event and to personally 
present the latest financial results. The IR personnel will normally be heavily 
involved in the preparations for this meeting and may take a supportive role by 
dealing with any follow-up calls and enquiries. 
The purpose of these face-to-face meetings is for the senior managers to present in 
person the firm's financial performance, how this has been achieved, to explain how 
performance varies from their previous forecasts and strategies and forecasts for 
future performance and how these will be achieved. A meeting is also an 
opportunity for the senior management to put a 'human face' behind the financial 
figures and to portray their personal managerial qualities, with the hope of 
engendering trust and credibility to investors and analysts through an informative 
and enthusiastic presentation. Increasingly the value of board members must be 
explained and demonstrated at these meetings because institutional investors place 
a growing importance on corporate governance issues. Importantly, the meetings 
can also give management an important source of feedback on how their 
performance is being received by the market. 
For the audience, the meetings are an opportunity to ask focused questions of 
management about issues that concern them and to use any information obtained to 
refine their assessments over their own forecasts of firm performance. The meetings 
are therefore a two-way communication process with all parties providing input. 
In addition to being a major IR event, this IR category is used in this research to 
contribute to the existing literature that has found empirical evidence of the 
importance for listed firms to communicate effectively at meetings with their analysts 
and key investors. For example, Holland (2002) conducted interviews with 
executives and their largest shareholders and analysts and found that the private 
meetings between analysts and firm executives were considered by both parties to 
be one of the most important channels of communication. 
There is also past research showing why firms might be concerned with maintaining 
good communications with security analysts, finding evidence of a significant positive 
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impact on share prices shortly after analyst-firm meetings suggesting that they are 
an important source of new information for investors (e. g. Walmsley, Yadav and 
Rees, 1992). Other research has also found that previously under-performing 
shares earn positive excess returns immediately after the firm concerned made a 
personal presentation to analysts and brokers and that the number of earnings 
forecasts produced by analysts for these firms also increased, indicating that useful 
and valuable information may have been revealed during the meetings that they 
disseminate and is absorbed by investors (Francis, Hanna and Philbrick, 1997). 
iii. Award for Best Annual Report IR Communications 
This award is not made only for the contents of the annual report, but for how 
effectively a firm communicates the information it contains is explained and 
interpreted by the firm to the market and for exceptional value-adding information 
shown in the annual report that exceed mandatory reporting requirements. 
The format and content of the UK and US annual report has evolved over time in 
accordance with accounting and reporting regulations (by the UK Accounting 
Standards Board (ASB) and the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)), 
and to meet the requirements of UK and US Company Law. However, firms are 
encouraged to provide any additional disclosures in their annual report that will assist 
stakeholders in understanding the financial performance and position of the firm. 
This is probably mainly driven by 'best practice reporting standards' determined by 
peer firms. Annual reports are also increasingly aimed at a wider range of 
stakeholders, including employees, environmental lobbyists and others. 
The annual report normally provides a great deal of information beyond the financial 
statements. This information may be detailed financial ratios, graphical presentations 
of performance indicators, narrative on the firm's business divisions, industry trends, 
management and employees and increasingly on corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) and environmental policy. The annual report is therefore an opportunity for 
management to explain in a clearly presented and 'user-friendly' format their 
assessments on the past period's performance and their plans and strategies for the 
future. 
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There is evidence that the annual report is still used by most investors and analysts 
as a primary source of firm information. This view is supported by evidence obtained 
from interviews with 100 of the top fund managers and their analysts by the firm that 
conducted the research for the 2003 UK IR Magazine IR awards. The 2003 IR 
Magazine UK Research Report includes a section that summarises the responses 
from a focused questionnaire to 100 buy and sell side analysts and fund managers. 
It shows that 54% of the sell-side analysts asked said that the annual report was 
their most important source of information, followed by meetings with management 
(45%) and websites (22%), with all other sources given a much lower priority. 
Annual reports were also the most frequently mentioned source of information by 
buy-side analysts and fund managers (73%), followed by firm websites at only 27%. 
The annual report as a key source of information has also been ranked highly in all 
of the equivalent Research Reports in 1999,2000,2001 and 2002. 
There is also some empirical research evidence that the annual report is a key 
source of information for security analysts. For example Hope and Pope (2003) 
show that firm disclosure level is positively related to earnings forecast accuracy, 
suggesting that the disclosures provide useful information to analysts. This is based 
on tests of the relationship between analysts' earnings forecast accuracy and the 
level of annual report disclosure in 22 countries, where the level of disclosure is 
measured against local GAAP. 
Meanwhile, other research by Eccles and Mavrinac (1995) concludes that the annual 
report is not sufficient alone in supplying investors and analysts with all the 
information they need. For example, from a survey of senior executives, analysts 
and fund managers, Eccles and Mavrinac (1995) find that there is a fundamental 
expectations gap between the information that firms are required to disclose in their 
annual reports and that required by the market. However, the survey respondents 
attribute the cause of any 'gap' more to a failure by senior management to 
adequately present and communicate the information in the annual report, rather 
than to a weakness in reporting regulations per se. 
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Also, in a more recent publication Eccles, Herz, Keegan and Phillips (2001) claim 
that the responses from a similar opinion survey of managers and analysts about the 
annual report, produced in conjunction with Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC), 
provides overwhelming evidence that the annual report is still insufficient at providing 
investors and analysts with the information they require. The respondents in this 
survey say that the two main problems with the current financial reporting model are, 
firstly, an over-focus on top-line earnings results and secondly the persistent failure 
of firms to meet the information 'gap'. Firms are described as playing an "earnings 
game" with their investors and analysts, which encourages analysts to increasingly 
focus on the short-term performance and for the market to place too much 
importance on how reported earnings compare to analysts' expectations of earnings. 
The respondents suspect that managers are "managing earnings expectations", 
because they are very aware of how the market dislikes 'earnings surprises. In fact, 
both managers and analysts can benefit from fewer earnings surprises because it 
gives the impression that analysts are knowledgeable and that management are 
doing their jobs well. The main areas where they perceive an information gap is a 
failure by some firms to report information that managers regard as important and 
use to manage the business, unreliable information due to weak internal reporting 
systems and lastly a failure of managers to even appreciate that the market is not 
receiving the information it requires and probably comes from a failure to pay 
attention to market feedback. In summary, these findings show how important it is 
for firms to make efforts to provide information beyond simply producing an annual 
report that meets the minimum of legal and accounting reporting standards and to 
respond to questions and queries form their investors and analysts and to listen to 
market feedback. 
Despite this, however, another reason for my thesis to test the annual report IR 
category is because Botosan and Plumlee (2002), in one of the key research papers 
upon which this research builds, find a positive and significant relationship between 
the rating given to firms for their 'Required Published Information' (including the 
annual report) in the AIMR survey and the cost of equity capital. The testing of the 
'Best Annual Report IR Communications' IR Magazine IR Award therefore allows a 
comparison with the findings on US firms in this prior literature. 
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6.1.3 Units of analysis 
6.1.3.1 By IR award 
The IR award categories I test are as follows: 
UK 
- Best IR Officer 
- Best Results Meeting with Fund Managers and Analysts 
- Best IR Communications of Information in the Annual Report 
US (note: the US firms are analysed both by large and small firms separately and 
then by combining the large and small firms into one sample of firms). 
- Best Overall IR for a Large Firm (over $3bn market capitalisation at year end) 
- Best Overall IR for a Small Firm (under $3bn) 
6.1.3.2 Portfolio formation 
All firms - For all of the empirical analyses that test for a relationship between the 
firms IR rating and equity returns, analyst coverage, liquidity and cost of equity 
capital, the tests are performed within the cross-section of all nominated firms in 
each IR award, by dividing the firms into portfolios in a consistent manner, as 
follows. The samples of all firms nominated for each annual IR award are divided 
into three portfolios (P) based on the break points of the rank percentage of the 
number of nominations each received. In all cases portfolio 1 comprises rank 100%- 
66.7%, portfolio 2 66.6%-33.4% and portfolio 3 33.3% - 0.001%. The three groups 
are then pooled across years (1999 to 2002 for the UK and 2000 to 2002 for the US) 
to result in three pooled portfolios 1,2 and 3 for each award category, where portfolio 
1 contains firms with the highest number of nominations. Appendix 1, table F (for 
UK firms) and table H (for US firms) show the resulting numbers of firms in each 
portfolio. 
Cost of equity capital tests - applying to all firms - For only the cost of capital 
tests, all firms are divided into portfolios in the two following ways. All firms 
nominated in each annual IR award are firstly ranked on their within-year IR rating 
and then divided into 3 within-year portfolios based on: 
- The 33% / 66.6% percentage break-points of ranked IR rating (as above) and; 
- By allotting an equal number of firms to each portfolio. 
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Portfolios 1,2 and 3 are then pooled across the IR award years to result in three 
larger across-year portfolios for each IR award. 
Cost of equity capital tests - US firms. Compared to the population of 
respondents in the UK IR Magazine IR awards survey, the population of US fund 
managers and analysts who are asked to nominate firms is much larger. This is 
probably essentially because there is a larger overall population of security analysts 
and fund managers in the US market. However, although this means that the 
ratings for a US firm is likely to be higher than for a UK firm simply because of the 
higher number of survey respondents, the UK and US firms are not combined in any 
of the empirical tests so this does not affect any of the test results. Further, whereas 
the distribution of the number of award nominations across the UK firms is quite 
evenly spread, the majority of the US nominations are highly skewed towards a small 
number of firms. Due to this skew-ness the cost of capital results for the US firms 
are further analysed by dividing all nominated firms into 10 portfolio groups and then 
pooling the portfolios across the award year, where the portfolios are formed by: 
- 10 percentage rank break points based on the IR rating and; 
- By dividing the total number into 10 groups containing an equal number of firms. 
Section 6.5 provides the methodology I adopt to measure the cost of equity capital. 
Analyst Coverage US firms - For reasons I have just explained, for the tests on 
levels of analyst coverage the US firms are also divided into both 3 and 10 portfolios, 
where 3 portfolios are based on the decile break points of ranked percentage of 
number of nominations from 100%-66.7% (portfolio 1), 66.6% to 33.4% (portfolio 2) 
and 33.3% - 0.01% (portfolio 3) and 10 portfolios are formed by dividing the total 
number of firms into 10 group containing an equal number of firms. Refer to section 
6.3 for further description of the tests on analyst coverage. 
6.1.3.3 Time periods analysed 
Because the portfolios are formed within each annual IR award and then pooled 
across years into three large portfolios 1/2/3, they may contain firms that have been 
nominated for the award in only or one more years 1999 to 2002. In order to test 
how the firms' equity returns, equity trading volumes, cost of capital and analyst 
coverage are related to the firm's IR rating in the years surrounding the specific 
month in which the firm is nominated, it is important to maintain the identity of the 
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year of nomination within the portfolios. To do this, each 12-month period 
immediately preceding the end of March in each IR award-year is referred to as 
year T throughout all the tests in the thesis. For example, the firms nominated in 
portfolio 1 in 1999, the period 1st April 1998 to 31st March 1999 is the period T and 
for those in portfolio 1 in 2000 period T is 1s' April 1999 to 31st March 2000. This 
pattern is also used for the 2001 and 2002 nominated firms. Accordingly, periods T- 
2, T-1 are the consecutive 12-months periods preceding T, and periods T+1 and T+2 
are the consecutive 12-months following T. This is more clearly shown thus: 
Chart of empirical data-collection periods for firms nominated for an award for 
their IR performance during the 12-month period ending 31 March in period T 
1999 IR Award (UK firms only) 
31.03.97 
1 
31.03.98 31.03.99 31.03.00 
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31.03.01 
1- 
T-2 T-1 TI T+1 T+2 
2000 IR Award 
31.03.98 
1 
31.03.99 31.03.00 31.03.01 
11, 
F 
31.0 
I 
3.02 
F 10 
T-2 T-1 TI T+1 T+2 
200, IR A ard 
31.03.99 31.03.00 31.03.01 31.03.02 31.03.03 
T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 
2002 IR Award 
31.03.00 
IF 
31.03.01 31.03.02 31.03.03 
IFIF 
31.0 
I 
3.04 
F 
T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 
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Methodologies for empirical tests 
The following sections describe the methodologies employed for the empirical tests 
of my research hypotheses that I developed in chapter 5 and are summarised below. 
Section 6.2 describes the methodology used for testing my null hypotheses relating 
to the firms' equity returns: 
H01: There is no significant relationship between effective IR and future excess 
equity retums. 
H05: There is no significant relationship between effective IR and prior excess 
equity retums. 
Section 6.3 describes the methodology used for testing the null hypotheses relating 
to the firm's analyst coverage: 
H02: There is no significant relationship between effective IR and future increased 
levels of analyst coverage. 
H06: There is no significant relationship between effective IR and prior high levels 
of analyst coverage. 
Section 6.4 describes the methodology used for equity trading volumes null 
hypothesis: 
H03: There is no significant relationship between effective IR and future increased 
trading volumes of equity. 
And, finally, section 6.5 describes the methodology used for testing the cost of equity 
capital null hypothesis: 
H04: There is no significant relationship between effective IR and a future reduced 
cost of equity capital. 
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6.2 Methodology for testing for a relationship between IR and 
equity returns - null hypotheses Hol and H05 
6.2.1 Risk-adjusted returns 
Firstly, an analysis is conducted to see whether the firms, which represent 'firms with 
effective IR', earn significant abnormal prior or subsequent risk-adjusted returns 
during the 12-months prior to and subsequent to the month of nomination for an IR 
award. Firms are tested by pooling the firms nominated in each IR award for'Best 
Overall IR - Large Firm' and 'Best Overall IR - Small Firm' separately across years 
2000 to 2002 for the US IR award and by pooling the firms nominated in each of the 
3 UK IR awards, 'Best IR Officer', 'Best Results Meeting' and 'Best Annual Report' 
separately across years 1999 to 2002. 
Firms' monthly returns are calculated for the 12 prior months (period T) and 12 
subsequent months (period T+1) and are then risk-adjusted as described below in 
section 6.2.3 (period T and T+1 are as defined in section 6.1). This results in 36 
prior monthly returns and 36 subsequent monthly returns for the pooled US firms 
nominated for 'Best Overall IR' 2000 to 2002 and 48 prior and 48 subsequent 
monthly returns for the pooled UK firms nominated in the three UK award categories 
1999 to 2002. Finally, regression analysis, described below in section 6.2.3, is 
performed. 
6.2.2 Portfolio risk-adjusted returns 
My second analysis relates to the monthly risk-adjusted returns within the cross- 
section of firms during periods T and T+1 and both tests for significant abnormal 
equity returns and also tests for any relationship between the firms' risk-adjusted 
returns and their IR rating. The portfolios are constructed as described in section 
6.1.3.2, resulting in 36 prior monthly returns and 36 subsequent monthly returns for 
each portfolio of US firms (for award years 2000 - 2002) and 48 prior/subsequent 
monthly returns for each portfolio of UK firms (for award years 1999 - 2002) for the 
pooled samples of firms. The portfolio monthly returns are the averages of the 
monthly buy-and-hold returns of the firms in each respective portfolio. Regression 
analysis is then performed for each portfolio, as shown below in section 6.2.3. 
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6.2.3 Risk-adjusting model 
Equity returns are tested using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model in 
two-tailed tests for whether the firms earn superior prior or subsequent risk-adjusted 
returns, augmented by the momentum factor5. The resulting model therefore adjusts 
the firms' buy-and-hold returns for the risk-free rate and also controls for risks 
associated with firm size, book-to-market value, and prior momentum, as shown 
below: 
Rp/it - 
RFt= a+b (Rmt - 
RFt)+ s SMBt +h HMLt +m MOMt + F-t 
where: 
a the intercept term and b, s, and m are the coefficients on the risk factors, 
Rpt the buy-and-hold return of the firms in portfolio P/firm i during month t, 
RR = the risk free rate (US/UK one- month Treasury bill rate) at the start of month t, 
Rmt = return on the relevant market portfolio in month t, 
SMBt = return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor in month t, 
HMLt = return on the mimicking portfolio for the B/M factor in month t, 
MOMt = return on the mimicking portfolio for the momentum factor in month t, and; 
P=1,2 and 3 (portfolios are constructed as described in section 6.1) 
5 In order to test the sensitivity of results to the inclusion of the momentum factor, a second regression 
analysis is run that controls only for size, book-to-market and market risk factors. Because the 
empirical results for US firms are not significant under this second analysis, they are not reported in 
this thesis. However, the results UK firms differ from those reported in section 7.1 below as follows. 
Across all firms nominated in the three IR award categories, whereas there are some significant 
results reported in section 7.1 for the prior period T, the results using this second analysis are 
insignificant. Also, whereas the results reported in section 7.1 for the following period T+1 are 
insignificant, using this second analysis the firms nominated for Best IR Officer and Best Results 
Meeting earn significant negative abnormal returns (both of approximately 3% per month, t= -2.10 and 
t= 2.01 respectively). Further, the tests of returns by portfolios of firms in these two IR award 
categories that exclude the momentum factor show that only firms in portfolios 1 and 2 nominated for 
Best IR Officer earn significantly negative returns (portfolio I at 2% per month, t= -2.23, portfolio 2 at 
2% per month, t= -2-10) and only firms in portfolio 3 in the Best Results Meetings category earn 
significantly inferior returns (at 2.47% per month, t= -2.60). 
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F- is the error term and HML, SMB and MOM are constructed as described below at 
31st of March of each year. 
Monthly buy-and-hold returns for the US and UK firms are obtained from the 
Thomson Financial DataStream database and the risk factors are calculated as 
described below. To interpret the results, the coefficient (a) indicates the size of any 
risk-adjusted returns of each group of firms/portfolio of firms in periods T and T+1 
and the t statistic indicates the two-tailed statistical significance of the firms' risk- 
adjusted returns. 
Construction of SMB, HML and MOM risk factors 
US firms 
For the US firms, monthly SMB, HML and MOM factors are taken from the Kenneth 
French web site for the relevant monthS. 6 The Fama and French (1993) benchmark 
factors, RM, SMB, and HML, are constructed from six size/book-to-market 
benchmark portfolios that do not incur transaction costs. Rm, the excess return on 
the market, is the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks 
(source: CRSP) minus the one-month Treasury bill rate (source: lbbotson 
Associates). SMB (Small Minus Big) is the average return on three small portfolios 
minus the average return on three big portfolios: 
SMB = 113 (Small Value + Small Neutral + Small Growth) 
- 1/3 (Big Value + Big Neutral + Big Growth) (i) 
HML (High Minus Low) is the average return on two value portfolios minus the 
average return on two growth portfolios: 
HML = 1/2 (Small Value + Big Value) - 1/2 (Small Growth + Big Growth) (H) 
The book-to-market ratio is high for value stocks and low for growth stocks 
. 
MOM is the average return on the two high momentum portfolios minus the average 
return on the two low momentum portfolios: 
MOM = 1/2 (Small High + Big High) - 1/2 (Small Low + Big Low) ON 
6 (http: //mba. tuck-dartmouth. edu/pages/faculty/ken. french/). 
7 31st March is used because in the UK and US the IR award nomination process occurs during 
March each year to a strict deadline that is required so that the'winners' can be announced in 
july each year. 
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UK firms 
Rmt for the UK firms is the monthly return on the FTSE All Share index and because 
there is no similar access to a source of data on UK risk factors relating to firm size, 
book-to-market and momentum, these are calculated employing the methodology 
used by Agarwal, Brown and Taffler (2004) as follows. Firstly, all stocks listed on the 
London Stock Exchange for the entire period commencing 1st April 1998 to 31st 
March 2003 7 are identified from the London Share Price Database (LSPD). Because 
the firms in the IR award samples include financial firms these are not excluded from 
the LSPD population. The firms are then ranked on the basis of their year-end 
market value/capitalisation (MV) at the close of each 12-month period ending 31't 
March and grouped into two portfolios, using the median size as the breakpoint. The 
portfolio with the lower 50% of market capitalisations is designated portfolio S (small) 
and that containing the other 50% of stocks is designated portfolio B (big). 
The firms are then independently ranked on their book-to-market value (B/M )8 at the 
close of each 12-month period ending 31't March and grouped into three portfolios, 
the lowest 30% (portfolio L), middle 40% (portfolio M) and highest 30% (portfolio H). 
SMB and HML are constructed, as by Fama and French (1993), by forming six 
portfolios from the intersections of the two MV and three B/M groups: small/low B/M 
(S/L), small/medium B/M (S/M), small/high B/M (S/H), large/low B/M (B/L), 
large/medium B/M (B/M) and large/high B/M (B/H). Factor SMB is constructed as 
the difference between the simple average of monthly returns on the three small 
stock portfolios and the simple average of monthly returns on the three large stock 
portfolios, i. e.: 
SMB = ((S/L + S/M + S/H) - (B/L + B/M + B/H)) /3 
8 Book values are sourced from Company Analysis (CA) database. Book values are taken as the 
value reported in CA at the firm's nearest year-end falling in the 12-month period preceding each 
31 March 1999 to 2002. The data was not amended to reflect the fact that for firms reporting 
shortly after end March, book values would not have been known at 31 March, and therefore may 
incorporate an element of 'hindsight bias'. It is assumed that this will occur in only a small 
number of cases and so will not materially affect the empirical results relying on these book 
values. 
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Factor HML is constructed as the difference between the simple average of monthly 
returns on the two high B/M portfolios and the simple average of monthly returns on 
the two low B/M portfolios, i. e.: 
HML = ((SIH + B/H) - (SIL + BIL)) /2 (ii) 
The momentum factor MOM is calculated by forming six value-weighted portfolios 
formed on market capitalisation and prior returns. The portfolios, which are formed 
monthly, are the intersections of 2 portfolios formed on size (MV) and 3 portfolios 
formed on equity returns over the 11 prior months commencing at the 12 th prior 
month. The monthly size breakpoint is the median market equity valuation of the full 
sample in the LSPD. The monthly prior return breakpoints are the 30th and 70th 
LSPD percentiles. 
Finally, MOM is the average return on the two high momentum portfolios minus the 
average return on the two low momentum portfolios, as follows: 
MOM = '/2(Small High + Big High) - 1/2(Small Low + Big Low) (iii) 
This concludes the section describing the methodology for testing the firms' 
equity returns. The test results are shown below in chapter 7, section 7.1. 
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6.3 Methodology for testing the relationship between IR and 
analyst coverage - null hypotheses H02 and H06 
6.3.1 Introduction 
As described in the literature reviewed in section 3.2, prior research suggests that 
firms can benefit from the effects of high analyst coverage. Further, this literature 
finds that analysts appear to be more attracted towards some firms, which have 
characteristics such as large size and low risk, more than others. This section 
describes the methodology for testing the relationship between a firm's IR 
performance and levels of analyst coverage and seeks to test whether the firms' IR 
rating is also a factor that is associated with high analyst coverage. These analyses 
specifically control for firm size, which is measured by market capitalisation at 31st 
March in the year in which the firm is nominated for an IR award. Firm size is 
relevant because prior research has shown that levels of analyst following are 
positively correlated with market value, as described in section 3.2. 
6.3.2 Measure of analyst coverage 
Levels of analyst following are measured by the number of analysts publishing 
earnings, price and growth forecasts for the firm at the end of each calendar year 
1998 to 2004 in the Thomson Financial FirstCall, IIBIEIS databases. The use of this 
database as a reliable source of information on analyst coverage follows an 
established research method (e. g. Shefrin and Statman, 2004) 
6.3.3 Analyses 
6.3.3.1 Portfolios of firms 
The first test is of the mean number of analysts of each firm at the end of T-2, T-1, T, 
T+I and T+2, where the US and UK firms nominated in each US and UK IR award 
are divided into three portfolios, following the method described in section 6.1.3.2. 
For reasons, also explained in section 6.1.3.2, mean analyst coverage for the US 
firms is also analysed by dividing the firms into 10 portfolios. 
6.3.3.2 Regression analyses 
Secondly, regression analysis is performed to test for any relationship between 
'sfirm's IR rating and analyst coverage across all US firms and UK firms nominated 
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in each IR award, controlling for firm size (market capitalisation at year-end ending in 
the year of the award period T-2, T-1, T, T+1 and T+2). The aim is to test how levels 
of analyst following in the years T-2 to T+2 are related to effective IR. This is done 
firstly in a regression test whereby analyst following is the dependent variable, as 
shown in equation 2 (a) below, to test for how effective IR (as measured by the IR 
ratings) may affect levels of analyst coverage in periods T-2 to T+2. A second 
regression analysis is also performed, with the IR rating as the dependent variable, 
as shown in equation 2 (b) below. Conversely, this tests for how existing levels of 
analyst coverage may affect the firms' IR ratings. Together the results of these two 
tests may show whether either analyst following appears to 'drive' the IR ratings or 
whether effective IR ratings 'drive' levels of analyst following i. e. whether analyst 
following either leads or lags effective IR). 
6.3.4 Regression models 
The regression models control for market value, following Botosan (1997): 
AFiT = Yo + YIIR i+ 
Y2MViT + ICiT (2a) 
IRj Yo+YIAFIT+y2MViT + CiT (2b) 
where: 
lRi IR rating of firm i nominated in the IR awards 2000 to 2002 (1999 to 2002 for UK firr 
T 2000 to 2002 for US firms and 1999 to 2002 for UK firms, as defined in section 6.1 
AFiT number of analysts publishing forecasts in Thomson Financial, 11BIEIS 
FirstCall database for firm i in year T 
MViT market value of firm i at 31st March in year T 
C iT the error term in year T 
YO intercept term 
Y11 Y2 regression coefficients for IR rating/market value terms 
This concludes this section and the empirical results are described in chapter 7, 
section 7.2. 
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6.4 Methodology for testing the relationship between IR and 
equity trading volumes - null hypothesis H03 
6.4.1 Introduction 
The literature reviewed in section 3.3 shows that there is a positive relationship 
between stock liquidity and the volume of equity traded. Based on this, this section 
describes the methodology employed for testing the relationship between the firms' 
IR rating and stock liquidity, by measuring levels of, and changes in, firm' equity 
trading volumes. 
6.4.2 Alternative methodologies for measuring liquidity 
The main alternative to using trading volumes as a method of measuring liquidity is 
the bid-ask spread, where the size of the spread is negatively related to the degree 
of liquidity. I use equity trading volumes to measure liquidity, firstly because the 
existing research described in section 3.3 finds that trading volumes are directly 
inversely related to the size of the bid-ask spread and, secondly, because data on 
stock trading volumes are available for all of the UK and US firms in the research 
samples, whereas data on the bid-ask spread is only available for a sub-set of the 
firms, which would have restricted the test sample sizes. 
6.4.3 The models 
The models used to test the relationship between equity trading activity and the 
firm's IR rating follow Arnihud, Mendelson and Lauterbach (1997) 
6.4.3.1 Relative Equity Trading Volumes (RV) 
This measures how a firm's monthly trading volumes have changed as a percentage 
of the trading volumes of the average firm in the same industry sector (normal' 
volume). Industry sector volume is used to gauge 'normal' volume level because all 
firms in the same industry are expected to be subject to largely the same industry- 
specific factors that affect traded volumes. 
Although there will be remaining firm-specific factors affecting trading volumes, 
including the market value of the firm, Amihud, Mendelson and Lauterbach (1997) 
argue that the effect of these on normal volume is mitigated to a large degree by 
averaging industry sector monthly volume by the number of firms in the sector at the 
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month end. However, in order to take account of any effect of firm size on trading 
volumes I perform an additional regression analysis, described below in section 
6.4.3.5, which does control for firm' market value. RV is calculated as follows: 
RVit = Vit / (V,,, t/N,,, t) 
(3) 
where: 
Vit volume of equity of firm i traded during month t; 
V,,, t volume of equity in firm i's industry sector traded during month t, and: 
N,,, t = the number of firms listed in firm i's industry sector in the FTSE All 
Share/S&P indices at the end of month t. 
6.4.3.2 Change in relative volume (DRV) 
I also compute the change in relative volume (DRV), which is a summary statistic for 
changes in the firms' stock liquidity, and present mean DRV for portfolios of firms, 
formed as described above in section 6.1. DRV is calculated as follows, with the 
variables defined as above: 
DRVit = Vit / (V .. t/N,,, t) - Vit-, 
/( V,,, t., / N,,, t. 1) (4) 
Finally I compute the percentage of firms for which DRV is positive versus negative 
and then a significance test of the change in the firms' RV, which is at test to test the 
significance of any change in the mean of the RV between periods T-1 and T for the 
set of firms nominated in each IR award. This t test essentially provides support for 
the significance of the percentages of DRV that are positive and negative. 
6.4.3.3 Liquidity ratio (LR) 
The liquidity of a stock can be defined as "The ease with which the market can 
absorb volume buying or selling, without a dramatic fluctuation in price" (Amihud, 
Mendelson and Lauterbach, 1997). Therefore an alternative and widely used 
measure of liquidity is to compares changes in volumes to changes in price (Cooper, 
Groth and Avera, 1985, Khan and Baker, 1993). This measure is called the liquidity 
ratio (LR), but is also sometimes referred to as the Amivest Ratio after an industry 
practitioner who popularised its use. The liquidity ratio is defined as: 
T+I 
LRit F- Vit lRitl 
T 
(5) 
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where: 
Vit = the traded volume of stock of firm i during month t 
Rit = the return on stock of firm i in month t 
The summation (Z) is performed over both the 12-month periods prior to and 
following the month of the award (T and T+1). LR measures the trading volume of a 
stock associated with a unit change in the stock price. A higher LR implies greater 
market 'depth' because it shows the 'price elasticity' of a stock to a change in its 
trading volumes or, alternatively, the 'volume elasticity' of a stock to a change in its 
price. This is potentially a very important ratio for a firm and for an IR manager to 
monitor, because if the LR ratio of a share increases, any factors affecting share 
price will then have a higher impact on the level of volumes traded and on liquidity. 
6.4.3.4 Change in the liquidity ratio (DLR) 
DLR provides a summary and more tractable measure to show how the change in 
equity trading over time may be associated with a change in stock returns over time. 
A DLR greater than 1 indicates an increase in 'market depth' i. e. that the stock's 
traded volume has become more price-elastic or volume-elastic over time and 
indicates an increasingly liquid market for the stock. DLR is calculated as follows: 
DLRj = LRiT+I / LRiT (6) 
T= the 12 months preceding the month of the IR award 
Finally, I present the average DLR for the portfolios of firms, which are formed as 
described above in section 6.1, and also the percentage of firms for which DLR is 
greater to and less than I and at test to test the significance of any change in the 
mean of the LR between periods T-1 and T for the set of firms nominated in each IR 
award. This t test essentially provides support for the significance of the 
percentages of DLR that are greater to and less than one. 
6.4.3.5 Regression analysis 
This analysis tests the relationship between equity trading volumes and the IR rating 
but controls for the potentially correlated variables of firm size (measured by market 
value at 31 March) and equity beta. This is because trading volumes of larger and 
less risky firms are likely to be higher than for smaller and more risky firms so the 
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omission of these factors might otherwise bias the results. The following regression 
equation is estimated for the samples of all nominated firms in each IR award, to test 
for any relationship between the firm IR rating and stock liquidity, controlling for size 
and risk, during periods prior to (periods T-2 to T) and subsequent to the IR award 
nominations (period T+1 and T+2). 
VOI iT-2 to T+2 : -- Yo + YJR it + Y2 109 MV i T-2 to T+2 + Y3 J6 iT-2 to T+2+ Ci T-2 to T+2 
where: 
YO = intercept term; 
YI , Y2 and 
Y3 = coefficients for the IR rating, market value and equity beta factors; 
Vol i T-2 to T+2 = mean of monthly equity trading volumes for firm i in year T-2 to T+2; 
lRiT = IR rating of firm i in year T; 
MV iT-2 to T+2 = natural log of the market value of firm i at 31't March in year T-2 to 
T+2-, 
JGiT-2toT+2 =equity beta of 
firm i in yearT-2toT+2; 
Ci T-2 to T+2 = error term T-2 to T+2 
T= 2000 to 2002 for US firms and 1999 to 2002 for UK firms. 
Data sources: Equity trading volumes are sourced from the Thomson Financial 
DataStream database. Industry sectors and index volumes are downloaded from the 
London Stock Exchange website (http: //Www. londonstockexchange. coml) and the 
New York Stock Exchange website ttp. -11Www. nvse. com1). 
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6.5 Methodology for testing for a relationship between IR and ex- 
ante cost of equity capital - null hypothesis H04 
6.5.1 Introduction 
This section describes the method I use to estimate the expected cost of equity 
capital and the reasons for employing this model over alternative methodologies. 
The section also describes the tests performed to test the relationship between 
effective IR and the cost of capital. 
6.5.2 The expected cost of equity capital 
In this research ex-ante cost of equity capital is estimated by using a version of the 
Finite Horizon Gordon Dividend Growth Model (Gordon and Gordon, 1997). This is 
a measurement method that has been widely used in extant research (e. g. Botosan 
and Plumlee, 2002). 
6.5.3 Benchmarking my cost of equity capital estimates 
Ideally, in order to test the robustness of the cost of equity capital estimates that I 
calculate using the Finite Horizon Gordon Dividend Growth Model, a comparison 
would be made to an appropriate benchmark, such as an average cost of capital by 
industry, or by using some other'normal' measure. However, the identification of an 
appropriate benchmark for this purpose is problematic, because estimates that have 
been made of the equity risk premium vary widely, depending upon the time period 
over which the estimate is calculated and the risk-free rate chosen. 
Estimates of the equity risk premium in the literature range from 3% to 9% (Claus 
and Thomas, 1999). The most frequently cited estimates in the literature are those 
provided by lbbotson Associates (lbbotson Associates, 1999), a US company 
founded in 1977 by Professor lbbotson, to provide products and services to 
investment professionals. lbbotson Associates produces an annual review of historic 
rates of return observed dating back to 1926 for various portfolios of stocks and 
bonds and lbbotson Associates estimate the over the past decade the equity risk 
premium has varied between 7% and 9%. However other researchers, notably 
Siegel (1992), suggest that ex-post estimates are highly sensitive to the particular 
period sampled. Siegel estimates the equity risk premium over three consecutive 
131 
periods from 1802 to 1870,1871 to 1925 and 1926 to 1992, obtaining data on 
historic stock prices from three different sources; Cowles (1938), the Standard & 
Poor's database and lastly from Schwert (1990) and the resulting average estimates 
of the equity risk premium for these three periods are 0.6 %, 3.5% and 5.9%. 
Meanwhile, in his best-selling investment book, Siegel (2002) showed that, 
historically, the long-term annualised real return on US common stocks has been 
very stable and this stability in the equity risk premium has since been coined 
'Siegel's constant'or's'. 
In another study, Claus and Thomas (1999) conclude that since 1985 the equity risk 
premium has averaged only 3%, Claus and Thomas (1999), calculated using the 
residual income valuation model and assuming a constant growth in abnormal 
earnings. Whilst the authors recognise that their estimate appears low there is no 
further analysis to test the robustness or their results. 
More recently, Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2004) calculate long-term real equity 
returns in 16 different countries, using data from 1900 to 2002. They estimate that 
real returns over this 103 year-period in the US were 6.3% and for other countries 
they ranged from 1.8% in Belgium to 7.4% in Australia. Dimson, Marsh and 
Staunton (2004) also combine the data across the 16 countries and estimate that, if 
this can be taken as a reflection of a 'global equity index', then global long-run real 
equity returns averaged close to 5.0% in real US dollar terms. They conclude that 
because their findings show a lower return to equity than suggested by much 
previous research, "Common stocks cannot be regarded as safe in real terms even 
when the investor has a horizon of 20 years or more". 
Due to this apparent wide variation in consensus in the research over the historic 
level of equity returns over a particular time period, let alone within one country or 
industry sector, it is appears futile to use any specific benchmark measure to support 
viability of future levels in the cost of equity capital that I calculate in this thesis. In 
addition, because the purpose of this research is to test a directional hypothesis and 
not to conclude that the estimates of the cost of capital are 'correct, it is considered 
sufficient for these purposes to use a robust and consistent method to calculate cost 
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of capital estimates that approximate the cross-sectional distribution of the risk 
premium 
6.5.4 Alternative methodologies 
As described in chapter 3, there have been some attempts in the literature to assess 
the adequacy of different models for estimating the expected cost of equity capital by 
examining how well the estimates produced are associated with the historic cross- 
sectional distribution in risk factors associated with realised equity returns in a 
consistent and predictable manner. For reasons explained in chapter 3, the estimate 
used in this thesis is following the research in this vein by Botosan and Plumlee 
(2005) that I described in section 3.4.5 (i). 
6.5.6 The finite-horizon Gordon dividend growth model 
This is the model that I use to estimate the firm's cost of equity capital and is 
identical to the rDIVPREM model that Botosan and Plumlee (2005) recommend. It is 
essentially a model that derives the implicit discount rate from discounting estimated 
future stock cash flows. A stock's main cash flows are the purchase price, any 
interim dividend income and the future proceeds of sale (i. e. the future share price, 
ignoring transactions such as scrip issues). This model therefore derives the ex- 
ante internal rate of return implicit in equating the current share price to the 
discounted expected future dividends and future share price. Because the 
effectiveness of firms' IR is measured over discrete 12-months periods ending 31't 
March, the cost of equity capital of the firms is estimated by equating the actual 
share price at time t, which is 31st March in period T (as defined in section 6.1) to the 
sum of the discounted forecasted future dividends four periods into the future and 
the forecasted share price four period ahead. The model is set out below: 
4 
pt1: (1+ riT)- 
AET (d 1T + (1 + riT) -4 P4 
A=l 
where 
The finite date is set at 4 because four years is the longest period ahead for which 
analysts publish stock price forecasts (see below). 
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Pt, P4 = stock price on 31 st March in year T and 4-year forecast stock price; 
t= 31st March in period T and is 2000 to 2002 for the US firms and 1999 to 2002 
for the UK firms, as defined in section 6.1; 
riT cost of equity capital estimate for firm i in period T; 
diT forecast dividends of firm i in period T; 
ET the expectations operator. 
This model is then run for periods T-2, T-1, T+1 and T+2 where t -2 is the stock price 
at 31't March in period T-2, t-1 is stock price at 31st March in period T-1 etc., 
resulting in an ex-ante cost of equity capital estimate for each firm for each year T-2 
to T+2. 
A conceptual problem with this model is in determining the market's expectations 
about future levels of dividends and prices. However, these can be very closely 
approximated from the consensus forecasts of security analysts, a research method 
that is established in the prior literature, e. g. Botosan and Plumlee (2002 and 2005). 
Analyst forecasts are used because their opinions are presumably derived from 
highly sophisticated and informed analysis and are likely to reflect consensus market 
expectations. 
The forecasts used in this research are those published on the Thomson Financial 
FirstCall and IIBIEIS databases. My model employs a four-year forecast horizon 
because this is the longest horizon over which forecasts are published in these 
databases. These databases contain (amongst a wealth of other information) at 
least a1 0-year history of actual equity price and dividend data and also quarterly 10- 
year history of the mean analyst dividend and stock price forecasts and respective 
forecast growth rates. Analysts do not publish share price and/or dividends forecasts 
for some of the firms in the samples for this research. Where this is the case, the 
average forecasted share price and dividend growth rates across the sample of firms 
in each IR award are applied to the current share price and most recent dividend and 
extrapolated four periods into the future. This is also an established solution that has 
been employed in past research to estimate forecast variables (e. g. Botosan and 
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Plumlee, 2002). This solution was only necessary in a small minority of these 
missing cases, in fact in less than 5% of each annual IR award sample and, by using 
either mean forecasts or by applying mean growth rate forecasts, forecasts were 
obtained for all firms. 
6.5.7 Tests and Models 
6.5.7.1 Descriptive statistics 
For each period T-2 to T+2 descriptive statistics are presented for the estimated cost 
of equity capital for all UK and US IR award-nominated firms and are shown in 
chapter 7 
6.5.7.2 Portfolio formation 
Secondly, I also test the average cost of capital estimate for the firms divided into 
portfolios of firms over the periods T-2 to T+2, to test for any relationship between 
the IR ratings and cost of capital in each period and also over the time periods both 
prior to and following the month of award nomination. The portfolios are formed as 
described in section 6.1.3.2. 
6.5.7.3 Regression analyses 
In addition, because the literature has shown that the cost of equity is negatively 
related to firm size and positively related to firm risk, and following the model 
employed by Botosan and Plumlee (2002), a further test is performed that controls 
for these factors. The relationship between IR rating and the average estimated 
cost of capital is tested for the pooled UK and US samples of firms in the periods T-2 
to T+2, using regression analysis, controlling for the firm's market value and equity 
beta, following Botosan and Plumlee (2002): 
r iT = YO + YJR iT + Y2 109 (MV) iT + Y3 JO iT +E iT 
where: 
YO intercept term; 
Y1, Y2, Y3 coefficients for the IR ratings, market value and equity beta factors; 
riT estimated cost of equity capital for firm i in year T; 
(9) 
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lRiT =IR rating of firm i in year T; 
Log(MV) iT= natural log of the market value of firm i at 31't March in year T; 
13 iT = equity beta of firm i in year T (source: DataStream); 
E iT = error term; 
T 2000 to 2002 (US firms), 1999 to 2002 (UK firms), as defined in section 6.1. 
6.6 Summary of chapter 
This concludes the chapter describing my empirical research methodologies, 
designed to test my hypotheses H01 to H06 developed in chapter 5 relating to the 
relationship between effective IR and firm equity returns, liquidity, cost of equity 
capital and analyst coverage. The following chapter reports the results of my 
analyses 
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Chapter 7. Empirical Results 
Introduction 
In this chapter I present the results of the empirical tests and analyses described in 
chapter 6. The test results are discussed below in the following sections. Section 
7.1 presents the results of the firms' equity returns, section 7.2 the test results 
relating to analyst coverage, section 7.3 the results for the firms' equity trading 
volumes and finally in section 7.4 1 present the results for my tests of the cost of 
equity capital of the firms. In each of these sections I firstly describe the results 
relating to the variable tested and then how any significant findings address the 
relevant research hypothesis and the extent to which they can be explained by 
theory. The tables showing the results from testing the firm variable are set out at 
the end of each relevant section. Finally, in section 7.5,1 summarise and conclude 
the chapter by discussing the extent to which my empirical results address the 
research questions posed in chapter 1. 
7.1. Equity returns 
In this section I describe the result of my empirical tests designed to address the 
following two null hypotheses: 
H01: There is no significant relationship between effective IR and future excess 
equity retums. 
H05: There is no significant relationship between effective IR and prior excess 
equity returns. 
I describe my findings on any abnormal equity returns that the firms earn in the prior 
period T and the future period, T+1, firstly for the full set of all firms nominated for 
each IR award and then by dividing the firms in portfolios within award samples, 
which are formed as described in above section 6.1. Section 7.1.1 refers to the 
results for US firms and section 7.1.2 results for UK firms. I employ regression 
equation (1), described in section 6.2, controlling for firm size, book-to-market and 
momentum: 
RP/a - 
RR =a+b (Rmt - 
RR) +s SMBt +h HMLt +m MOMt + et 
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In this equation, the intercept term, a, indicates the significance, sign and strength in 
two-tailed significance tests for any relationship between firms' IR rating and excess 
stock returns. Two-tailed tests are performed because my I set out to test for any 
abnormal prior or subsequent stock performance of the firms with ratings for effective 
IR. In section 7.1.3 1 discuss how the results relate to hypotheses HOI and H05 and 
in section 7.1.4 how the results can be explained by theory. In section 7.1.5 1 
conclude and summarise my findings. 
7.1.1. US firms' equity returns 
7.1.1.1 Risk-adjusted returns across all nominated firms 
The results of my tests for any abnormal prior and subsequent risk-adjusted equity 
returns of the US firms nominated for effective IR, are set out in table 7.1.1.1. and 
7.1.1.2. 
Period T 
Table 7.1.1.1 shows that the larger firms did not earn significant abnormal equity 
returns in period T at normal significance levels, which is the 12-months immediately 
preceding their nomination in the IR award. However, the smaller firms earned 
significant excess equity returns of an average 1.2% per month (t = 2.602) at a 0.01 
significance level and the sample combining the large and small firms earned 
significant excess returns of an average of 1.7% per month in period T (t = 2.246). 
Period T+I 
Table 7.1.1.2 shows that, across all nominated firms, none of the large or small firms 
with effective IR earned abnormal equity returns at a 0.05 level, in period T+1. 
Although the signs of the intercept coefficients are negative for all firm-size samples, 
indicating that the firms stocks earn inferior risk-adjusted returns in T+1, only the 
results for the small firms are weakly statistically significant at a 0.10 significance 
level (t = -1.874). 
7.1.1.2 Portfolio risk-adjusted returns 
The results of my tests for any abnormal prior and subsequent risk-adjusted returns 
of the US firms divided into portfolios are set out in table 7.1.1.3 to 7.1.1.8. 
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Period T 
Table 7.1.1.3 shows that none of the portfolios of large firms earn significant risk- 
adjusted abnormal returns in period T (for a two-tailed 0.05 significance level). In 
contrast, table 7.1-1.4 shows that all three portfolios of small firms earn significant 
excess risk-adjusted returns in period T. Portfolio 1 of small firms on average 
earned excess returns of 1.9% per month (t = 3.380,0.01 level of significance), 
which is almost 1% per month higher than firms in portfolio 2. Portfolio 2 earn 
significant excess returns of approximately 1% per month on average (t = 2.056) and 
the lowest IR rated group, portfolio 3, also earn over 1% per month on the same risk- 
adjusted basis (t = 2.001, both at 0.05 significance in two-tailed tests). Further, 
table 7.1.1.5 shows that the results are also significant in period T for the combined 
sample of smaller and larger firms divided into portfolios. Portfolio 1 of the combined 
sample on average earned excess returns of 1.3% per month (t = 2.781) at a 0.01 
level, which is 0.3% per month higher than the average of firms in portfolio 2 and 3. 
Portfolio 2 and 3 show significant excess returns of 1% per month at a 0.05 level in 
two-tailed tests (t = 2.060 and t =2.031 respectively). 
Period T+1 
The results of the same test of the large, small and combined large and small firm 
portfolios, set out in tables 7.1.1.6 to 7.1.1.8, show that none of these portfolios of 
firms earned either significant inferior or significant excess risk-adjusted returns over 
period T+1. The regression coefficients for all firms of all size and for each portfolio 
are negative but although they are weakly negatively significant at a 0.01 level for 
portfolio 2 of small firms (t = -1.687 in table 7.1.1.7) they are not significant for 
portfolio 2 of the combined sample of large and small firms (in table 7.1.1.8). 
This concludes my description of the empirical results relating to any relationship 
between effective IR and the stock returns of the US firms, which are further 
discussed below, together with the results for the UK firms, in section 7.1.3 and 
7.1.4. The tables of test results for the US firms are set out on the following pages. 
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Table 7.1.1.1. 
Results of regression analysis for all US firms nominated for Best Overall IR 2000 
to 2002 during period T, the 12-month period immediately preceding 31 March of 
each IR award. 
Rt- RFt= a+b (Rmt - 
RFO +s SMBt +h HMLt + rn MOMt + et 
where: 
Rt = the average of the returns of all of the firms nominated in each award in month t, 
RFt =the risk free rate (1 month UK treasury bill/US long bond rate) at the start of month t, 
RMt = return on the S&P 500 in month t. 
SMBt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor in month t, 
HMLt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the B/M factor in month t, 
MOMt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the momentum factor in month t, and; 
a is the intercept coefficient and b, s, h and m the estimated coefficients for the Rm-Rf, SMB, 
HML, MOM factors and e is the error term. 
Large Firms N =1,059 
Adj. R 
0.929 
Coeff. t 
a 0.050 1.476 
s 0.027 4.013 
h 0.014 2.727 
m -0.007 -1.647 
b 0.948 20.424 
Small Firms N=2,054 
Adj. R 
0.892 
Coeff. t 
a 0.012 2.602 
s 0.063 7.047 
h 0.006 0.938 
m -0.012 -2.104 
b 0.842 14.768 
Large and Small Firms N=3,113 
Adj. R 
0.918 
Coeff. t 
a 0.017 2.246 
s 0.090 6.091 
h 0.020 1.807 
m -0.018 -2.023 
b 0.907 18.222 
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Table 7.1.1.2. 
Results of regression analysis for all US firms nominated for Best Overall IR 2000 
to 2002 during period T+I, the 12-month period immediately following 31 March in 
the year of each IR award. 
Rt - RFt =a+b (Rmt - RFJ +s SMBt +h HIVILt + rn M01VIt + et 
where: 
Rt = the average of the returns of all of the firms nominated in each award in month t, 
RFt = the risk free rate (1 month UK treasury bill/US long bond rate) at the start of month t, 
RMt = return on the S&P 500 in month t. 
SMBt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor in month t, 
HMLt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the B/M factor in month t, 
MOMt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the momentum factor in month t, and; 
a is the intercept coefficient and b, s, h and m the estimated coefficients for the Rm-Rf, SMB, 
HML, MOM factors and e is the error term. 
Large Firms N=1,059 
Adj. R 
0.917 
Coeff. t 
a -0.020 -0.624 
s 0.009 1.075 
h 0.025 4.435 
m -0.007 -1.672 
b 0.896 18.446 
Small Firms N=2,059 
Adj. R 
0.936 
Coeff. t 
a -0.064 -1.874 
s 0.020 3.169 
h 0.020 3.828 
m -0.016 -4.323 
b 0.961 21.281 
Large and Small Firms N=3,113 
Adj. R 
0.931 
Coeff. t 
a -0.087 -1.271 
s 0.033 2.159 
h 0.046 4.293 
m -0.020 -3.056 
b 0.949 20.529 
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Table 7.1.1.3. 
Results of regression analysis for all large US firms nominated for Best Overall IR 
2000 to 2002 by portfolio during period T, the 12-month period immediately 
preceding 31 March of each IR award. 
Large Firms N=1,059 
Rpt- RFt= a+ b (Rmt - 
RFJ +s SIVIBt +h HMLt +m MOMt + et 
where: 
Rpt the average of the returns of the companies in portfolio P during month t, 
RR the risk free rate (1 month UK treasury bill/US long bond rate) at the start of month t, 
Rmt Return on the S&P 500 in month t, 
SMBt = Return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor in month t, 
HMLt = Return on the mimicking portfolio for the B/M factor in month t, 
MOMt= Return on the mimicking portfolio for the momentum factor in month t, 
a is the intercept coefficient and b, s, h and rn the estimated coefficients for the Rm-Rf, SMB, 
HML, MOM factors and e is the error term, 
P= portfolio 1/2/3, where portfolio 1 contains the firms with the most award nominations. 
Portfolio 1N= 302 
Adj. R 
0.859 
Coeff. T 
a 0.080 1.628 
s 0.010 1.370 
h 0.010 1.332 
m -0.010 -1.334 
b 0.992 14.067 
Portfolio 2N= 246 
Adj. R 
0.914 
Coeff. T 
a 0.010 0.928 
s 0.020 3.140 
h 0.010 1.920 
m 0.000 -0.270 
b 1.068 18.829 
Portfolio 3N= 511 
Adj. R2 
0.904 
Coeff. T 
a 0.060 1.638 
s 0.030 4.419 
h 0.020 2.789 
m -0.010 -2.247 
b 0.971 17.034 
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Table 7.1.1.4. 
Results of regression analysis for all small US firms nominated for Best Overall 
IR 2000 to 2002 by portfolio during period T, the 12-month period immediately 
preceding 31 March of each IR award. 
Small Firms N=2,054 
Rpt-RFt= a+ b(Rmt-RFt)+sSMBt+ h HMLt+ m MOMt+et 
where 
Rpt = the average of the returns of the companies in portfolio P during month t, 
RR = the risk free rate (11 month UK treasury bill/US long bond rate) at the start of month t, 
Rmt = Return on the S&P 500 in month t, 
SMBt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor in month t, 
HMLt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the B/M factor in month t, 
MOMt= Return on the mimicking portfolio for the momentum factor in month t, and; 
a is the intercept coefficient and b, s, h and m the estimated coefficients for the Rm-Rf, SMB, 
HML, MOM factors and e is the error term, 
P= portfolio 1/2/3, where portfolio 1 contains the firms with the most award nominations. 
Portfolio IN= 385 
Adj. R 
0.839 
Coeff. t 
a 0.019 3.380 
s 0.040 3.903 
h 0.010 0.782 
m -0.010 -0.887 
b 1.025 12.608 
Portfolio 2N= 389 
Adj. R 
0.915 
Coeff. t 
a 0.010 2.056 
s 0.050 6.512 
h 0.020 2.664 
m -0.010 -2.024 
b 1.081 17.753 
Portfolio 3N=1,280 
Adj. R 
0.859 
Coeff. t 
a 0.011 2.001 
s 0.070 7.155 
h 0.000 0.411 
m -0.010 -2.139 
b 1.080 17.750 
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Table 7.1.1.5. 
Results of regression analysis for all large and small US firms nominated for Best 
Overall IR 2000 to 2002 by portfolio during period T, the 12-month period 
immediately preceding 31 March of each IR award. 
Large and Small Firms N=3,113 
Rpt-RFt= a+ b (Rmt- RFJ +s SMBt+ h HMLt+ m MOMt+ et 
where: 
Rpt = the average of the returns of the companies in portfolio P during month t, 
RR = the risk free rate (1 month UK treasury bill/US long bond rate) at the start of month t, 
Rmt = Return on the S&P 500 in month t, 
SMBt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor in month t, 
HMLt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the B/M factor in month t, 
MOMt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the momentum factor in month t, and; 
a is the intercept coefficient and b, s, h and m the estimated coefficients for the Rm-Rf, SMB, 
HML, MOM factors and e is the error term, 
P= portfolio 1/2/3, where portfolio 1 contains the firms with the most award nominations. 
Portfolio IN= 687 
Adj. R 
0.882 
Coeff. t 
a 0.013 2.781 
s 0.030 3.380 
h 0.010 1.013 
m -0.010 -0.956 
b 1.011 15.463 
Portfolio 2N= 635 
Adj. R 
0.926 
Coeff. t 
a 0.010 2.060 
s 0.040 5.735 
h 0.010 2.439 
m -0.010 -1.322 
b 1.078 19.705 
Portfolio 3N=1,791 
Adj. R 
0.881 
Coeff. t 
a 0.010 2.031 
s 0.060 6.985 
h 0.010 0.933 
m -0.010 -2.231 
b 0.913 13.791 
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Tab Ie7.1.1.6. 
Results of regression analysis for all large US firms nominated for Best Overall IR 
2000 to 2002 by portfolio during period T+1, the 12-month period immediately 
following 31 March in the year of each IR award. 
Large Firms N=1,059 
Rpt-RFt= a+ b(Rmt-RFJ +s SMBt+ h HMLt+ rn MOM, + et 
where: 
Rpt = the average of the returns of the companies in portfolio P during month t, 
RR = the risk free rate (1 month UK treasury bill/US long bond rate) at the start of month t, 
Rmt = Return on the S&P 500 in month t, 
SMBt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor in month t, 
HMLt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the B/M factor in month t, 
MOMt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the momentum factor in month t, and; 
a is the intercept coefficient and b, s, h and rn the estimated coefficients for the Rm-Rf, SMB, 
HML, MOM factors and e is the error term, 
p= portfolio 1/2/3, where portfolio 1 contains the firms with the most award nominations. 
Portfolio 1N= 302 
Adj. R 
0.914 
Coeff. t 
a -0.030 -0.682 
s 0.000 0.459 
h 0.020 3.047 
m 0.000 -0.456 
b 0.941 18.301 
Portfolio 2N= 246 
Adj. R 
0.861 
Coeff. t 
a -0.050 -1.141 
s 0.020 1.921 
h 0.020 3.273 
m -0.010 -1.607 
b 0.863 13.701 
Portfolio 3N= 511 
Adj. R 
0.880 
Coeff. t 
a -0.020 -0.406 
s 0.010 0.885 
h 0.030 4.282 
m -0.010 -1.717 
b 0.895 14.956 
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Table 7.1.1.7. 
Results of regression analysis for all small US firms nominated for Best Overall 
IR 2000 to 2002 by portfolio during period T+I, the 12-month period immediately 
following 31 March in the year of each IR award. 
Small Firms N=2,054 
Rpt - 
RR= a+b (Rmt - 
RFJ +s SMBt +h HMLt +m MOM, + et 
where: 
Rpt = the average of the returns of the companies in portfolio P during month t, 
RFt= the risk free rate (1 month UK treasury bill/US long bond rate) at the start of month t, 
Rmt = Return on the S&P 500 in month t, 
SMBt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor in month t, 
HMLt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the B/M factor in month t, 
MOMt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the momentum factor in month t, and; 
a is the intercept coefficient and b, s, h and m the estimated coefficients for the Rm-Rf, SMB, 
HML, MOM factors and e is the error term. 
P= portfolio 1/2/3, where portfolio 1 contains the firms with the most award nominations. 
Portfolio 1N= 385 
Adj. R 
0.900 
Coeff. T 
a -0.060 -1.386 
s 0.010 1.142 
h 0.020 2.412 
m -0.020 -3.429 
b 1.009 17.113 
Portfolio 2N= 389 
Adj. R 
0.914 
Coeff. t 
a -0.070 -1.687 
s 0.020 2.766 
h 0.020 3.881 
m -0.010 -3.314 
b 0.930 17.943 
Portfolio 3N=1,280 
Adj. R 
0.563 
Coeff. t 
a -0.011 -1.055 
s 0.020 0.819 
h 0.020 1.074 
m -0.030 -2.254 
b 0.938 6.549 
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Tab Ie7.1.1.8. 
Results of regression analysis for all large and small US firms nominated for Best 
Overall IR 2000 to 2002 by portfolio during period T+1, the 12-month period 
immediately following 31 March in the year of each IR award. 
Large and Small Firms N=3,113 
Rpt-RFt= a+ b(Rmt-RFt)+sSMBt+ h HMLt+m MOMt+ et 
where: 
Rpt the average of the returns of the companies in portfolio P during month t, 
RR the risk free rate (1 month UK treasury bill/US long bond rate) at the start of month t, 
Rmt Return on the S&P 500 in month t, 
SMBt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor in month t, 
HMLt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the B/M factor in month t, 
MOMt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the momentum factor in month t, and; 
a is the intercept coefficient and b, s, h and rn the estimated coefficients for the Rm-Rf, SMB, 
HML, MOM factors and e is the error term, 
P= portfolio 1/2/3, where portfolio 1 contains the firms with the most award nominations. 
Portfolio 1N= 687 
Adj. R 
0.927 
Coeff. t 
a -0.050 -1.424 
s 0.010 1.139 
h 0.020 2.881 
m -0.010 -2.900 
b 0.975 20.356 
Portfolio 2N= 635 
Adj. R 
0.915 
Coeff. t 
a -0.050 -1.256 
s 0.030 3.528 
h 0.020 4.092 
m -0.010 -2.332 
b 0.913 17.836 
Portfolio 3N=1,791 
Adj. R 
0.926 
Coeff. t 
a -0.050 -1.382 
s 0.020 2.612 
h 0.020 4.052 
m -0.020 -3.966 
b 0.933 19.668 
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7.1.2 UK firms' equity returns 
7.1.2.1 Risk-adjusted returns across all nominated firms 
The results of my tests for any abnormal prior and subsequent risk-adjusted equity 
returns of the UK firms nominated for effective IR, employing regression analysis, 
controlling for firm size, book-to-market and momentum are set out in table 7.1.2.1 
and 7.1.2.2. 
Period T 
Table 7.1.2.1 shows that in period T only the firms nominated for UK Best IR 
Communications of Information in the Annual Report earned significant excess risk- 
adjusted returns at a 0.05 level of an average 2.9% per month (t = 2.162). Although 
the signs on the intercept coefficients are also positive for the firms nominated for 
Best IR Officer and Best Results Meetings, they are not statistically significant (t 
1.253 and t=1.293 respectively). 
Period T+1 
However, table 7.1.2.2 shows no significant results to indicate that the firms 
nominated for any of the three UK IR awards earned either significant excess or 
significant inferior risk-adjusted equity returns in period T+1. 
7.1.2.2 Portfolio risk-adjusted returns 
The results of my tests for any abnormal prior and subsequent risk-adjusted returns 
of the UK firms, divided into portfolios as described in section 6.1, are set out in 
tables 7.1.2.3 to 7.1.2.8. 
Period T 
Tables 7.1.2.3 to 7.1.2.5 show that the only results that are significant in period T, at 
a 0.05 two-tailed significance level, across all three of the UK IR awards are for the 
firms with the most nominations in portfolio 1. Meanwhile, the firms with fewer 
nominations, in portfolios 2 and 3, do not have significant equity returns in period T. 
portfolio 1 of UK firms nominated for the Best IR Officer category award earned 
excess returns of on average 1.7% per month (t = 2.020), 0.3% per month higher 
that the firms in portfolio 2 and 0.5% per month more than the firms in portfolio 3 
(table 7.1.2.3). Firms nominated for Best Results Meetings with Analysts and Fund 
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Managers earned average excess returns of 2% per month, t=2.045,0.8% per 
month more than portfolio 2 and 0.6% per month more than portfolio 3 (table 
7.1.2.4). Similarly, the firms in the Best IR Communications in the Annual Report 
portfolio 1 earn excess share returns of 3.9% per month in period T (t = 2.059), as 
shown in table 7.1.2.5. 
Period T+1 
Finally, tables 7.1.2.6 to 7.1.2.8 show that in period T+1 the same portfolios of firms 
do not earn significant equity returns, regardless of the category of IR in which they 
were nominated and of the number of nominations they receive. 
The tables of results for my tests of a relationship between effective IR and stock 
returns for the UK firms are set out on the following pages, and I further discuss all 
my results below in section 7.1.3 and 7.1.4. 
149 
Table 7.1.2.1. 
Results of regression analysis for all UK firms nominated 1999 to 2002 during 
period T, the 12-month period immediately preceding 31 March in the year of 
each IR award. 
Rt- RFt= a+ b (Rmt- RFt) +s SMBt +h HMLt + rn MOM, + et 
where: 
Rpt = the average of the returns of all of the firms nominated in each award in month t, 
RR =the risk free rate (1 month UK treasury bill/US long bond rate) at the start of month t, 
Rmt = Return on the FTSE All Share in month t, 
SMBt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor in month t, 
HMLt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the B/M factor in month t, 
MOMt= Return on the mimicking portfolio for the momentum factor in month t, and; 
a is the intercept and b, s, h and m are the estimated coefficients on the Rm-Rf, SMB, HML, 
MOM factors and e is the error term. 
Best IR Officer Award N= 461 
Adj. R 
0.304 
Coeff. t 
a 0.019 1.253 
s 0.235 3.543 
h 0.140 1.698 
m -0.386 -1.433 
b 1.184 10.805 
Best Results Meeting N= 412 
Adj. R 
0.322 
Coeff. t 
a 0.020 1.293 
s 0.272 3.957 
h 0.136 1.593 
m -0.350 -1.255 
b 1.015 10.622 
Best Annual Report N= 381 
Adj. R2 
0.312 
Coeff. T 
a 0.029 2.162 
s 0.217 3.719 
h 0.149 2.058 
m -0.309 -1.309 
b 1.063 10.313 
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Table 7.1.2.2. 
Results of regression analysis for all UK firms nominated 1999 to 2002 during 
period T+1, the 12-month period immediately following 31 March in the year of 
each IR award. 
Rt-RFt= a+ b(Rmt-RFt)+ sSMBt+ h HMLt+ m MOMt+et 
where: 
Rpt = the average of the returns of all of the firms nominated in each award in month t, 
RFt = the risk free rate (11 month UK treasury bill/US long bond rate) at the start of month t, 
Rmt = Return on the FTSE All Sharel in month t, 
SMBt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor in month t, 
HMLt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the B/M factor in month t, 
MOMt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the momentum factor in month t, and; 
a is the intercept and b, s, h and rn are the estimated coefficients on the Rm-Rf, SMB, HML, 
MOM factors and e is the error term. 
Best IR Officer Award N= 461 
Adj. R 
0.427 
Coeff. t 
a -0.030 -0.176 
s 0.310 4.035 
h 0.862 0.994 
m -0.389 -2.734 
b 1.258 10.039 
Best Results Meeting N= 412 
Adj. R 
0.452 
Coeff. t 
a 0.000 0.016 
s 0.308 4.104 
h 0.105 1.239 
m -0.423 -3.044 
b 1.244 10.008 
Best Annual Report N= 381 
Adj. R 
0.421 
Coeff. t 
a 0.040 0.232 
s 0.269 3.884 
h 0.856 1.098 
m -0.405 -3.162 
b 1.138 10.620 
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Table 7.1.2.3. 
Results of regression analysis for all UK firms nominated for Best IR Officer 1999 
to 2002 by portfolio during period T, the 12-month period immediately preceding 
31 March in the year of each IR award. 
Best IR Officer Award 
Rpt - 
RFt= a+b (Rmt - 
RFJ +s SMB, +h HMLt +m MOMt + et 
where: 
Rpt = the average of the returns of the companies in portfolio P during month t, 
RN = the risk free rate (11 month UK treasury bill/US long bond rate) at the start of month t, 
Rmt = Return on the FTSE All Share in month t, 
SMB, Return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor in month t, 
HMLt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the B/M factor in month t, 
MOMt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the momentum factor in month t, and; 
a is the intercept and b, s, h and m are the estimated coefficients on the Rm-Rf, SMB, HML, 
MOM factors and e is the error term, 
P= portfolio 1/2/3, where portfolio 1 contains the firms with the most award nominations. 
Portfolio 1N= 153 
Adj. R 
0.296 
Coeff. t 
a 0.017 2.020 
s 0.115 3.082 
h 0.140 3.006 
m -0.217 -1.426 
b 1.050 10.387 
Portfolio 2N= 147 
Adj. R 
0.304 
Coeff. T 
a 0.014 1.490 
s 0.134 3.172 
h 0.135 2.592 
m -0.316 -1.852 
b 1.014 10.095 
Portfolio 3N= 161 
Adj. R 
0.255 
Coeff. t 
a 0.012 1.082 
s 0.171 3.588 
h 0.853 1.442 
m -0.247 -1.275 
b 1.024 10.143 
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Tab Ie7.1.2.4. 
Results of regression analysis for all UK firms nominated for Best Results 
Meetings 1999 to 2002 by portfolio during period T, the 12-month period 
immediately preceding 31 March in the year of each IR award. 
Best Results Meeting Award 
Rpt-RFt= a+ b(Rmt-RF0 + sSMB, + h HMLt+ m MOMt+et 
where: 
Rpt = the average of the returns of the companies in portfolio P during month t, 
RR = the risk free rate (1 month UK treasury bill/US long bond rate) at the start of month t, 
Rmt = Return on the FTSE All Share in month t, 
SMBt = Return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor in month t, 
HMLt = Return on the mimicking portfolio for the B/M factor in month t, 
MOMt = Return on the mimicking portfolio for the momentum factor in month t, and; 
a is the intercept and b, s, h and m are the estimated coefficients on the Rm-Rf, SMB, HML, 
MOM factors and e is the error term, 
P= portfolio 1/2/3, where portfolio 1 contains the firms with the most award nominations. 
Portfolio 1N= 136 
Adj. R 
0.255 
Coeff. t 
a 0.020 2.045 
s 0.125 2.940 
h 0.129 2.444 
m -0.349 -2.024 
b 1.078 10.532 
Portfolio 2N= 133 
Adj. R 
0.312 
Coeff. T 
a 0.012 1.242 
s 0.145 3.373 
h 0.153 2.880 
m -0.166 -0.955 
b 1.024 10.161 
Portfolio 3N= 143 
Adj. R 
0.321 
Coeff. t 
a 0.014 1.386 
s 0.192 4.354 
h 0.806 1.481 
m -0.148 -0.830 
b 1.005 10.036 
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Table 7.1.2.5. 
Results of regression analysis for all UK firms nominated for Best Annual Report 
1999 to 2002 by portfolio during period T, the 12-month period immediatel 
preceding 31 March in the year of each IR award. 
Best Annual Report Award 
Rpt-RFt= a+ b (Rmt-RFJ +s SMBt+ h HMLt+ m MOMt+ et 
where: 
Rpt = the average of the returns of the companies in portfolio P during month t, 
RFt = the risk free rate (1 month UK treasury bill/US long bond rate) at the start of month t, 
Rmt = Return on the FTSE All Share in month t, 
SMBt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor in month t, 
HMLt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the B/M factor in month t, 
MOMt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the momentum factor in month t, and; 
a is the intercept and b, s, h and m are the estimated coefficients on the Rm-Rf, SMB, HML, 
MOM factors and e is the error term, 
P= portfolio 1/2/3, where portfolio 1 contains the firms with the most award nominations. 
Portfolio IN= 126 
Adj. R2 
0.271 
Coeff. t 
a 0.039 2.059 
s 0.139 3.426 
h 0.105 2.100 
m -0.179 -1.088 
b 1.006 10.043 
Portfolio 2N= 121 
Adj. R 
0.264 
Coeff. t 
a 0.019 1.894 
s 0.912 2.096 
h 0.171 3.177 
m -0.387 -2.191 
b 1.044 10.291 
Portfolio 3N= 134 
Adj. R 
0.315 
Coeff. t 
a 0.012 1.374 
s 0.162 4.074 
h 0.113 2.288 
m -0.111 -0.687 
b 1.091 10.663 
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Table 7.1.2.6. 
Results of regression analysis for all UK firms nominated for Best IR Officer 1999 
to 2002 by portfolio during period T+1, the 12-month period immediately following 
31 March in the year of each IR award. 
Best IR Officer Award 
Rpt - 
RFt =a+b (Rmt - 
RFJ +s SMBt +h HMLt + rn M01VIt + et 
where: 
Rpt the average of the returns of the companies in portfolio P during month t, 
RR the risk free rate (11 month UK treasury bill/US long bond rate) at the start of month t, 
Rmt Return on the FTSE All Share in month t, 
SMBt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor in month t, 
H MLt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the B/M factor in month t, 
MOMt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the momentum factor in month t, and; 
a is the intercept and b, s, h and rn are the estimated coefficients on the Rm-Rf, SMB, HML, 
MOM factors and e is the error term, 
P= portfolio 1/2/3, where portfolio 1 contains the firms with the most award nominations. 
Portfolio 1N= 153 
Adj. R 
0.376 
Coeff. t 
a -0.020 -0.142 
s 0.178 3.914 
h 0.417 0.814 
m -0.261 -3.109 
b 1.033 10.226 
Portfolio 2N= 147 
Adj. R 
0.409 
Coeff. t 
a -0.030 -0.242 
s 0.239 4.843 
h 0.556 1.000 
m -0.230 -2.524 
b 1.067 10.423 
Portfolio 3N= 161 
Adj. R 
0.357 
Coeff. t 
a 0.030 0.243 
s 0.166 3.520 
h 0.117 2.202 
m -0.264 -3.023 
b 1.031 10.203 
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Table 7.1.2.7. 
Results of regression analysis for all UK firms nominated for Best Results 
Meetings 1999 to 2002 by portfolio during period T+I, the 12-month period 
immediately following 31 March in the year of each IR award. 
Best Results Meeting Award 
Rpt-RFt= a+ b (Rmt-RFt) +s SMBt+ h HMLt+ rn MOMt+ et 
Where: 
Rpt = the average of the returns of the companies in portfolio P during month t, 
RFt = the risk free rate (1 month UK treasury bill/US long bond rate) at the start of month t, 
Rmt = Return on the FTSE All Share in month t, 
SMBt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor in month t, 
HMLt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the B/M factor in month t, 
MOMt Return on the mimicking portfolio for the momentum factor in month t, and; 
a is the intercept and b, s, h and rn are the estimated coefficients on the Rm-Rf, SMB, HML, 
MOM factors and e is the error term, 
P= portfolio 1/2/3, where portfolio 1 contains the firms with the most award nominations. 
Portfolio 1N= 136 
Adj. R 
0.305 
Coeff. t 
a 0.020 0.218 
s 0.153 3.159 
h 0.263 0.483 
m -0.280 -3.138 
b 1.082 10.524 
Portfolio 2N= 133 
Adj. R 
0.357 
Coeff. t 
a 0.080 0.758 
s 0.176 3.884 
h 0.555 1.086 
m -0.223 -2.663 
b 1.012 10.081 
Portfolio 3N= 143 
Adj. R 
0.415 
Coeff. t 
a -0.080 -0.753 
s 0.215 4.512 
h 0.127 2.372 
m -0.220 -2.497 
b 1.012 10.076 
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Table 7.1.2.8. 
Results of regression analysis for all UK firms nominated for Best Annual Report 
1999 to 2002 by portfolio during period T+1, the 12-month period immediately 
following 31 March in the year of each IR award. 
Best Annual Report Award 
Rpt-RFt= a+ b (Rmt-RFt) +s SMBt+ h HMLt+ m MOMt+ et 
Where: 
Rpt = the average of the returns of the companies in portfolio P during month t, 
RFt = the risk free rate (1 month UK treasury bill/US long bond rate) at the start of month t, 
Rmt = Return on the FTSE All Share in month t, 
SMBt = Return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor in month t, 
HMLt = Return on the mimicking portfolio for the B/M factor in month t, 
MOMt = Return on the mimicking portfolio for the momentum factor in month t, and; 
a is the intercept and b, s, h and m are the estimated coefficients on the Rm-Rf, SMB, HML, 
MOM factors and e is the error term, 
P= portfolio 1/2/3, where portfolio 1 contains the firms with the most award nominations. 
Portfolio 1N= 126 
Adj. R 
0.276 
Coeff. t 
a -0.010 -0.070 
s 0.158 3.556 
h 0.605 1.205 
m -0.192 -2.332 
b 1.078 10.544 
Portfolio 2N= 121 
Adj. R 
0.357 
Coeff. t 
a 0.070 0.587 
s 0.184 3.571 
h 0.530 0.915 
m -0.341 -3.588 
b 1.161 10.972, 
Portfolio 3N= 134 
Adj. R 
0.377 
Coeff. t 
a 0.050 0.558 
s 0.162 3.966 
h 0.793 1.726 
m -0.229 -3.033 
b 1.042 10.322 
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7.1.3 Addressing the research hypotheses on equity returns 
The smaller sized US firms nominated for having the Best Overall IR (2,054 firms) 
earned significant excess risk-adjusted returns of 1.2% per month on average in 
period T (the 12-months immediately before being nominated in the IR awards). 
In addition, although each portfolio of US small firms individually earned excess 
returns in this period, the most highly-rated portfolio (385 firms) earned the highest 
returns, at an average 1.9% per month, although both portfolio 2 and 3 firms (389 
firms and 1,280 firms) earned on average over 1% excess returns per month. In 
contrast, there is no evidence that even the most highly rated of the larger sized 
firms (1,059 firms) also nominated for having the Best Overall IR have significant 
excess equity returns over the 12-months immediately preceding the IR award 
nominations. 
Týe results for the UK firms show that the full sample of 381 firms nominated for 
Best UK Annual Report have significant excess equity returns in the preceding 
period of an average 2.9% per month. Furthermore, the results by portfolio indicate 
that the degree of IR effectiveness (number of nominations) in this category of IR 
award matters, because only the sub-set of the firms in portfolio 1 (126 firms) have 
significant prior equity returns of an average 3.9% excess returns per month, 
whereas the results for portfolios 2 and 3 in the Best Annual Report IR 
Communications category are statistically insignificant. 
There are no significant equity returns across the full sample of firms nominated for 
Best UK IR Officer (461 firms) or Best UK Results Meetings with Fund Managers and 
Analysts (412 firms) during the period immediately preceding the award nominations. 
However, the most highly rated sub-set of firms in both of these categories of IR 
(portfolio 1) did have excess returns, at on average 1.7% excess returns per month 
and 2.0% per month, respectively. Nonetheless, as with the firms in the UK Best 
Annual Report IR Communications category, results are also insignificant for 
portfolios 2 and 3 in these two IR award categories. 
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7.1.4 Theory 
Finding that smaller US firms and UK firms earn significant prior excess returns is 
consistent with some of the predictions made by behavioural finance. Behavioural 
finance suggests that the bias of representativeness explains why high prior stock 
price performance can cause individuals to assign a cognitive 'financial halo' over 
firms, whereby their high past equity performance may come to represent to the 
respondents of the IR award survey that the firm is a 'good' firm, which has a 'good' 
IR policy. The implication is that prior financial performance causes them to express 
a preference towards these firms over others, in a seemingly irrational manner. An 
alternative, yet consistent, explanation for these findings, also provided by 
behavioural finance theory, is that these firms' enhanced IR policy increases their 
$availability' to security analysts and investors, and this also may have resulted in 
them being nominated in the IR awards. 
As described above in section 7.1, US larger sized firms do not have significant prior 
excess returns. That they are nevertheless nominated for having the most effective 
overall IR may also be rooted in certain behaviours, described in behavioural 
finance, both of managers of the firms and the respondents to the IR award survey. 
Firstly, this is because the investment portfolios of the fund managers nominating 
firms for the IR awards are likely to comprise a high percentage of shares of larger 
firms. Therefore the stock performance of larger firms is probably already more 
available in the minds of these fund managers compared to that of smaller, and 
perhaps newer, firms that they do not research so actively, which is also consistent 
with the operation of the bias of availability. 
In addition, as shown in the findings of existing empirical research described in 
section 3.2., large firms are also more likely to already have a larger body of security 
analysts following their performance compared to smaller-sized firms. Therefore 
larger firms may also have higher 'availability' in the minds of analysts caused by 
their higher familiarity with them. Higher availability may cause analysts to be 
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positively biased towards these large firms and influence them to nominate a larger 
and more familiar firm for the IR award. Behavioural finance also suggests that 
some characteristics about a firm that are perceived as superior, such as large firm- 
size and having a long established history that brings an existing high level of market 
exposure for example, may be mentally transferred to represent characteristics of 
other firm' attributes, the form of a mental 'halo'. In this case, large firm size may 
come to represent a higher standard of communication performance in the eyes of 
the market i. e. larger firms are expected to provide better information than smaller 
firms, regardless of whether their shares are performing well or poorly. 
It should be noted that my analysis in equation (1) described in section 6.2.3 
specifically controls for any effect that firm size may have on the relationship 
between effective IR and excess equity returns, by including a SMB factor, defined in 
section 6.2.3 equation (i). That my findings for the smaller sized US firms (under 
$3bn market capitalisation in the year of the IR award) differ from those of the larger 
firms (over $3bn), suggests either that my methodology inadequately controls for 
firms size, or that my results pertain and in fact indicate a fundamental difference in 
the relationship between effective IR and stock returns for smaller versus larger 
firms. 
Meanwhile although, as explained in section 4.1, information risk and agency 
theories predict that effective IR will be associated with a subsequent rise in stock 
prices, I do not find any empirical evidence of excess risk-adjusted equity returns for 
the US or UK firms. Therefore, my findings are contrary to those expected according 
to theory, but, as I describe in section 4.2.4, my findings are consistent with prior 
research, which also finds that firms nominated in surveys such as the IR Magazine 
IR award survey do not earn excess returns in subsequent periods. 
7.1.5 Conclusion on equity returns 
In conclusion, because the test results show that the firms do not earn significant 
future excess equity returns, there is no evidence to reject the following null 
hypothesis: HOI: that there is no significant relationship between effective IR 
160 
and future excess equity returns. Conversely, the findings of significant prior 
excess equity returns of smaller-sized US firms and of UK firms mean that the 
following null hypothesis is rejected, H05: there is no evidence of a significant 
relationship between effective IR and prior excess equity returns. However, 
because US larger sized firms do not earn significant excess prior returns, there is 
insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis H05: there is no significant 
relationship between effective IR and prior excess equity returns for larger 
sized firms, for the reasons suggested above. 
This concludes the section describing the results of my empirical tests of equity 
returns. All of my findings on the relationship between effective IR and equity returns 
are discussed further in chapter 8. 
7.2. Analyst Coverage 
Introduction 
Here I describe the results of testing the levels of analyst coverage of the firms with 
effective IR in periods both prior and subsequent to their nomination in the IR 
awards, in accordance with the two further null hypotheses that I developed in 
chapter 5: 
H02: There is no significant relationship between effective IR and future increased 
levels of analyst coverage. 
H06. There is no significant relationship between effective IR and prior high levels 
of analyst coverage. 
My empirical analyses are designed to test, firstly, whether analyst coverage of firms 
with effective IR is higher in periods following the firms' nominations in the IR 
awards, compared to during periods prior to the IR awards. I do this by comparing 
the average number of analysts following each firm at the close of each year-end 
falling in the IR award years T-2, T-1, T, T+1 and T+2, as defined in section 6.1. 
Secondly, I test for the existence and strength of any relationship between the 
number of nominations the firms receive and their level of analyst coverage in these 
161 
prior and subsequent periods. I do this, firstly, by dividing the firms into portfolios, 
which are formed as described in section 6.1.3.2, and comparing the average 
number of analysts per firm for portfolios of firms with the most IR award 
nominations (portfolio 1), to the average number of analysts for firms in portfolios 
containing firms with fewer nominations. In addition, I perform regression analysis, 
described in section 6.3.4, to test for any relationship between the firms' number of 
nominations and their analyst coverage (employing equations 2 (a) and 2(b) 
described in section 6.3.4) at the end of the year of the IR award, controlling for firm 
size. Because the regression analysis is performed over all periods T-2, T-1, T, T+1 
and T+2, these test results may also show whether there is any relationship, and the 
strength of any relationship, in periods prior to the IR awards compared to 
subsequentperiods. 
Section 7.2.1 relates to the results of these tests for US firms and section 7.2.2 
relates to the results for UK firms. The tables showing the relevant test results are 
set out at the end of each of these sections. In section 7.2.3 1 discuss all of my 
findings in relation to hypotheses H02 and H06, in section 7.2.4 1 review how these 
findings relate to theory, and in section 7.2.5.1 conclude on my findings on any 
relationship between prior and subsequent analyst coverage for the firms with 
effective IR. 
Comparative analysis of my findings 
Firstly, I show in appendix 4a summary of my findings on the numbers of analysts 
covering the firms with effective IR compared to levels of analyst coverage found in 
the key relevant existing literature. This shows that across the pooled samples, in 
the year that the firms are nominated for the IR awards, the combined sample of 
large and small US firms 2000-2002 have an average level of coverage of 9.7 
analysts per firm and that the average across all the UK firms 1999-2002 is 7.7 
analysts per firm. 
The average number of analysts covering all the firms in my research data set are 
low compared to those shown from comparative research; Lang and Lundholm 
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(1996) find an average of 17.6 analysts per firm for 751 US firms rated in the AIMR 
survey 1985-1989, and Botosan (11997) finds an average of 11.5 per firm for 122 US 
firms in 1991. However, Lang and Lundholm (1996) do not distinguish analyst 
following levels for differently sized firms and Botosan(1997) reports an average of 
only 4.8 analysts per firm for her 62 firms with "low analyst coverage", which is 
defined as below the median number of analysts in her full sample of 122 firms. My 
results for 'large firms' (over $3bn market capitalisation at the year end of the IR 
award) of an average of 16.3 analysts per firm and for the 'small firms' (under $3bn) 
of 3.9 per firm appear reasonable in this light. 
7.2.1. US firms' analyst coverage 
The results showing levels of analyst coverage of the US firms are shown below, in 
tables 7.2.1.1 to 7.2.1.3, following a discussion of my findings. 
7.2.1.1 US large firms 
Average number of analysts 
Table 7.2.1.1 shows that the average number of analysts following large firms with 
effective IR is 15.3 per firm in period T-2,16.3 per firm in period T-1,16.3 per firm in 
the year leading up to the IR award nominations (period T), and falls to 12.3 and 
11.3 analysts per firm in periods T+1 and T+2. This shows that, on the basis of 
simple averages, the firms have higher analyst following before, compared to after, 
the IR awards. The regression analysis described below in section 7.2.1.4 further 
tests this relationship whilst additionally controlling for firm size. 
Meanwhile, my analysis of average coverage by portfolios of firms, shown in the 
second panel of table 7.2.1.1, also shows the marked relationship between the firms' 
number of IR award nominations and both their prior and subsequent levels of 
average analyst coverage. The US large firms in the portfolios with the most 
nominations (portfolio 1) attract higher average levels of analyst coverage than the 
firms in the portfolios with fewer nominations. The constituent firms in portfolio 1 (of 
3), containing 302 out of 1,059 firms, are on average followed by 20.8 analysts in 
periods immediately preceding the awards, T-1 and T, and this is also the highest 
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coverage for this group of firms in any of the periods. Meanwhile, the maximum 
number of analysts for portfolios 2 and 3 (of 3) of large firms is 14.7 across any of 
the prior periods T-2, T-1 and T. The 105 firms in portfolio 1 (of 10) are followed by 
an average of 23.6 analysts in T-1 and T but attract slightly lower coverage in 
periods T-2 (22-6), T+1 (19.6) and T+2 (18.6). Finally, the correlation coefficients 
between number of nominations and analyst coverage whilst only showing a 
coefficient of marginally above 0.5 in each period across all the 1,059 firms, does 
show the relatively constant level of coverage of the firms over these five years, 
which indicates that analysts appear to have a high degree of inertia in switching 
their attention from firms that they follow. Overall, these results indicate a strong 
positive relationship between the perceived IR performance and prior and 
subsequent analyst coverage, but that the firms' coverage is generally higher prior to 
the IR awards. 
7.2.1.2 US small Firms 
Average number of analysts 
Table 7.2.1.2 shows that the average number of analysts following each of the 2,054 
small firms in period T-2 is 3.5, in periods T-1 is 3.7, in period T 3.9 and this average 
falls to 2.5 and 2.4 in period T+1 and T+2, showing that average analyst following for 
the small firms is lower than for large firms but is also higher in periods prior to the IR 
awards compared to during subsequent periods. 
The second panel in table 7.2.1.2 shows the average coverage of the firms when 
divided into 3 portfolios. This shows that, in all periods T-2 to T+2, the small firms in 
portfolio 1 of 3, (385 out of 2054), attract the higher levels of analyst coverage 
compared to the firms in portfolios 2 and 3. The highest levels of coverage for these 
385 firms are in periods T-1 and T, with an average of 7.0 and 6.8 analysts per firm. 
This is almost twice the average level attracted by the firms in portfolio 2 in these 
periods; 3.6 and 4.0 analysts per firm and the average for portfolio 3 is only 0.4 and 
1.0 in T-1 and T. These findings indicate both that prior analyst coverage is higher 
than subsequent analyst coverage and also shows the positive relationship between 
the number of analysts following a firm and their number of IR awards nominations. 
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When divided into 10 portfolios, also shown in table 7.2.1.2, it is clearer that the 
highest levels of analyst coverage of the smaller-sized firms are concentrated on a 
small percentage of the firms with the most nominations. In all periods, the firms in 
portfolios 1,2,3 and 4 (totalling 821 firms out of 2,054) attract the majority of total 
analyst coverage across all the nominated smaller firms, leaving the other 1,233 
small firms with almost no coverage during the periods I test. This skewed 
distribution of analyst coverage is shown more clearly in the table comparing the top 
5 portfolios are compared to the bottom 5 portfolios, in the bottom panel of table 
7.2.1.2. Approximately 50% of the firms that are in the 5 lowest portfolios have on 
average a maximum of less than 1 analyst each. Despite this, the correlation 
coefficients show a consistently strong relationship (over 0.8 in each period) between 
the firms' number of nominations and analyst coverage in all periods T-2 to T+2. 
These findings are discussed further in sections 7.2.3 to 7.2.5. 
7.2.1.3 US large and small firms 
Average number of analysts 
Table 7.2.1.3 shows that across the combined sample of 3,113 large and small US 
firms an average of 9.0 analysts cover each firm in period T-2,9.5 in T-1,9.7 in T 
and 7.0 and 6.5 per firm in T+1 and T+2. This reflects my findings for the separate 
samples of large and small firms described above, that analyst coverage is higher for 
the firms in periods prior to the IR awards, compared to subsequently. 
Table 7.2.1.3 also shows that the combined sample of large and small firms with the 
highest number of nominations, when grouped into both 3 and 10 portfolios, attract 
higher analyst coverage in all periods compared to the firms with fewer nominations. 
The 687 firms (of 3,113) in portfolio 1 (of 3) have their highest average analyst 
following in period T-1 and T of 16.7 analysts per firm (the 2 years immediately 
preceding the IR award nomination month), with only 15.7 analysts per firm in T-2, 
and analyst following falls to 12.7 and 11.7 for portfolio 1 in T+1 and T+2. Firms in 
portfolio 2 have the second highest analyst following in each of these periods (9.5, 
10.5,10.4,7.7 and 7.1 in the respective consecutive periods) and firms in portfolio 3 
have the lowest coverage in each period with only a maximum of 2.0 per firm in 
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period T. The bottom panel of table 7.2.1.3 compares average analyst coverage of 
the top 5 portfolios and the bottom 5. This shows the 1,555 firms receiving IR award 
nominations in the top 50% percentile rank have significantly higher average analyst 
coverage compared to the bottom 50%. The correlation coefficients of over 0.8 in 
each period further indicate the strong positive relationship between perceived 
effective IR and analyst coverage. 
Overall, these results indicate both that for firms of all sizes there is a striking and 
almost monotonic positive relationship between analyst coverage and effective IR 
(measured by the firms' number of IR award nominations at least) and that analyst 
coverage is higher prior to the firms' nominations compared to in periods following 
the IR awards. These findings are discussed further in section 7.2.3 to 7.2.5 below. 
This concludes the section describing the results of my analyses of average 
coverage levels. Tables 7.2.1.1 to 7.2.1.3 are set out on the following pages, 
followed by a description of the results of the regression analysis to test for any 
relationship between effective IR and prior and subsequent analyst coverage, 
controlling for firm size. 
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Table 7.2.1.1. 
Results for large US Firms nominated for Best Overall IR 2000 to 2002 average 
number of analysts by portfolio 
This table shows the average number of analysts following the US companies nominated in the 
Best IR Awards in 2000 to 2002. The 3 pooled portfolios are the firms nominated in the IR 
award in 2000,2001 and 2002 divided into three portfolios 1,2 and 3, based on the ranked 
percentile of their number of IR award nominations (100% to 66.7%, 66.6% to 33.4%, 33.3% to 
0.001%) and then pooled across these years. The 10 portfolios are formed by ranking the firms 
on their number of IR award nominations and dividing the total number of firms into 10 groups 
containing equal numbers of firms. The correlation coefficient measures the strength of the 
relationship between the firms' number of nominations and their analyst following. Analyst 
following numbers are taken from the average number of estimates at the year end in which the 
firm is nominated for an IR award shown in the Thomson Financial FirstCall 11WEIS database. 
Large Firms N=1,059 
Mean Annual Analyst Following 
T-2 T-1 T T+l T+2 N 
Average 15.3 16.3 16.3 12.3 11.3 1,059 
Portfolio 
1 19.8 20.8 20.8 16.8 15.8 302 
2 13.7 14.7 14.7 10.7 9.7 246 
3 12.4 13.4 13.4 9.4 8.4 511 
Average 15.3 16.3 16.3 12.3 11.3 
Portfolio T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 N 
1 22.6 23.6 23.6 19.6 18.6 105 
2 21.1 22.1 22.1 18.1 17.1 106 
3 15.3 16.3 16.3 12.3 11.3 106 
4 13.4 14.4 14.4 10.4 9.4 106 
5 13.5 14.5 14.5 10.5 9.5 106 
6 13.5 14.5 14.5 10.5 9.5 106 
7 12.0 13.0 13.0 9.0 8.0 106 
8 12.0 13.0 13.0 9.0 8.0 106 
9 12.1 13.1 13.1 9.1 8.1 106 
10 12.9 13.9 13.9 9.9 8.9 106 
Average 15.3 16.3 16.3 12.3 11.3 
Correlation 0.531 0.531 0.531 0.532 0.532 
Coefficient 
Portfolio T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 N 
1-5 17.2 18.2 18.2 14.2 13.2 529 
6-10 12.5 13.5 13.5 9.5 8.5 530 
Total 1,059 
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Table 7.2.1.2. 
Results for small US firms nominated for Best Overall IR 2000 to 2002 average 
number of analysts by portfolio 
This table shows the average number of analysts following the US companies nominated in the 
Best IR Awards in 2000 to 2002. The 3 pooled portfolios are the firms nominated in the IR award 
in 2000,2001 and 2002 divided into three portfolios 1,2 and 3, based on the ranked percentile of 
their number of IR award nominations (100% to 66.7%, 66.6% to 33.4%, 33.3% to 0.001%) and 
then pooled across these years. The 10 portfolios are formed by ranking the firms on their 
number of IR award nominations and dividing the total number of firms into 10 groups containing 
equal numbers of firms. The correlation coefficient measures the strength of the relationship 
between the firms' number of nominations and their analyst following. Analyst following numbers 
are taken from the average number of estimates at the year end in which the firm is nominated for 
an IR award shown in the Thomson Financial FirstCall IIBIEIS database. 
Small Firms N=2,054 
Mean Annual Analyst Following 
T-2 T-1 T T+l T+2 N 
Average 3.5 3.7 3.9 2.5 2.4 2,054 
Portfolio 
1 6.2 7.0 6.8 5.5 5.2 385 
2 3.6 3.6 4.0 2.1 2.0 389 
3 0.9 0.4 1.0 0.0 0.0 1,280 
Average 3.5 3.7 3.9 2.5 2.4 
Portfolio T-2 T-I T T+I T+2 N 
1 6.7 7.7 7.4 6.2 5.9 206 
2 5.5 6.1 6.1 4.6 4.4 205 
3 4.1 4.2 4.5 2.7 2.6 205 
4 2.6 2.3 2.9 0.8 0.8 205 
5 1.9 1.4 2.1 0.0 0.0 205 
6 1.4 0.6 1.5 0.0 0.0 205 
7 0.9 0.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 205 
8 0.5 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 205 
9 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 205 
10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 208 
Average 3.5 3.7 3.9 2.5 2.4 
Correlation 0.811 0.832 0.811 0.860 0.860 
coefficient 
Portfolio T-2 T-I T T+1 T+2 N 
1-5 4.2 4.3 4.6 2.9 2.7 1,026 
6-10 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.0 1.028 
Total 2,054 
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Table 7.2.1.3 
Results for large and small US firms nominated for Best Overall IR 2000 to 2002 
average number of analysts by portfolio 
This table shows the average number of analysts following the US companies nominated in the 
Best IR Awards in 2000 to 2002. The 3 pooled portfolios are the firms nominated in the IR award 
in 2000,2001 and 2002 divided into three portfolios 1,2 and 3, based on the ranked percentile 
of their number of IR award nominations (100% to 66.7%, 66.6% to 33.4%, 33.3% to 0.001%) 
and then pooled across these years. The 10 portfolios are formed by ranking the firms on their 
number of IR award nominations and dividing the total number of firms into 10 groups 
containing equal numbers of firms. Analyst following numbers are taken from the average 
number of estimates at the year end in which the firm is nominated for an IR award shown in 
the Thomson Financial FirstCall 11WEIS database. 
Large and Small Firms N=3,113 
Mean Annual Analyst Following 
T-2 T-1 T T+I T+2 N 
Average 9.0 9.5 9.7 7.0 6.5 3,113 
Portfolio 
1 15.7 16.7 16.7 12.7 11.7 687 
2 9.5 10.5 10.4 7.7 7.1 635 
3 1.8 1.5 2.0 0.8 0.7 1,791 
Average 9.0 9.5 9.7 7.0 6.5 
Portfolio T-2 T-1 T T+I T+2 N 
1 19.7 20.7 20.7 16.7 15.7 311 
2 13.6 14.6 14.6 10.6 9.6 311 
3 12.0 13.0 13.0 9.0 8.0 311 
4 9.2 10.2 10.0 7.7 7.1 311 
5 5.3 5.8 5.9 4.3 4.1 311 
6 3.1 2.9 3.4 1.4 1.3 311 
7 1.8 1.2 2.0 0.0 0.0 311 
8 1.0 0.2 1.1 0.0 0.0 311 
9 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 311 
10 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 314 
Average 9.0 9.5 9.7 7.0 6.5 
Correlation 0.810 0.800 0.803 0.840 0.854 
coefficient 
Portfolio T-2 T-1 T T+I T+2 N 
1-5 12.0 12.9 12.8 9.7 8.9 1,555 
6-10 1.3 0.9 1.4 0.3 0.3 1,558 
Total 3,113 
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7.2.1.4 Regression analysis results 
The regression results for equations 2 (a) and 2 (b), which are described in section 
6.3.4, to test for a relationship between the firms' number of award nominations and 
analyst coverage, controlling for firm size, are set out in stable 7.2.1.4. The first 
section of this table shows the results of tests with analyst following as the 
dependent variable in regression equation 2 (a), shown again below. These 
results therefore indicate how effective IR, as measured by the firms' IR 
ratings, may affect levels of analyst coverage and are as follows: 
Results for equation 2 (a): AF iT= ro + r1IR i+ 72MV 1T+EiT 
US large firms - table 7.2.1.4 also shows that, controlling for market value, there is a 
strong and significant positive relationship between analyst coverage and the firms' 
number of IR award nominations in the periods preceding the IR award nominations 
at a 0.01 significance level, (t= 3.91,3.91 and 3.79 in T-2, T-1 and T), whereas this 
relationship is still positive, but only significant at a 0.10 level in two-tailed tests and 
at a 0.05 level in one-tailed directional tests, in the periods following the IR awards 
(t=1.87 in T+1 and T+2). 
US small firms - the results in the second panel of table 7.2.1.4 show that, as with 
the larger-sized firms, levels of analyst following of the smaller firms are significantly 
positively related to the market value of the firms. The table also ýhows that, in all 
periods T-2 to T+2, the relationship between perceived IR performance and analyst 
coverage is positive and highly significant at a 0.01 level (the t statistic is over 6 in all 
periods). The coefficients indicate that that for each extra analyst following a small 
firm it received almost one extra IR award nomination, and that analyst following 
levels also continue to be positively related to the firms' number of IR award 
nominations in the following years. 
US combined large and small firms - the final panel in the first section of table 
7.2.1.4 below shows that for the firms of all sizes, there is a positive and significant 
relationship between IR analyst coverage and IR award nominations in one-tailed 
directional tests at a 0.01 level, in all period T-2 to T+2. This relationship is also 
significant in two-tailed significance tests at a 0.05 level in the prior periods, T-2 to T 
(t=2.43,2.34 and 2.36) and at a 0.01 level in the subsequent periods T+1 and T+2 
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2.67 and 2.79). These results show that effective IR across the combined 
sample of large and small firms appears to 'drive' or lead to higher levels of 
analyst coverage in the three years preceding the awards, also in the two following 
years. 
Results for equation 2 (b) IR i= )10 + r, AF iT+ r2MV 1T+EiT 
The results of these tests are in the second section of table 7.2.1.4 and show how 
pre-existing levels of analyst coverage may be 'driving' or leading the size of the 
firms' IR ratings, which is the dependent variable in this equation. 
US large firms -the regression coefficients in all periods T-2 to T+2 are positive and 
highly significant (the t statistics are all over 20), suggesting that analyst coverage 
levels may be determining the size of the firms' IR ratings. In all of these periods the 
results indicate that for one extra analyst the firms receive over 0.5 extra IR award 
nominations (the coefficients are all 0.531). 
US small firms - for the set of smaller firms, the coefficients for the analyst coverage 
variable (AF) are also all positive and highly significant in all periods T-2 to T+2, with 
t statistics as high as 75.92 in period T+2 (coefficient of 0.86 indicates that for one 
extra analyst a firm receives over 0.8 extra IR award nominations. 
US large and small firms - for the combined sample of firms there are positive and 
significant regression results for the AF variable in all periods T-2 to T+2 with t 
statistics over 23 in all these periods and the coefficients indicate that, for all firms, 
they receive approximately 0.5 more IR award nominations for each extra analyst 
that covers them (i. e. the coefficients average approximately 0.5 across all these 
periods). 
This concludes the section describing the results of my tests for any relationship 
between analyst coverage and effective IR of the US firms. The table of results of 
my regression analyses is shown below and all my findings described above are 
further discussed in sections 7.2.3 to 7.2.5, following my description of the results of 
the tests on levels of analyst coverage of the UK firms with effective IR in the 
following section. 
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UK firms' analyst coverage 
The results for UK firms showing levels of analyst coverage by portfolios of firms 
over the periods T-2 to T+2 and of the regression analyses described in section 6.3.4 
to test for any relationship between effective IR and analyst coverage, controlling for 
firm size, set out in table 7.2.2, immediately following my discussion of these results 
below 9- 
7.2.2.1 Best IR Officer Award 
Average number of analysts 
Table 7.2.2 shows that the average number of analysts following each of the 461 
firms nominated for Best IR Officer does not vary significantly from the periods prior 
to periods following the IR awards, at approximately 7.5 in all periods that I test. In 
T-2 average coverage is 7.6 analysts per firm, and in consecutive years T-1, T, T+1 
and T+2 the average is 7.5,7.7,7.5 and 7.4. However, table 7.2.2 also shows that, 
in all the periods T-2 to T+2, the firms in portfolio 1 have the highest average levels 
of analyst-following, portfolio 2 the second highest and portfolio 3 the lowest, but that 
the highest coverage level of the firms in portfolio 1 is 8.2 analysts per firm in periods 
T-2 and period T. Also, the correlation coefficients between the firms' numbers of 
award nominations and analyst coverage are positive and approximately 0.6 in each 
period. Overall, these findings suggest a positive relationship between analyst 
following and firms' IR ratings and that analyst following is higher prior to when the 
IR ratings are given to firms. 
Regression analysis results for'Best IR Officer' 
The results described below are for equation 2 (a) AFiT --": yo +, yj IR i +, Y2MV tT +E itT 
described in section 6.3.4. The signs of the regression coefficients of the 
relationship between analyst coverage and the market value of the firms shown in 
table 7.2.2 are positive but insignificant in each of the periods. However, the 
9 As described in section 6.3.4., two regression analyses are performed to test the relationship 
between analyst coverage and the UK firms IR ratings. The results described in this section relate 
only to those from equation 2 (a) AFffý- yo+yjIRj+Y2MViT + CAT because none of the results 
from the test using equation 2 (b), IR iT = yo + y, AF iT + Y2MV iT +E jtT are significant. The 
implications of the results described in this section and of the insignificant results from equation 2 (b) 
are discussed in section 7.2.3 to 7.2.5 below. 
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coefficients indicating a relationship between the IR performance of the firms and 
analyst following are also positive and are significant in each period. This 
relationship is significant at a 0.05 level (one-tailed) and at a 0.10 level (two-tailed) in 
T-2 (t= 1.688), at a 0.025/0.05 level in periods T-1 (t=1.97) and T (t=1.98) and 
positive and significant at a 0.10/0/05 level in T+1 (t=11.69). Therefore, controlling for 
firm size, a higher number of nominations for Best IR Officer are subsequently given 
to firms with higher analyst coverage in the periods preceding the month of their 
nominations and firms with more nominations continue to have higher analyst 
following in the year following the IR awards compared to other nominated firms. 
7.2.2.2 Best Results Meeting Award 
Average number of analysts 
The second panel of table 7.2.2 shows that the levels of analyst coverage for firms 
nominated for Best Results Meetings with Fund Managers and Analysts are similar 
to those for the Best IR Officer award category and similarly do not vary greatly 
across the periods. Although the correlation coefficients again do not indicate a 
strong relationship between nomination numbers and analyst following (the mean is 
0.57 across the five periods), the table shows that portfolio 1 attracts the highest 
coverage in most periods compared to the other firms. The highest level for portfolio 
1 is in the periods prior to the IR awards, at 8.5 analysts per firm in T-2,8.0 in T-1 
and 8.1 in T failing to 7 analysts per firm in T+1 and T+2. Meanwhile, portfolios 2 
and 3 attract approximately 7 analysts per firm in periods T-2 to T+1, but in T+2 this 
rises slightly to 7.6 analysts, although this is the only period during which these firms 
have higher analyst coverage than firms in portfolio 1. 
Regression analysis results for 'Best Results Meeting' 
The results described below are for equation 2 (a) AF iT ý YO + Y1 IR i+ Y2MV iT +E iff 
described in section 6.3-4. The regression coefficients in the second panel of table 
7.2.2 show that the relationship between the number of analysts and market value of 
the firm is positive and significant in all of the periods, indicating that more analysts 
follow larger sized firms. The coefficients showing the relationship between the 
firms' number of IR award nominations and analyst following are also positive and 
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significant and positive at a 0.01 level in the prior periods T-1 (t=2.54) and at a 0.025 
level in T (t=2.20) in directional tests and continue to be significant with a 0.025 one- 
tailed significance level in T+2 (t=1.99) but, although still positive, are insignificant in 
T-2 and in T+1 - 
7.2.2.3 Best Annual Report 
Average number of analysts 
The final panel in table 7.2.2 shows the average analyst following for firms 
nominated for Best Annual Report. Although analyst following is marginally higher in 
period T, at 7.9 analysts compared to 7.6 in T-1 and 7.7 in T+1, coverage levels do 
not vary significantly across the periods I test. However, the table does show that 
firms in portfolio 1 attract the highest analyst coverage in all of the periods, peaking 
at 9.7 analysts per firm in period T when portfolio 2 firms have 6.9 per firm and 
portfolio 3 has 7 analysts per firm. The correlation coefficients also show that the 
relationship between nominations and analyst coverage is positive and averages at 
approximately 0.6 across the periods. 
Regression analysis results forBest Annual Report' 
The results described below are for equation 2 (a) 
AFiT 7- 'yo + yj IR j+ Y2MV iT +C RT 
described in section 6.3-4. The final panel in table 7.2.2 shows significant and 
positive relationships between analyst coverage and IR nomination numbers (0.01 
significance level ) in periods T-1 (t=2.33) and T (t=3.60), showing that when these 
firms have higher analyst coverage they also subsequently receive a higher number 
of nominations in the IR awards. There is also a positive relationship between 
numbers of award nominations and subsequent analyst coverage, which are 
significant in period T+2 and at a 0.01 level (t=1.68) in two-tailed tests and at a 0.05 
level in directional testing. 
This concludes the section describing the results of my tests for any relationship 
between analyst coverage and effective IR for the UK firms. The tables of results of 
these tests are set out on the following pages, and in section 7.2.3 1 review my 
results on the US and UK firms' levels of analyst coverage. 
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Tab Ie7.2.2. 
Results for UK firms nominated 1999 to 2002 average number of analysts 
by portfolio and regression estimation 
This table shows the average number of analysts following the UK companies nominated in the 
Best IR Officer, Best Results Meeting and Best Annual Report IR Awards in 1999 to 2002 for all 
nominated companies divided into three portfolios. The pooled samples are all firms nominated 
in the IR awards in 1999,2000,2001 and 2002 divided into three portfolios 1/2/3 based on the 
ranked percentile of IR Score (100% to 66.7%, 66.6% to 33.4%, 33.3% to 0.001%). Analyst 
following numbers are taken from the average number of estimates at the year end in which the 
firm is nominated for an IR award shown in the Thomson Financial FirstCall IIBIEIS database. 
The table also shows the results of testing the relationship between IR rating for all nominated 
companies and the number of analysts in the year in which the firm is nominated, whilst 
controlling for market value. The correlation coefficient measures the strength of the relationship 
between the firms' number of nominations and their analyst following, 
The following regression is estimated: 
AFITý yo+yllRi+ 72MV iT +C iff 2(a) 
where: 
AF F= Number of analysts publishing forecasts in 11BIEIS FirstCall database for firm i 
in year T, the 12-months immediately preceding 31 March in the year of each IR award. 
MviT = Market Value of firm i at 31 March in year T, 
IR iT = IR rating of firm i in year T 
Best IR Officer Award N= 461 
T-2 T-1 T T+l T+2 N 
Average 7.6 7.5 7.7 7.5 7.4 
Portfolio 
1 8.2 7.9 8.2 8.0 7.9 153 
2 7.3 7.6 7.5 7.9 7.6 147 
3 7.2 6.9 7.4 6.7 6.8 161 
Average 7.6 7.0 7.7 7.0 7.0 461 
Correlation 0.562 0.575 0.596 0.619 0.620 
coefficient 
Regression 
T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 
Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
ro 0.495 9.835 0.497 10.078 0.496 10.064 0.497 10.228 0.503 10.177 
IR 0.079 1.688 0.080 1.971 0.082 1.976 0.081 1.749 0.072 1.553 
mv 0.026 0.561 0.026 0.546 0.026 0.551 0.015 0.322 0.016 0.337 
R2 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001 
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Table 7.2.2. continued. 
Results for UK firms nominated 1999 to 2002 average number of analysts 
by portfolio and regression estimation 
Best Results Meeting Award N= 412 
T-2 T-1 T T+I T+2 N 
Average 7.7 7.4 7.5 7.0 7.4 
Portfolio 
1 8.5 8.0 8.1 7.0 7.0 136 
2 7.2 7.3 7.3 6.8 7.6 133 
3 7.5 7.0 7.0 7.2 7.6 143 
Average 7.7 7.4 7.5 7.0 7.4 
Correlation 0.581 0.531 0.481 0.581 0.631 
coefficient 
Regression 
T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 
Coeff. T Coeff. T Coeff. T Coeff. T Coeff. T 
ro 0.387 9.702 0.375 9.602 0.384 9.841 0.375 9.607 0.364 9.291 
IR 0.004 1.075 0.027 2.539 0.011 2.204 0.027 1.533 0.049 1.985 
mv 0.196 3.717 0.189 3.710 0.193 3.675 0.189 3.713 0.185 3.686 
R2 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.035 0.037 
Best Annual Report Award N= 381 
T-2 T-I T T+I T+2 N 
Average 7.7 7.6 7.9 7.7 7.5 
Portfolio 
1 8.6 8.7 9.7 8.8 7.8 126 
2 7.1 7.0 6.9 7.7 7.4 121 
3 7.4 7.1 7.0 6.6 7.4 134 
Average 7.7 7.6 7.9 7.7 7.5 
Correlation 0.547 0.572 0.576 0.688 0.550 
coefficient 
Regression 
T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 
Coeff. T Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t 
408 0 404 10 0.394 10.181 0.331 8.526 0.392 10.161 0.329 8.475 . ro 
IR 0.041 
. 0.782 0.069 2.329 0.183 3.595 0.073 1.406 0.187 1.684 
mv 0.034 0.642 0.033 0.645 0.035 0.681 0.033 0.634 0.037 0.726 
R2 -0.002 0.001 0.030 0.002 0.032 
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7.2.2 Addressing the research hypotheses on analyst coverage 
As described above, the US firms with the highest number of nominations have a 
significantly higher level of analyst following compared to the firms with fewer 
nominations. Coverage of the larger sized firms in the top 50% of firms, when 
ranked in order of the number of their nominations, is on average 18.2 per firm 
compared to the firms in the lowest 50% that have an average of 13.5 analysts per 
firm. Also, these levels of coverage are persistent; that is, the firms with a certain 
number of nominations in the IR awards attract a relatively constant level of analysts 
over time. 
Analyst following of the US smaller firms, as expected based on the prior literature, is 
lower compared to the number of analysts following larger sized firms (an overall 
average of 3.9 compared to 16.3), but is also higher for the firms with more IR award 
nominations compared to firms with fewer nominations. In the case of the small 
firms, the top portfolio of 1,026 firms of the 2,054 total have on average 4.6 analysts 
each in the 12-months leading up to the IR award, whereas the least often 
nominated 50% have only an average of 0.7 per firm. 
The results of both of the regression analyses to test the relationship between 
analyst coverage and IR ratings, controlling for firm size, both by separate samples 
of 'large firms' and 'small firms' and across 'large and small firms' show significant 
relationships between coverage and IR award nominations in periods both prior to 
and subsequent to their nomination for 'Best Overall IR' performance. Notably, 
though, whilst both showing significant positive results, the results of equation 2(b) 
for US firms; which takes IR ratings as the dependent variable, are statistically much 
stronger than those for equation 2 (a), which takes levels of analyst coverage and 
the dependent variable. Meanwhile, only results for running equation 2(a) are 
significant for UK firms. The aims of conducting these two types of tests were both 
to test for the existence of any relationship between more effective IR and analyst 
coverage and also to test for any lead or lag effects. And the implications of my 
findings are that, whilst effective IR is related to higher analyst coverage, based on 
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the stronger results for equation 2(a), higher analyst coverage appears to 'lead' 
effective IR more than 'lag' effective IR. 
For UK firms, the firms given more nominations in the UK IR awards also have 
higher analyst coverage, although the level of coverage is slightly lower than for the 
US firms (Best IR Officer firms have an average of 7.7 analysts per firm in the 12- 
months leading up the IR award, Best Results Meeting firms have 7.5 per firm and 
firms nominated for Best Annual Report have 7.9 per firm on average). The 
regression results of regression equation 2(a) for the UK firms show that, even 
controlling for the effect of firm size on analyst coverage, the relationship between 
the firms' number of nominations and the number of analysts following them is 
positive and significant, but the significance of this relationship is stronger in the 
periods prior to their nomination compared to the following years (seen by the t 
statistics in table 7.2.2), indicating that more effective IR is associated with higher 
analyst following. Meanwhile, as noted above, the regression results to test for any 
'lead' effect between higher pre-existing levels of analyst coverage and IR ratings of 
equation 2(b) are insignificant, suggesting that more effective IR 'leads', more than 
'lags' higher analyst coverage. 
Prior to my conclusions on my tests concerning the firms' analyst coverage, in the 
following section I place all of the findings described above in the context of 
relationships between effective IR and analyst following that are predicted by 
relevant theory. 
7.2.4 Theory 
My findings on the relationship between high levels of analyst coverage for the firms 
with high ratings for effective IR are consistent with the IR award survey respondents 
being subject to some decision-making biases described in the behavioural finance 
literature. Specifically, behavioural finance suggests that the bias of 
representativeness can explain how some 'favoured' characteristics about firms can 
cause decision-makers to create a mental 'halo' over firms that possess these 
characteristics that they carry-over to other attributes of the firm. If analysts have a 
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positive bias towards following large firms over smaller firms then analyst following 
will be higher for larger-sized firms and they are more likely to nominate the firms 
they already follow for the IR awards, perhaps regardless of their financial 
performance. 
Also, although my regression test results indicate that high analyst coverage appears 
to 'lead' rather than 'lag' the firms' being nominated for effective IR, the relationship I 
find between coverage and the number of IR award nominations for the firms is 
positive across all years that I test, both prior to and also following the nomination 
month. This suggests that, once attracted to a firm with effective IR, analysts follow 
firms consistently over time. Firms with effective IR may enter a form of 'virtuous 
analyst coverage circle'. whereby investors and other capital market participants are 
better informed about the firms for whom many analysts produce a wealth of analysis 
and information and are thereby rendered more 'available', as described in the 
behavioural finance literature, formalised in the psychological bias of 'availability', 
whereby more familiar choices are favoured by decision-makers. 
7.2.5 Conclusion on analyst coverage 
In summary, the test results show that the firms with high prior levels of analyst 
coverage receive higher subsequent IR ratings by the respondents to the IR award 
survey. Further, the positive relationship between the IR rating and analyst coverage 
persists beyond the nomination date, although the level of analyst coverage does not 
significantly increase over future periods. Overall, this means that null hypothesis 
H02 cannot be rejected at normal significance levels, that there is no significant 
relationship between effective IR and future increased levels of analyst 
coverage. On the contrary the results for both the US firms and UK firms provide 
significant evidence to reject the null hypothesis H06, that there is a no significant 
relationship between effective IR and prior high levels of analyst coverage. 
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This concludes the section on the empirical tests of analyst coverage. My findings 
on the relationship between effective IR and analyst coverage are discussed more 
fully in chapter 8. 
7.3 Equity Trading Volumes 
Introduction 
In this section I describe the results of the tests described in section 6.4 that are 
designed to test the null hypothesis that stock liquidity is not higher subsequent to 
the firms' nominations in the IR awards that I developed in chapter 5: 
H03: There is no significant relationship between effective IR and future increased 
trading volumes of equity. 
Section 7.3.1 describes the US firm results and section 7.3.2 results for the UK firms. 
Section 7.3.3 reviews how my findings relate to null hypothesis H03 and in section 
7.3.4 1 review how they relate to theory. I conclude on stock liquidity in section 7.3.5. 
7.3.1 US firms' equity trading 
The results are set out in table 7.3.1.1 to 7.3.1.7. 
7.3.1.1 Relative equity trading volumes (RV) 
RV measures stock liquidity in terms of average monthly trading volume over 12- 
month periods as a percentage of the average monthly trading volume of the 
average firm in the same industry sector over the same 12-months, thus largely 
controlling for industry-specific factors that may affect trading volumes. Although the 
RV measure does not specifically control for firm size, the regression tests I perform, 
which are described below in section 7.3.1.3 for US firms, do control for firm size. 
US large firms 
Table 7.3.1 .1 shows that the firms in portfolio 1 have the highest average RV in both 
periods T and T+1, at 3.11 times'normal volume'in T and increasing to 3.63 times in 
T+1, which are higher than the equivalent combined RV of portfolios 2 and 3 (1.17 in 
T and 1.45 in T+1). Portfolio 1 firms also show the largest increase in RV as a 
percentage of the average firm in their industry sector (measured by the DRV) with a 
DRV of 0.52, which is higher than the average DRV of portfolios 2 and 3 which, as 
shown in table 7.3.1.1, is 0.28. Also, a one-tailed t test of the difference in mean RV 
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across all 1,059 large firms between period T-1 and period T is statistically significant 
at a 0.10 level (t=1 . 35) and the general rise in their stock liquidity (volumes) is shown 
by the percentages of positive and negative DRV statistics, which are positive for 
61.6% of these large-sized firms. 
US small firms 
As expected, trading volumes for the smaller firms are much lower than for the larger 
firms, which is indicated by the significantly smaller RV results for the smaller firms. 
The RV measure of liquidity rises for all three portfolios of firms from T to T+1. The 
firms in portfolio 1 have (marginally) the highest average RV in both periods, at 0.046 
rising to 0.050, although portfolio 2 shows the largest percentage increase (DRV is 
0.0095 compared to 0.0042). Although the t test of the difference in mean RV 
across all the 2,054 small firms shows that the rise in liquidity is not large enough to 
be statistically significant, the DRV statistic is still positive for 63.2% of the firms, 
showing that in general the liquidity of the smaller firms with effective IR clearly rose 
between periods T and T+1. 
US large and small firms 
Unsurprisingly, given the results described above, the RV statistic increases across 
all firms in the combined sample of large and small firms from period T to T+1. In 
addition, the firms with higher IR ratings exhibit higher increases in this liquidity 
measure compared to the firms with lower ratings (DRV is 0.21 for portfolio 1,0.13 
for portfolio 2 and 0.01 for portfolio 3). Finally, the DRV statistic is positive for 1,949 
firms out of 3,113 (62.6%) and negative for 37.4%, reflecting the general increase in 
liquidity for across all of the US firms (although again not large enough to be 
statistically significant). Therefore, overall, stock liquidity levels rise in general 
following the IR awards and appear to be positively associated with the firms' ratings 
for IR effectiveness. 
7.3.1.2 Liquidity ratio (LR) 
LR measures the price-elasticity of the firm's stock, because it measures changes in 
trading volumes that are associated with a unit change in stock price. Although LR 
also does not control for firm size, a change in the LR (DLR) is a ratio that shows the 
sign and size of the change in price elasticity and so provides a measure of a rise or 
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fall in the 'market depth' of the firms' stocks, i. e. a DLR of <1 indicates a fall in stock 
liquidity falls. 
US large firms 
Table 7.3.1.4 shows that LR rises across all firms from T to T+1. It also shows that 
LR of the firms in the portfolio with most nominations (portfoliol) more than doubles 
between period T to T+1 (DLR is 2.04 for portfoliol, more than twice that of portfolio 
2, at 0.79, and also higher than portfolio 3 firms, at 1.04), indicating that the firms 
perceived to have the most effective IR have a much higher rise in liquidity (the 
apparent fall in liquidity of firms in portfolio 2 is unexpected, whilst LR for portfolio 3 
rises). Although the t test results show that the change in mean LR across the 
sample of large firms alone is not significant, DLR is >1 for 55.32% of the firms, 
indicating that in general liquidity rises for large firms with effective IR. 
US small firms 
Contrary to the RV results for the US small firms described above, when measured 
by LR stock liquidity of the firms in portfolio 1 is the highest of the portfolio groups in 
both periods T and T+1 (because LR measures changes in volumes in relation to 
changes in stock returns i. e. of the price elasticity of traded volumes). Although LR 
for both portfolios 2 and 3 increase from T to T+1 (portfolio 2 LR is 1.76 in T with a 
IDLR of 1.05 and portfolio 3 is 1.48 with a DLR of 1.12), portfolio 1 has a DLR of 1.38 
and so exhibit the highest increase in liquidity over the periods. Meanwhile, the rise 
in the size of LR across the small firms is significant at a 0.05 level (t= 1.69) and DLR 
is >1 for slightly over 50% of the firms (1,034 out of 2,054). 
US large and small firms 
Table 7.3.1.6 shows once more that portfolio 1 has the highest LR in both periods 
(6.77 in period T with a two-fold increase to 12.10 in period T+1), whereas average 
LR across of all other firms is approximately 3.0 in both periods. LR of portfolio 3 
also rises from 3.11 to 3.32, although for portfolio 2 LR falls from 3.04 to 2.67 (DLR 
for portfolio 2 of less than 1, at 0.88). In summary, the firms with the most award 
nominations have both the highest stock liquidity in each period and also and the 
highest increases in liquidity. Finally, LR is >1 for 52% of all US firms although, as 
noted above, whilst the t test for the change in mean LR is significant for the 2,054 
small firms, for the combined sample of large and small firms the absolute rise in 
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mean LR is not significant. So far, the tests of liquidity have controlled only for 
industry sector factors that may affect stock liquidity. The regression analysis results 
described below control both for the industry sector and market value of the firms. 
7.3.1.3 Regression analysis 
The results of the regression model, to test the relationship between the US firms' IR 
rating and equity trading volumes, controlling for firm size and equity beta, are shown 
in Table 7.3.1.7. The regression equation is set out in section 6.4.3.5 (equation (7)). 
Firstly, consistent with existing literature that has shown that stock liquidity is higher 
for lower risk and larger-sized firms, the coefficients show that the firms' equity 
trading volumes are negatively related to equity risk beta, although none of the 
results are significant. However there are significant and positive coefficients for the 
firms' market value variable that are significant at a 0.05 level in one-tailed tests in 
period T for the small firms and at a 0.01 level in period T and at a 0.10 level in 
period T +1 for the combined sample of large and small firms, although for the large 
firms alone they are not statistically significant. Table 7.3.1.7 also shows that 
trading volume is significantly positively related to the IR rating of the firms in periods 
T and T+1 but only for the large firms. The strength of this relationship is higher in 
period T (0.483 t= 16.95) but is still highly significant in T+1 (0.171 t=5.31). This 
means that, controlling for differences in trading volumes related to risk and market 
size, the larger firms with higher equity trading volumes are subsequently given more 
IR award nominations and that the firms with more nominations also continue to 
have higher trading volumes over the following year (in period Tt= 16.95 and in 
period T+1 t=5.31). Whilst the coefficients showing any relationship between IR 
ratings and liquidity for the smaller firms in periods T and T+1 are both positive they 
are insignificant. However, the final panel in table 7.3.1.7 shows that when the 
smaller firms are combined with the larger firms there is again a strong, positive 
relationship between trading volume and IR ratings (t=23.20 in period T and t= 6.98 
in T+1). 
This concludes my discussion of the results of the tests for any relationship between 
effective IR and increased stock liquidity for the US firms. The tables of test results 
for the US firms are set out on the following pages. 
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Table 7.3.1.1. 
Results for large US firms nominated for Best Overall IR 2000 to 2002 relative 
volumes (RV) 
This table shows the average monthly relative volumes during 12-month periods T and T+1. 
Relative volume (RV) measures the traded volume of a stock as a percentage of the average 
traded volume of the stock of a firm in the same industry sector in the same month. The table 
also shows the results of at test for the difference in average RV between year T and T+1 and 
also the number of companies for which the change in RV from T to T+1 (DRV) is positive or 
negative. DRV summarises the sign and size of the change in liquidity from before to after the 
company was nominated for the IR award. The table shows the number of companies in the 
sample where DRV is positive or negative. 
Relative Volume RVit Vit / (V,, t/N,, t) 
Change in Relative Volume DRVjt RVit- RVit., 
where: 
V, t the traded volume of stock of firm i during month t 
Vrnt traded volume of stock in firm i's industry sector during month t 
N .. t number of 
firms listed in firm i's industry sector in the FTSE All Share/S&P indices at the 
end of month t 
T= 12-month period preceding the month of the IR award nomination 
Large Firms N=1,059 
Relative Volumes (RV) 
portfolio RV T RV T+1 DRV it N 
1 3.11 3.63 0.52 302 
2 1.07 1.18 0.11 246 
3 1.26 1.71 0.45 511 
1,059 
2+3 1.17 1.45 0.28 757- 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means of RV in T and T+1 
T T+1 
Mean 1.78 2.22 
Variance 288.29 426.80 
Pearson Correlation 0.87 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
t Stat 1.35 
Change in Relative Volumes (DRV) T to T+1 
Sign of DRV No of Cases % Cases 
-ve 
407 38.43% 
+ve 652 61.57% 
1,059 
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Table 7.3.1.2. 
Results for small US firms nominated for Best Overall IR 2000 to 2002 relative 
volumes (RV) 
This table shows the average monthly relative volumes during 12-month periods T and T+1. 
Relative Volume measures the traded volume of a stock as a percentage of the average 
traded volume of the stock of a firm in the same industry sector in the same month. The 
table also shows the results of a t, test for the difference in average RV between year T and 
year T+1 and also the number of companies for which the change in RV from T to T+I 
(DRV) is positive or negative. DRV summarises the sign and size of the change in liquidity 
from before to after the company was nominated for the IR award. The table shows the 
number of companies in the sample where DRV is positive or negative. 
Relative Volume RVit = Vit / (V, JN, t) 
Change in Relative Volume DRVjt = RVit. RVit., 
where: 
V, t the traded volume of stock of firm i during month t Vmt traded volume of stock in firm i's industry sector during month t 
N,,, t number of firms listed in firm i's industry sector in the FTSE All Share/S&P indices at 
the end of month t 
T= 12-month period preceding the month of the IR award nomination 
Small Firms N=2,054 
Relative Volumes (RV) 
Portfolio RV T RV T+I DRV it N 
1 0.046 0.049 0.0042 385 
2 0.040 0.049 0.0095 389 
3 0.021 0.024 0.0028 1,280 
2,054 
2+3 0.031 0.037 0.0061 1,669 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means of RV in T to T+1 
T T+I 
Mean 0.03 0.03 
Variance 0.02 0.07 
Pearson Correlation 0.31 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
t Stat 0.47 
Change in Relative Volumes (DRV) 
Sign of DRV No of Cases % Cases 
-ve 757 36.85% 
+ve 1,297 63.15% 
2,054 
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Table 7.3.1.3. 
Results for large and small US firms nominated for Best Overall IR 2000 to 
2002 relative volumes (RV) 
This table shows the average monthly relative volumes during 12-months periods T and T+1. 
Relative Volume measures the traded volume of a stock as a percentage of the average traded 
volume of the stock of a firm in the same industry sector in the same month. The table also 
shows the results of at test for the difference in average RV between year T and year T+1 and 
also the number of companies for which the change in RV from T to T+1 (DRV) is positive or 
negative. DRV summarises the sign and size of the change in liquidity from before to after the 
company was nominated for the IR award. The table shows the number of companies in the 
sample where DRV is positive or negative. 
Relative Volume RVit = Vit / (V,, t/Nmt) 
Change in Relative Volume DRVit = RVit. RVit., 
where: 
Vit = the traded volume of stock of firm i during month t 
V, t = traded volume of stock in firm i's industry sector during month t 
Nmt = number of firms listed in firm i's industry sector in the FTSE All Share/S&P indices at the 
end of month t. 
T= 12-month period preceding the month of the IR award nomination 
Large and Small Firms N=3,113 
Relative Volumes (RV) 
Portfolio RV T RV T+1 DRV it N 
1 1.31 1.52 0.21 687 
2 0.54 0.67 0.13 635 
3 0.47 0.48 0.01 1,791 
3,113 
2+3 0.51 0.57 0.07 2,426 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means in RV in T and T+1 
T T+1 
Mean 0.75 3.16 
Variance 141.90 204.82 
Pearson Correlation 0.20 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
t Stat 0.94 
Change in Relative Volumes (DRV) 
Sign of DRV No of Cases % Cases 
-ve 1,164 37.39% 
+ve 1,949 62.61% 
3,113 
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Tab Ie7.3.1.4. 
Results for large US firms nominated for Best Overall IR 2000 to 2002 liquidity 
ratio (LR) 
This table shows the average monthly liquidity ratios during T and T+1 by portfolio of firms. The 
Liquidity Ratio (LR) is a measure of 'market depth' as it measures the trading volume of a stock 
associated with a unit change in the stock price. The table also shows the change in the 
Liquidity Ratios (DLR) over periods T to T+1. This measures the change in traded volumes over 
time that is associated with a change stock return over the same period. 
Liquidity Ratio LRj I Vit /EIR,, l 
Change in liquidity ratio DLRj LRiT+l / LRiT 
V, t = the traded volume of stock of firm i during month t 
Rit = the return on stock of firm I in month t 
The summation is performed over both the 12-months prior to and following the month of the 
award (T and T+1). 
Large Firms N=1,059 
Liquidity Ratio (LR) 
Portfolio LRT LR T+1 DLR N 
1 12.82 26.12 2.04 302 
2 6.41 5.05 0.79 246 
3 7.39 7.69 1.04 511 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means of LR in T and T+1 
LRT LR T+1 
Mean 8.73 12.41 
Variance 5060.9 20732.9 
Pearson Correlation 0.41 
Hypothesized Mean 0.00 
Difference 
t Stat 0.89 
Change in Liquidity Ratio (DLR) 
DLR 
No of % Cases 
Cases 
.0 473 44.66% 
>1 586 55.34% 
1,059 
189 
Table 7.3.1.5. 
Results for small US firms nominated for Best Overall IR 2000 to 2002 liquidity 
ratio (LR) 
This table shows the average monthly liquidity ratios during T and T+1 by portfolio of firms. The 
Liquidity Ratio (LR) is a measure of 'market depth' as it measures the trading volume of a stock 
associated with a unit change in the stock price. The table also shows the Change in the Liquidity 
Ratios (DLR) over periods T to T+1. This measures the change in traded volumes over time 
associated with a change stock returns. 
Liquidity Ratio LRj = F- Vit / TE JR, tj 
Change in liquidity ratio DLR, = LRiT+I / LRiT 
V, t = the traded volume of stock of firm i during month t 
R, t = the return on stock of firm I in month t 
The summation is performed over both the 12-months prior to and following the month of the 
award (T and T+1), 
Small Firms N= 2,054 
Liquidity Ratio (LR) 
Portfolio LRT LR T+1 DLR N 
1 2.44 3.36 1.38 385 
2 1.76 1.85 1.05 389 
3 1.48 1.67 1.12 1,280 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means of LR in T and T+1 
LRT LT T+1 
Mean 1.72 2.03 
Variance 36.71 44.60 
Pearson Correlation 0.15 
Hypothesized Mean 0.00 
Difference 
t Stat 1.69 
Change in Liquidity Ratio (DLR) 
DLR 
No of Cases % Cases 
<1 1,020 49.66% 
>1 1,034 50.34% 
2,054 
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Table 7.3.1.6. 
Results for large and small US firms nominated for Best Overall IR 2000 to 2002 
liquidity ratio (LR) 
This table shows the average monthly liquidity ratios during T and T+1 by portfolio of firms. The 
Liquidity Ratio (LR) is a measure of 'market depth' as it measures the trading volume of a stock 
associated with a unit change in the stock price. The table also shows the Change in the 
Liquidity Ratios (DLR) over periods T to T+1. This measures the change in traded volumes over 
time associated with a change stock returns. 
Liquidity Ratio LRj =E Vit / T- JR, tj 
Change in liquidity ratio DLRj = LRiT+I / I-RiT 
V, t = the traded volume of stock of firm i during month t 
R, t = the return on stock of firm I in month t 
The summation is performed over both the 12-months prior to and following the month of the 
award (T and T+1). 
Large and Small Firms N=3,113 
Liquidity Ratio (LR) 
Portfolio LRT LR T+1 DLR N 
1 6.77 12.10 1.79 687 
2 3.04 2.67 0.88 635 
3 3.11 3.33 1.07 1,791 
3,113 
t-Test: Paired Tw o Sample for Means of LR 
Mean 
Variance 
Pearson Correlation 
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 
t Stat 
LR T LR T+l 
4.04 5.46 
1705.3 6894.6 
0.41 
0.00 
1.03 
Change in Liquidity Ratio (DLR) 
DLR 
No of Cases % Cases 
<1 1,493 48.00% 
>1 1,620 52.00% 
3,113 
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Table 7.3.1.7. 
Results for all US firms nominated for Best Overall IR 2000 to 2002 equity trading volumes 
regression analysis 
This table shows the coefficients from estimating the following regression equation for the full pooled 
sample of US companies nominated in the IR Awards: 
Vol iT YO + Yll R it + 
Y2 109 (MV) iT + Y3 fliT +C iT 
VOI, T mean monthly volume of equity traded for firm i in year T 
MV iT natural log of market value of equity capital of firm i at 31 March in year T 
BiT equity beta of firm i in year T 
C jT error term in year T 
I R, t IR rating of firm i in year t 
indicates one-tailed statistical significance at the 0.01 level 
indicates one-tailed statistical significance at the 0.10 level 
T= 1999 to 2003 (i. e. over discrete 12-month periods from one period prior to the first IR 
award in 2000, to one period subsequent to the final IR awards in 2002) 
t= 2000 to 2002 
Large firms N=1,059 
Intercept 
Beta 
Market Value 
IR Rating 
R2 
Small Firms N=2,054 
T T+l 
Coeff t stat Coeff t stat 
-538 -0.014 14,536 0.115 
B -0.003 -0.095 -0.046 -1.509 
MV 0.024 0.844 0.014 0.431 
IR 0.483 16.951 0.171 5.305** 
0.2400 0.0272 
T T+1 
Coeff t stat Coeff t stat 
Intercept 22,785 1.692* 2,338 0.044 
Beta B -0.033 -1.479* -0.024 -1.068 
Market Value MV 0.036 1.502* 0.012 0.514 
IR Rating IR 0.029 1.243 0.011 0.447 
R2 0.0100 0.0010 
Large and Small Firms N=3,113 
T 
Coeff 
Intercept 8,144 
Beta B -0.017 
Market Value MV 0.051 
IR Rating IR 0.396 
R20.1720 
T+l 
t stat Coeff t stat 
0.637 -55,174 -1.181 
-1.018 -0.028 -1.522* 
3.002** 0.028 1.451 * 
23.196** 0.130 6.976** 
0.0190 
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7.3.2 UK firms' equity trading volumes 
I perform the same tests that are performed on the trading volumes of the US firms 
on the UK firms with effective IR. The results for UK firms are set out in table 
7.3.2.1. to 7.3.2.7, immediately following on from my discussion of the salient results 
below. 
7.3.2.1 Relative equity trading volumes (RV) 
UK Best IR Officer Award 
The RV results in table 7.3.2.1 indicate that all the firms' stock liquidity increases 
between period T to period T+1 and also show that the average for firms in portfolio 
is the highest in both periods (at 2.93 times 'normal volume' rising to 3.34) compared 
to the combined average RV of portfolios 2 and 3 (2.64 rising to 2.85). The change 
in relative volume (DRV) summarises this in percentage form and is 0.41 for portfolio 
1, higher than for the lower-rated portfolios (0.30 for portfolio 2 and 0.12 for portfolio 
3). In addition, the results of the t test show that the increase in the mean RV across 
all firms in this IR award category from T to T+1 is significant at a 0.025 level in a 
one-tailed test (t = 2.19). Finally, DRV is positive for 65.1 % of the pooled sample of 
all firms (300 out of 461) and negative for 34.9%, showing that the majority of these 
firms exhibit higher liquidity during T+1 compared to T. 
Best Results Meeting Award 
The RV results in table 7.3.2.2 are higher for UK firms nominated for having Best 
Results Meetings compared to those noted above. However, portfolio 1 firms again 
have the highest average RV in both T and T+1 (4.63 to 4.85) and portfolio 2 have 
the second highest (3.99 to 4.76) and portfolio 3 the lowest (2.59 to 2.89). However 
the percentage increases in volumes from T to T+1 is highest for portfolio 2 firms 
(DRV is 0.77) compared to portfolio 1, with a DRV of 0.22, and portfolio 3 have a 
DRV of 0.30. Meanwhile, the t test shows that the rise in mean RV across all firms is 
significant at the 0.01 level for a one-tailed test (t = 2.35) and DRV is positive for 
63.6% (262 out of 412) of firms and negative for 36.4%. 
Best Annual Report 
The RV results for this set of firms in table 7.3.2.3 are the lowest of the UK firms, 
although all portfolios show a rise in RV in T+1 compared to T. However, in this 
case portfolios 2 and 3 show a higher increase in RV compared to the average for 
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portfolio 1 firms (DRV is 0.4507 compared to 0.111). Finally, the size of the increase 
in average RV across all firms is significant at a 0.01 level in a one-tailed directional t 
test (t = 2.92) and the general rise in liquidity of the firms is also shown by 
percentages of positive and negative DRV results, which are positive for 63.7% of 
firms (or 245 of 381 firms). 
7.3.2.2 Liquidity ratio (LR) 
Best IR Officer Award 
Between T and T+1 LR rises markedly across firms in all three portfolios by over 
approximately 150% (shown in table 7.3.2. ) showing that the firms' trading volumes 
rise more in relation to changes in their stock returns than indicated by the RV 
measure results described above in sub-section 7.3.2.1. Also the t test shows that 
the increases in the mean LR across all nominated firms is statistically significant at 
the 0.025 level in a one-tailed test (t = 2.16) and the overall increase in volume/price 
elasticity of the firms is shown by 98.3% of the firms having a DLR >1. In addition, 
results show that in period T average LR is highest for portfolio 1 firms, then for 
portfolio 2 and portfolio 3 has that lowest (8.99,8.59 and 5.84 respectively), which 
implies that share price is a more 'sensitive' to changes in levels of trading volumes 
for firms with higher IR ratings. 
Best Results Meeting 
In period T+1 LR results shown in table 7.3.2.5 again rise between period T and T+1 
for firms in portfolios 1 and 2, although the liquidity ratio for portfolio 3 falls (DLR <1). 
In period T portfolio 3 has the highest LR, of 13.2, portfolio 1 have an LR of 10.76 
and portfolio 2 an LR of 9.98. Therefore, the firms with higher IR ratings exhibit a 
higher increase in liquidity and this is also shown by the DLR results, where portfolio 
1 and 2 firms have the highest DLR, at 1.9 and 2.8 and DLR for portfolio 3 is lower at 
0.71. Finally, there is strong evidence that after the award nominations liquidity rises 
for all of the firms because DLR is >1 for 98.54% of the firms and <1 for only 6% and 
the t test shows that this increase in significant at a 0.10 level in a one-tailed test (t= 
1.33). 
Best Annual Report 
Although portfolio 1 has an LR of 10.4 in period T, unexpectedly LR falls in period 
T+1 to 7.5 and LR also falls for portfolio 2, from 17.9 to 14.7, although the LR for 
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portfolio 3 rises from 6.3 to 12.3 over the same period. Although these results do not 
show that liquidity increases more for firms with higher IR ratings, across all 
nominated firms DLR is still >1 for 96.81 % of firms and portfolio 3 experiences a rise 
in LR of over 190%, again providing strong evidence that in general trading volumes 
increase from T to T+1 for the firms. 
7.3.2.3 Regression analysis 
The results of the regression analysis for UK firms, which is described in equation (7) 
in section 6.4.3.5, are shown in Table 7.3.2.7. As expected, for all firms both in 
periods T and T+1 there is a negative relationship between their equity trading 
volumes and beta and positive and significant relationships with their market value, 
indicating that stock liquidity is higher for less risky and larger sized firms. The 
results also show that liquidity is significantly positively related to the firms' IR rating 
for 'Best IR Officer' and 'Best Results Meeting' IR awards over both in the years 
immediately preceding and following the month of the award nominations at a 0.01 
level in one-tailed tests (t >3.0 in all cases). However, the results are only significant 
at a 0.10 level in a one-tailed test for the firms nominated for the 'Best Annual 
Report' IR Award in the preceding period T (t=1.51) and are insignificant in T+11. 
These findings indicate that firms with higher ratings for more effective IR via their IR 
officers and in meetings with fund managers and analysts, where they present their 
results, have higher stock liquidity, but that IR in the form of annual reports has a 
weaker association with stock liquidity levels. In section 7.3.3 and 7.3.4 1 discuss 
further some reasons that may explain these findings together with a review of all of 
my findings on the liquidity of the US and UK firms. 
This concludes my discussion of the results of the tests for any relationship between 
effective IR and increased stock liquidity for the UK firms. The tables of results 
relating to these tests are set out on the following pages. 
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Table 7.3.2.1. 
Results of UK nominated for Best IR Officer 1999 to 2002 relative volumes (RV) 
This table shows the average monthly relative volumes during period T and T+1. Relative 
Volume measures the traded volume of a stock as a percentage of the average traded volume 
of the stock of a firm in the same industry sector in the same month. The table also shows 
the results of at test for differences in average RV between year T and year T+1 and also the 
number of companies for which the change in RV from T to T+1 (DRV) is positive or negative. 
DRV summarises the sign and size of the change in liquidity from before to after the company 
was nominated for the IR award. The table shows the number of companies in the sample 
where DRV is positive or negative. 
Relative Volume RVit = Vit / (VmjNmt) 
Change in Relative Volume DRVjt = RVit - RVit., 
V, t = the traded volume of stock of firm i during month t 
V,, t = traded volume of stock in firm i's industry sector during month t 
N,, t = number of firms listed in firm i's industry sector in the FTSE All Share/S&P indices at the 
end of month t. 
T= 12-month period preceding the month of the IR award nomination 
Best IR Officer Award N= 461 
Relative Volume (RV) 
Portfolio RV T RV T+I DRV it N 
1 2.93 3.34 0.41 153 
2 2.55 2.85 0.30 147 
3 2.72 2.84 0.12 161 
461 
2+3 2.64 2.85 0.21 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means RV from T to T+1 
Mean 
Variance 
Pearson Correlation 
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 
t. Stat 
T T+l 
2.73 3.01 
31.99 37.24 
0.90 
0 
2.19 
Change in Relative Volume (DRV) 
Sign of No of % Cases 
DRV Cases 
-ve 161 34.92% 
+ve 300 65.08% 
461 
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Table 7.3.2.2. 
Results for UK firms nominated for Best Results Meeting 1999 to 2002 relative 
volumes (RV) 
This table shows the average monthly relative volumes during period T and T+1. Relative 
Volume measures the traded volume of a stock as a percentage of the average traded 
volume of the stock of a firm in the same industry sector in the same month. The table also 
shows the results of at test for differences in average RV between year T and year T+1 and 
also the number of companies for which the change in RV from T to T+1 (DRV) is positive or 
negative. DRV summarises the sign and size of the change in liquidity from before to after 
the company was nominated for the IR award. The table shows the number of companies in 
the sample where DRV is positive or negative. 
Relative Volume RVit = Vit / (Vt/Nmt) 
Change in Relative Volume DRVjt = RVj, - RV, t-I 
where: 
V, t = the traded volume of stock of firm i during month t 
V .. t= traded volume of stock 
in firm i's industry sector during month t 
N,, t = number of firms listed in firm i's industry sector in the FTSE All Share/S&P indices at 
the end of month t. 
T= 12-month period preceding the month of the IR award nomination 
Best Results Meeting Award N= 412 
Relative Volume (RV) 
Portfolio RV T RV T+1 DRV it N 
1 4.63 4.85 0.22 136 
2 3.99 4.76 0.77 133 
3 2.59 2.89 0.30 143 
412 
2+3 3.60 3.86 0.26 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Mean RV from T to T+1 
Mean 
Variance 
Pearson Correlation 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
t Stat 
T T+l 
3.73 4.15 
181.2 21 V 
0.97 
0 
2.35 
Change in Relative Volumes (DRV) 
Sign of DRV No of % Cases 
Cases 
-ve 150 36.41% 
+ve 262 63.59% 
412 
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Table 7.3.2.3. 
Results for UK firms nominated for Best Annual Report 1999 to 2002 relative 
volumes (RV) 
This table shows the average monthly relative volumes during period T and T+1- Relative 
Volume measures the traded volume of a stock as a percentage of the average traded volume 
of the stock of a firm in the same industry sector in the same month. The table also shows the 
results of at test for differences in average RV between year T and year T+1 and also the 
number of companies for which the change in RV from T to T+1 (DRV) is positive or negative. 
DRV summarises the sign and size of the change in liquidity from before to after the company 
was nominated for the IR award. The table shows the number of companies in the sample 
where DRV is positive or negative. 
Relative Volume , RVit = Vit / (Vmt/N,,, t) 
Change in Relative Volume DRVit = RVit- RVit-I 
V, t = the traded volume of stock of firm i during month t 
Vmt = traded volume of stock in firm i's industry sector during month t 
N, t= number of firms listed in firm i's industry sector in the FTSE All Share/S&P indices at the 
end of month t. 
T= 12-month period preceding the month of the IR award nomination 
Best Annual Report Award N= 381 
Relative Volumes (RV) 
Portfolio RV T RV T+1 DRV it N 
1 2.85 2.96 0.11 126 
2 3.71 4.12 0.42 121 
3 2.55 3.04 0.49 134 
381 
2+3 3.13 3.58 0.45 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Mean RV from T to T+I 
Mean 
Variance 
Pearson Correlation 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
t Stat 
T T+l 
3.04 3.38 
37.06 46.84 
0.95 
0 
2.92 
Change in Relative Volumes (DRV) 
Sign of DRV No of % Cases 
Cases 
-ve 136 36.27% 
+ve 245 63.73% 
381 
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Table 7.3.2.4. 
Results for all UK firms nominated for Best IR Officer 1999 to 2002 liquidity ratio 
(I-R) 
This table shows the average monthly liquidity ratios during T and T+1 by portfolio of firms. The 
Liquidity Ratio (LR) is a measure of 'market depth' as it measures the trading volume of a stock 
associated with a unit change in the stock price. The table also shows the change in the Liquidity 
Ratios (DLR) between year T and year T+1. This measures the change in traded volumes over 
time that is associated with a change stock return over the same period. 
Liquidity Ratio LRj 2: Vit / T- I Ritl 
Change in liquidity ratio DLRj 
LRiT+1 / I-RiT 
where: 
Vit = the traded volume of stock of firm i during month t 
R, t = the return on stock of firm I in month t 
The summation is performed over both the 12-months prior to and following the month of the 
award (T and T+1). 
T= the 12 months preceding the month of the IR award 
Best IR Officer Award N= 461 
Liquidity Ratio (LR) 
Portfolios LRT LR T+1 DLR N 
1 8.99 21.51 2.39 153 
2 8.59 28.50 3.32 147 
3 5.84 8.71 1.49 161 
461 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Mean LR from T to T+1 
Mean 
Variance 
Pearson Correlation 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
t Stat 
LR T LR T+l 
7.80 19.60 
721.6 1418.9 
0.19 
0.00 
2.16 
Change in Liquidity Ratio (DLR) 
DLR No of Cases % of Cases 
e. 181.74% 
>1 453 98.26% 
461 
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Table 7.3.2.5. 
Results for all UK firms nominated for Best Results Meetings 1999 to 2002 liquidity 
ratio (I-R) 
This table shows the average monthly liquidity ratios during T and T+1 by portfolio of firms. The 
Liquidity Ratio (LR) is a measure of 'market depth' as it measures the trading volume of a stock 
associated with a unit change in the stock price. The table also shows the change in the Liquidity 
Ratios (DLR) between year T and year T+1. This measures the change in traded volumes over 
time associated with a change stock returns. 
Liquidity Ratio LRj =E Vit / F- IRitl 
Change in liquidity ratio DLRj = LRiT+1 / LRiT 
where: 
Vit = the traded volume of stock of firm i during month t 
R, t = the return on stock of firm I in month t 
The summation is performed over both the 12-months prior to and following the month of the 
award (T and T+1). 
T= the 12 months preceding the month of the IR award 
Best Results Meeting Award N= 412 
Liquidity Ratio (LR) 
Portfolios LRT LR T+I DLR N 
1 10.76 20.81 1.93 136 
2 9.98 27.97 2.80- 133 
3 13.21 9.40 0.71 143 
412 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Mean LR from T to T+I 
Mean 
Variance 
Pearson Correlation 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
t Stat 
LR T LR T+l 
11.33 19.31 
223.72 1375.50 
0.11 
0.00 
1.33 
Change in Liquidity Ratio (DLR) 
DLR No of % of 
Cases Cases 
<1 6 1.46% 
>1 406 98.54% 
412 
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Table 7.3.2.6. 
Results for all UK firms nominated for Best Annual Report 1999 to 2002 liquidity 
ratio (LR) 
This table shows the average monthly liquidity ratios'during T and T+1 by portfolio of firms. The 
Liquidity Ratio (LR) is a measure of 'market depth' as it measures the trading volume of a stock 
associated with a unit change in the stock price. The table also shows the change in the Liquidity 
Ratios (DLR) between year T and year T+1. This measures the change in traded volumes over 
time that are associated with a change stock returns. 
Liquidity Ratio LRj =E Vit /E IRitl 
Change in liquidity ratio DLRj = LRiT+I / LRiT 
where: 
V, t the traded volume of stock of firm i during month t 
R, t the return on stock of firm I in month t 
The summation is performed over both the 12-months prior to and following the month of the 
award (T and T+1). 
T= the 12 months preceding the month of the IR award 
Best Annual Report Award N= 381 
Liquidity Ratio 
Portfolios LR T LR T+1 DLR N 
1 10.39 7.51 0.72 126 
2 17.99 14.67 0.82 121 
3 6.31 12.25 1.94 134 
381 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Mean LR T to T+I 
LRT LR T+1 
Mean 11.58 11.54 
Variance 3187.24 2345.32 
Pearson Cor relation 0.05 
Hypothesized Mean 0.00 
Difference 
t Stat -0.01 
Change in Liquidity Ratio (DLR) 
DLR No of % of Cases 
Cases 
12 3.19% 
>1 364 96.81% 
376 
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Table 7.3.2.7. 
Results for all UK firms nominated 1999 to 2002 equity trading volumes regression 
analysis 
This table shows the coefficients from estimating the following regression equation for the full 
pooled sample of UK companies nominated in the IR Awards: 
Vol iT = YO + YIIR it + 
Y2 109 (MV) iT + 
Y3 AT +C iT 
where: 
Vol iT = mean monthly traded volumes of equity for firm i in year T 
lRit =IR rating of firm i in year t 
log = natural log of market value of equity capital of firm i at 31 March in year T 
(MV) iT 
B iT = equity beta of 
firm i in year T 
C iT = error term 
indicates one-tailed statistical significance at a 0.01 level 
indicates one-tailed statistical significance at a 010 level 
t= 1999 to 2002 
T= 1998 to 2003 (i. e. over discrete 12-month periods from one period prior to the first IR award in 
1999, to one period subsequent to the final IR awards in 2002) 
Best IR Officer Award N= 416 
T T+1 
Coeff t stat Coeff t stat 
Intercept -264,197 - 3.20 -401,445 -3.21 
Beta B -0.04 -0.99 -0.01 -0.24 
Market Value MV 0.19 4.18 0.22 4.79 
IR Rating IR 0.17 3.64 0.15 3.37 
R2 0.08 0.08 
Best Results Meeting Award N= 412 
T T+1 
Coeff T stat Coeff t stat 
Intercept -331,143 -3.28 ** -431,418 - 3.15 
Beta B -0.04 -0.75 -0.03 -0.64 
Market Value MV 0.20 4.03 0.20 4.20 
IR Rating IR 0.16 3.26 0.16 3.32 
R2 0.07 0.08 
Best Annual Report Award N= 381 
T T+1 
Coeff t stat Coeff t stat 
Intercept -287,305 -3.84 -291,104 - 2.90 
Beta B -0.07 -1.32 -0.01 -0.27 
Market Value MV 0.27 5.46 0.26 5.17 
IR Rating IR 0.08 1.51 0.06 1.26 
R2 0.08 0.07 
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7.3.3 Addressing the research hypothesis for equity trading 
volumes 
Although the results of the tests for any relationship between effective IR and stock 
liquidity measured by relative trading volume (RV) do not consistently show that the 
firms with the higher IR ratings have the highest increases in liquidity in all cases, 
they do show that liquidity across all the large and small US firms individually, and 
when combined in one sample, increases between the 12-months immediately prior 
to their nomination for the IR award to the 12-month period immediately following. 
However, the tests based on the liquidity ratio measure (LR), which measures how 
volumes change in relation to a change in share price, whilst also showing that 
liquidity of US firms with effective IR increases after their nomination, show a positive 
relationship between number of nominations the firms receive and the increase in 
stock liquidity. This is important because the LR liquidity measure is perhaps a 
more salient measure for the IR manager, who is probably most concerned by how a 
rise or fall in share price may affect the volume of equity trading and vice versa. The 
volume-price elasticity, that the LR measures, is an important concept for a listed 
firm because if LR is high a firm should be more concerned that large 
disposals/acquisitions of stock will have a more significant negative/positive impact 
on share price compared to stocks with a lower LR. In other words, the price of a 
stock with a higher LR may be more sensitive to large buy or sell transactions. 
Further, the results of the regression tests show a significant positive relationship 
between US firms' IR ratings and trading volumes when the US firms are combined 
in one sample regardless of size and for the large US firms individually but not for 
the individual sample of small US firms. These tests also find that the equity trading 
volumes of the smaller US firms are lower than for the large firms, which is 
consistent with the findings of existing research and some recent industry studies 
claiming that the stock of smaller firms are 'trapped' in a less liquid end of the equity 
markets, i. e. that liquidity is negatively related to firm size. These findings that 
suggest that firm size is an important factor in any relationship between effective IR 
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and stock liquidity are discussed further below in sections 7.3.3 and 7.3.4 and also in 
my review of all of my findings in chapter 8. 
Meanwhile, the UK firms nominated in all three IR award categories also show 
significant increases in liquidity in the period immediately following their nominations 
compared to 12-months immediately prior, by all of the measures of liquidity I 
employ. Whilst the results for the UK firms using the relative volume measure (RV) 
and the liquidity ratio (LR) show increased liquidity over time, unexpectedly there 
again no obvious relationship between the size of their IR ratings and liquidity. 
However, the regression analysis results show that liquidity is significantly positively 
related to the number of the firms' IR award nominations, although only for the firms 
nominated for Best IR Officer and Best Results Meeting and not for the firms with the 
Best Annual Report communications (although the coefficients for the latter are all 
positive). As noted above, these latter findings suggests that effective IR in the 
more informal and frequent forms, in person via the IR officer and in company 
meetings, may have a greater positive impact on liquidity compared to the effect of 
effective IR in more formal communications such as in annual reports, indicating that 
the form and frequency of corporate IR communications are important. This issue is 
discussed more fully in chapter 8. 
7.2.4 Theory 
As I explain in section 4.1, that effective IR should be associated with increased 
volumes of equity trading is consistent with the relationship predicted information risk 
and agency theories. These theories predict that an enhanced information 
disclosure policy will reduce the level of information asymmetry between inside 
managers and external shareholders, leading to a reduction in perceived risks 
associated with a stock and in reduced agency costs for investors. The theories 
explain that by alleviating any agency problems and reducing the level of perceived 
risk caused by information asymmetry, effective IR will stimulate equity trading 
volumes and enhance stock liquidity. 
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7.2.5 Conclusion on equity trading volumes/liquidity 
The results of my tests for any relationship between levels of cross-sectional liquidity 
of the firms at any point in time and the effectiveness of the firms' IR ratings are 
mixed and therefore somewhat inconclusive. However, the results of the tests 
described above in section 7.3.1 and 7.3.2, using both of the measures that I use to 
gauge changes in liquidity levels (RV and LR) provide compelling evidence that the 
firms with effective IR experience rising stock liquidity in the period immediately 
following their nomination in the IR awards and that this increase in liquidity is 
statistically significant. 
My findings therefore support the findings in prior research that also shows that "A 
corporation can affect liquidity .... by the amount and quality of the information it 
releases to investors" (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986) and allows a rejection of the 
null hypothesis H03: there is no significant relationship between effective IR and 
future increased trading volumes of equity. 
This concludes the section on equity trading volumes test results, which are 
discussed more fully in chapter 8. 
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7.4. Cost of Equity Capital 
Introduction 
In this section I describe the results of the empirical tests described in section 6.5 to 
test the null hypotheses to test for any relationship between the firms' IR 
performance and their cost of equity capital: 
H04: There is no significant relationship between effective IR and future expected 
cost of equity capitaL 
Section 7.4.1 describes the test results for the US firms and section 7.4.2 the results 
for the UK firms. In section 7.4.3 1 discuss how these results relate to hypothesis 
H04 and in section 7.4.4 how my findings compare to those predicted by relevant 
theory. Section 7.4.5 concludes my findings relating to the firms' cost of equity 
capital 
7.4.1. US firms' cost of equity capital 
The results are shown in table 7.4.1.1 to 7.4.1.5, following a description of the test 
results below. 
7.4.1.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 7.4.1 .1 shows that, across the US large firms the mean cost of capital falls by 
4.3%, from 11.4% in T-2 to 6.5% in T+2. Meanwhile, the second panel in table 
7.4.1.1 shows that the average cost of capital for smaller US firms is slightly higher 
than for the large US firms in almost all these periods, indicating that smaller firms 
may generally face a higher cost of equity capital. However, the average cost of 
capital across small firms also falls steadily and consistently over the consecutive 
periods T-2 to T+2 from 12.3% to 8.3% (by 4.0% in total). Finally, when all firms are 
combined into one sample of large and small firms, the average cost of capital for 
the combined sample falls consistently over periods T-2 to T+2 from 12.0% to 7.7%. 
These results provide preliminary support for the proposition that effective IR is 
associated with a reduced cost of equity, although any such conclusion depends 
inter alia upon any weaknesses in my methodology for estimating the firms' cost of 
equity and also may merely be a result of a more general fall in the cost of equity 
that is unrelated to IR, which I discuss further below in section 7.4.3. 
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7.4.1.2 Results for cost of capital by portfolio 
The results are shown in Table 7.4.1.2. to 7.4.1.4. 
US large firms 
For each portfolio of large firms, whether formed by IR rating or by equal numbers of 
firms, the average estimated cost of capital falls over each consecutive period T-2 to 
T+1, and then rises slightly in period T+2. The average estimate for constituent firms 
in portfolio 1 (based on the percentage rank of IR rating and containing 302 firms) 
falls from 11.3% to 5.2% in total over periods T-2 to T+1, rising in T+2 to 6.5%. The 
average for portfolio 1 formed by equal number of firms (353 firms) falls from 12.6% 
to 5.7%, rising to 6.6% in T+2. Also, in most of these periods, firms in portfolio 1 
have the lowest average cost of capital and particularly so in period T+1, the 12- 
months immediately following the month of award nomination and also in period T+2. 
The comparison of the average for portfolio 1 and for portfolio 10 shows that in all 
periods T to T+2 inclusive, the average cost of capital estimate is significantly lower 
for the firms in portfolio 1. Further, in periods T to T+2 the average of the top 50% of 
firms (portfolios 1 to 5 versus portfolios 6 to 10) is lower by 0.8% in T, in period T+1 
by 1.3% and in period T+2 by 0.9%. These results together indicate both that 
effective IR is associated with a reduction in the cost of equity capital and also that 
firms that have more effective IR have a lower cost of capital. These findings are 
discussed further below in section 7.4.3 and 7.4.4. 
US small firms 
Table 7.4.1.3 shows that, by both methods of portfolio formation, the average 
estimate for the small firms in both portfolios 1 and 2 also falls consistently over the 
time periods T-2 to T+2. This is also the case for portfolio 3 (684 out of 2,054 firms), 
until period T+1, although the average estimate rises in T+2 from 8.3% to 9.6% but 
only when the portfolios are formed by equal numbers and not when based on 
percentage rank of their IR ratings. However, overall there is not strong evidence 
that portfolio 1 firms have significantly lower average cost of capital compared to the 
other firms, although in none of the periods do portfolio 1 firms have the highest 
average estimate. Although in all periods, except for period T, the top 50% firms 
(portfolios 1 to 5) have a lower average cost of capital than the bottom 50% 
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(portfolios 6 to 10) but during period T the difference is only of 0.7%. These results 
indicate that effective IR for small firms is also associated with a reduced cost of 
capital over time, but there is weaker evidence of any relationship between their IR 
ratings and a significantly lower cost of capital compared to that shown for the large 
firms. I discuss any reason for these findings further in section 7.4.3 and 7.4.4 
below. 
US large and small firms 
The average cost of capital estimate shown in table 7.4.1.4 for the firms in each of 
the 3 combined portfolios, formed by both methods, falls consistently and steadily 
over the consecutive periods T-2 to T+2. Portfolio 1 firms have the lowest average 
of the three groups of firms in all periods except for T-2 for the group containing 
1,037 firms. However, across all periods the average cost of capital for portfolio 1 
falls from 11.4% to 7.2% for the highest rated 687 firms and from 11.9% to 6.9% for 
the top 1,037 firms. Portfolio 2 firms show a similar range of results over this period, 
falling from 12.9% in T-2 to 7.5% in T+2 (11.3% to 7.5% for the portfolios of equal 
numbers) and similar results are found for firms in portfolios 3. Although portfolio 2 
firms do not have a lower average cost of capital than firms in portfolio 3 in all 
periods, the difference is only approximately 1% in each period. The analysis by 10 
portfolios of equal numbers of firms shows that for almost all of the 10 groups of 311 
firms, the average falls consistently and steadily over time. In summary, I find a 
negative relationship between effective IR and the size of the cost of equity capital 
over time for the firms that I test, which suggests that this may also hold for firms 
more generally. I discuss some reasons for my findings and any implications they 
imply below in sections 7.4.3 and 7.4.4 and also in my review of all my findings in 
chapter 8. 
7.4.1.3 Regression analysis 
So far my tests on the firms' cost of equity test purely for any direct relationships 
between the firms' IR ratings and their cost of equity on both an inter-temporal and 
on a cross-sectional basis in discrete periods. However, the regression analysis that 
I also use is equation (9), described above in section 6.5, which additionally controls 
for firm size (MV) and risk (equity beta P) and also provides a measure of statistical 
significance of any such relationships. Equation (9) is set out again as follows: 
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iT = Yo + Y, IR it + 
Y2 109 (MV) iT + Y3 AT + CE iT (9) 
The results of these regression analyses for US firms are shown in table 7.4.1.5, 
following this description of the regression test results. Firstly, theory and prior 
literature would suggest that larger and less risky firms have a lower cost of equity 
capital. The results in table 7.4.1.5 for the combined sample of large and small firms 
in fact do show, in all cases and during all periods, a negative relationship between 
the firms' market value and cost of equity (significant at a 0.01 level in three of these 
periods). The relationships between cost of equity and equity beta are expected to 
be positive and, although they are unexpectedly mixed in sign, they are not 
significant at a 1% level in any period. I review these findings further in chapter 8 
and the remainder of this section relates to the regression results for the firms' IR 
ratings (the variable IR in equation (9)). 
US large firms 
The first panel in table 7.4.1.5 shows the results for the large US firms and shows 
that the sign of the relationship between IR rating and cost of capital changes across 
the periods. Notably, in T-2 there is a significant positive relationship between the 
large firms' IR ratings and cost of equity (t= 1.59) and also in T-1 -(at a 0.01 level, t= 
2.47). This means that the firms that receive the most nominations at the end of 
period T had a higher cost of capital in two of the three prior years compared to 
those subsequently nominated less often. The coefficient indicates that in period T-1 
this is by 10.9% higher across the whole sample of 1,059 large firms. There are not 
any obvious reasons to explain these results, but they do serve to contrast with the 
results in the 12-months immediately preceding the IR awards (T) and the two 
following periods T+1 and T+2. In period T there is now a negative relationship 
between IR rating and the cost of capital (significant at a 0.10 level, t= -1.61) and in 
T+1 there is also a significant negative relationship (t =-1.97) at a 0.025 level. In T 
the most nominated firms have a cost of capital 2.7% lower than the least nominated 
and in T+1 this differential in 4.0%, although the results in period T+2 are not 
significant. Overall, these findings indicate that more effective IR by large firms is 
associated with a subsequently reduced cost of equity. 
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US small firms 
Although the results for small firms in the second panel of table 7.4.1.5 show a 
negative relationship between IR rating and cost of capital in T-1 and T, the 
coefficients are not significant. However, in period T there is a negative coefficient 
(significant at a 0.05 one-tailed level), indicating that the firms with most nominations 
at the end of T had 2.3% lower cost of equity compared to the other firms (t= -1.87). 
However, in the periods following the IR award nomination month this differential 
increases and the firms with most nominations have a 3% lower cost of equity in T+1 
and by 8.7% in T+2 (t= -2.13 and -3.27, respectively). This again suggests that 
effective IR is associated with a subsequent reduction in firms' cost of equity. 
US large and small firms 
The final panel in table 7.4.1.5 shows the regression results for the full sample of US 
firms nominated for effective IR. There are significant results showing a positive 
relationship between the firms' IR ratings and their subsequent cost of equity in 
periods T-2 and T-1, (at a 0.10 one-tailed significance level (t= 1.62) in T-2, and in 
period T-1 at a 0.01 level (t= 2.63)). Again means that the firms that subsequently 
receive more award nominations in period T previously have significantly higher cost 
of equity compared to the other nominated firms. However, during the periods 
immediately preceding and following the nominations the sign of this relationship 
changes to a negative one and, although the coefficients are not statistically 
significant in T and T+2 (t = -1.24 and -1.10, respectively), they are significant at a 
0.10 one-tailed level in T+1 (t= -1.36). 
These findings, prima facie, suggest that more effective IR is associated with a 
subsequent fall in the cost of equity and further discussion, support for, and any 
reasons for this I present below in sections 7.4.3 and 7.4.4 and also in my overall 
review in chapter 8. 
7.4.1.4 Regression analysis by portfolio 
Again, a further analysis was performed which replicated the regression test above 
for the firms in three pooled portfolios following the method described in section 6.1. 
However, because these tests do not produce any further significant results or 
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relationships between effective IR and the cost of capital tests that are not presented 
or further discussed. 
This concludes my discussion of the tests of the cost of equity of the US firms with 
effective IR. The tables showing the test results described above are set out on the 
following pages and all of the findings described above are discussed further below 
in section 7.4.3 to 7.4.5, following my description of the test results for the UK firms 
in the following in section 7.4.2. 
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Table 7.4.1.1. 
Results for US firms nominated for Best Overall IR 2000 to 2002 descriptive 
statistics of estimated cost of equity capital 
This table show the range, minimum, maximum, mean, standard deviation and percentile 
averages of the cost of equity capital estimates in period T-2 to T+2 of the US firms 
nominated for Best Overall IR 2000 to 2002 pooled across these years. 
Large Firms N=1,059 
Percentiles 
Period Range Min Max Mean Std. 25% 50% 75% 
Deviation 
T-2 98.17% 0.00% 98.17% 11.44% 15.98% 2.48% 7.96% 11.80% 
T-I 99.91% 0.00% 99.91% 11.53% 15.75% 2.56% 7.71% 13.66% 
T 78.04% 0.00% 78.04% 8.27% 7.52% 3.12% 7.19% . 
11.33% 
T+1 49.14% 0.00% 49.14% 6.33% 6.16% 2.01% 5.00% 9.02% 
T+2 90.20% 0.00% 90.20% 6.50% 8.15% 1.40% 4.32% 9.17% 
Average 8.81% 
Small Firms N=2,054 
Percentiles 
Period Range Min Max Mean Std. 25% 50% 75% 
Deviation 
T-2 97.84% 0.00% 97.84% 12.29% 13.78% 3.38% 8.31% 15.35% 
T-1 99.80% 0.00% 99.80% 10.84% 12.38% 3.70% 8.31% 12.85% 
T 97.08% 0.00% 97.08% 9.83% 10.46% 2.87% 7.74% 12.08% 
T+1 89.64% 0.00% 89.64% 8.67% 10.64% 2.01% 6.01% 11.81% 
T+2 99.99% 0.00% 99.99% 8.33% 10.56% 2.02% 6.03% 10.98% 
Average 9.99% 
Large and Small 
Firms N=3,113 
Period Range Min Max Mean Std. 
Deviation 
T-2 98.17% 0.00% 98.17% 12.02% 14.57% 
T-1 99.91% 0.00% 99.91% 11.11% 13.62% 
T 97.08% 0.00% 97.08% 9.21% 9.58% 
T+l 89.64% 0.00% 89.64% 7.94% 9.43% 
T+2 99.99% 0.00% 99.99% 7.64% 9.84% 
Average 9.58% 
Percentiles 
25% 50% 75% 
2.96% 7.75% 14.16% 
3.16% 7.57% 13.09% 
2.95% 7.55% 11.91% 
2.01% 5.28% 10.36% 
1.79% 5.36% 10.31% 
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Table 7.4.1.2. 
Results for large US firms nominated for Best Overall IR 2000 to 2002 estimated 
cost of equity capital by portfolio 
This table shows the cost of equity capital estimates for the firms pooled across the IR Awards 
2000,2001 and 2002 for the two 12 month periods T and T+1. 
The pooled samples of all companies nominated in the IR award in 2000,2001 and 2002 are 
divided into portfolio groups based on their IR rating, firstly into three portfolios (portfolio 
number 1 is the highest rated), then into 10 portfolios. 
The Cost of Equity Capital is estimated from 'base years' two year prior to and two years 
following the 12 month period in which the company is nominated for an IR Award, by solving 
the following equation: 
4 
Pt Y_(I + ri t)"' Et (d t+, ) + (I +r)-4E4[P4] 
where: 
r, t= estimated expected cost of equity capital for firm i at time t, Pt = share price of firm i at 
time t, P4 is the forecasted share price four periods ahead, Et = the expectations operator, t=0 
is at 01/04/1997,1998,1999,2000,2001, t= 01104/2000,2001,2002,2003,2004. 
Large Firms N=1,059 
Portfolio T-2 T-1 T T+I T+2 N % of IR 
Number rating 
1 11.34% 11.58% 7.76% 5.20% 6.45% 302 100-66.7 
2 12.52% 11.51% 8.16% 6.61% 5.79% 246 66.6-33.4 
3 10.46% 11.48% 8.90% 7.17% 7.25% 511 < 33.3 
Average 11.44% 11.53% 8.27% 6.33% 6.50% 1,059 
1 12.60% 12.03% 8.01% 5.68% 6.55% 353 
2 9.45% 10.08% 7.42% 5.74% 5.50% 353 
3 11.52% 12.44% 9.77% 8.01% 7.99% 353 
Average 11.44% 11.53% 8.27% 6.33% 6.50% 1,059 
1 10.58% 11.98% 7.24% 4.15% 5.18% 106 
2 12.51% 11.70% 8.19% 5.39% 7.40% 106 
3 11.82% 11.50% 7.63% 6.64% 7.02% 106 
4 12.73% 11.77% 9.30% 6.63% 5.86% 106 
5 11.81% 11.31% 7.67% 6.32% 5.66% 106 
6 9.25% 9.06% 6.53% 5.49% 5.82% 106 
7 7.07% 8.81% 7.26% 4.83% 5.69% 106 
8 20.32% 16.83% 9.83% 10.07% 9.59% 106 
9 7.00% 10.10% 8.86% 7.32% 6.74% 106 
10 8.77% 12.13% 11.55% 7.95% 7.86% 105 
Average 11.44% 11.53% 8.27% 6.33% 6.50% 1,059 
1 10.58% 11.98% 7.24% 4.15% 5.18% 106 
10 8.77% 12.13% 11.55% 7.95% 7.86% 105 
1-5 11.89% 11.65% 8.01% 5.83% 6.22% 530 
6-10 10.48% 11.39% 8.80% 7.13% 7.14% 529 
1,059 
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Table 7.4.1.3. 
Results for small US firms nominated for Best Overall IR 2000 to 2002 estimated 
cost of equity capital by portfolio 
This table shows the cost of equity capital estimates for the firms pooled across the IR Awards 
2000,2001 and 2002 for the two 12 month periods T and T+ 1. 
The pooled samples of all companies nominated in the IR award in 2000,2001 and 2002 are 
divided into portfolio groups based on their IR rating, firstly into three portfolios (portfolio 
number 1 is the highest rated), then into 10 portfolios. 
The Cost of Equity Capital is estimated from 'base years' two year prior to and two years 
following the 12 month period in which the company is nominated for an IR Award, by solving 
the following equation: 
4 
Pt = Y, (I + ri t)* " Et(d t+, ) + (1 + r)-4E4[P4] 
ri, = estimated expected cost of equity capital for firm i at time t, Pt = share price of firm i at time 
t, P4 = forecasted share price four periods ahead, Et = the expectations operator, and, t 
01/04/1997,1998,1999,2000,2001, t=4 is 01/04/2000,2001,2002,2003,2004. 
Small Firms N=2,054 
Portfolio T-2 T-1 T+I T T+2 N % of IR 
Number rating 
1 11.51% 10.26% 9.80% 8.53% 7.86% 385 100-66.7 
2 13.13% 11.22% 10.36% 8.79% 8.50% 389 66.6-33.4 
3 12.24% 11.04% 9.33% 8.69% 8.62% 1,280 < 33.3 
Average 12.29% 10.84% 9.83% 8.67% 8.33% 2,054 
1 12.11% 10.73% 10.35% 8.72% 6.66% 685 
2 11.95% 11.18% 10.47% 8.96% 8.74% 685 
3 12.76% 10.67% 8.71% 8.31% 9.56% 684 
12.29% 10.84% 9.83% 8.67% 8.33% 2,054 
1 10.61% 9.36% 10.53% 8.70% 5.48% 205 
2 12.80% 10.67% 9.62% 8.11% 6.33% 205 
3 11.69% 11.42% 10.85% 8.99% 6.68% 205 
4 14.09% 11.17% 9.67% 8.67% 8.13% 205 
5 10.83% 10.81% 10.18% 8.52% 7.12% 205 
6 12.53% 11.02% 12.12% 10.25% 7.08% 205 
7 11.30% 13.45% 9.77% 9.04% 9.36% 205 
8 10.77% 12.06% 9.41% 8.65% 10.24% 205 
9 14.11% 9.17% 6.58% 7.54% 11.55% 205 
10 13.95% 9.48% 9.62% 8.09% 11.22% 209 
Average 12.27% 10.84% 9.83% 8.67% 8.33% 2,054 
1 10.61% 9.36% 10.53% 8.70% 8.13% 205 
10 13.95% 9.48% 9.62% 8.09% 11.22% 209 
1-5 12.00% 10.69% 10.17% 8.60% 7.92% 1025 
6-10 12.53% 11.04% 9.50% 8.71% 11.01% 1029 
2,054 
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Table 7.4.1.4. 
Results for large and small US firms nominated for Best Overall IR 2000 to 2002 
estimated cost of equity capital by portfolio 
This table shows the cost of equity capital estimates for the firms pooled across the IR Awards 
2000,2001 and 2002 for the two 12 month periods T and T+1. 
The pooled samples of all companies nominated in the IR award in 2000,2001 and 2002 are 
divided into portfolio groups based on their IR rating, firstly into three portfolios (portfolio 
number 1 is the highest rated), then into 10 portfolios. 
The Cost of Equity Capital is estimated from 'base years' two year prior to and two years 
following the 12 month period in which the company is nominated for an IR Award, by solving 
the following equation: 
4 
pt Y_(l+ rit)""Et(d t.,, ) +(I +r)-4E4[P4] 
ri, = estimated expected cost of equity capital for firm i at time t, Pt = share price of firm i at 
time t, P4 = forecasted share price four periods ahead, Et = the expectations operator, t=0 is 
at 01/04/1997,1998,1999,2000,2001, t=4 is 01/04/2000,2001,2002,2003,2004. 
Large and Small Firms N=3,113 
Portfolio T-2 T-I T T+1 T+2 N %of IR 
Number rating 
1 11.44% 10.84% 8.90% 7.63% 7.24% 687 100-66.7 
2 12.89% 11.33% 9.51% 7.95% 7.45% 634 66.6-33.4 
3 11.73% 11.17% 9.20% 8.25% 8.23% 1,792 < 33.3 
Average 12.02% 11.11% 9.21% 7.94% 7.64% 3,113 
1 11.90% 10.95% 9.08% 7.26% 6.85% 1,037 
2 11.31% 11.34% 9.45% 7.80% 7.45% 1,037 
3 12.85% 11.04% 9.11% 8.76% 8.63% 1,039 
12.02% 11.11% 9.21% 7.94% 7.64% 3,113 
1 11.88% 11.42% 9.11% 6.69% 7.29% 311 
2 11.68% 10.90% 9.04% 8.29% 7.06% 311 
3 11.61% 10.53% 8.18% 7.10% 6.22% 311 
4 12.73% 11.63% 10.90% 9.03% 7.70% 311 
5 10.60% 9.12% 7.41% 6.21% 7.63% 311 
6 11.53% 13.60% 10.35% 8.42% 7.88% 311 
7 12.53% 10.37% 10.45% 8.60% 6.04% 311 
8 11.91% 12.88% 11.10% 8.98% 6.75% 311 
9 11.37% 10.73% 8.46% 8.03% 10.54% 311 
10 14.41% 9.92% 7.13% 8.09% 9.28% 314 
Average 12.02% 11.11% 9.21% 7.94% 7.64% 3,113 
1 11.88% 11.42% 9.11% 6.69% 7.70% 311 
10 14.41% 9.92% 7.13% 8.09% 9.28% 314 
1-5 11.70% 10.72% 8.93% 7.46% 7.31% 1,555 
6-10 12.35% 11.50% 9.50% 8.42% 8.86% 1,558 
3,113 
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7.4.2. UK Firms' Cost of Equity Capital 
The results are shown in table 7.4.2.1 to 7.4.2.3. 
7.4.2.1 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 7.4.2.1. The magnitude of the cost of 
capital for the UK firms is approximately similar to those calculated for the US firms. 
Indeed, due to international trading arbitrage, there are no theoretical or practical 
reasons to expect that the cost of capital should differ markedly between the two 
markets. 
Best IR Officer Award 
The average cost of equity across firms nominated for this IR awards in all years 
from 1999 to 2002 is 12.7% in T-2 and is 11.3% in T+2. However, over the three 
consecutive periods immediately surrounding the month in which they are nominated 
their average cost of equity falls from 14.79% in T-1 to 8.0% in T+1. 
Best Results Meeting 
The second panel of table 7.4.2.1 shows that in most periods I test the 412 firms 
nominated in this IR category have a higher cost of capital compared to the firms 
nominated for 'Best IR Officer'. However, their cost of capital also falls over this 
period of time, from an average of 14.9% in period T-2 to 9.8% in T+2 and likewise it 
falls consistently over each consecutive period in-between. 
Best Annual Report 
The final panel in table 7.4.2.1 shows that, in the case of the firms nominated for 
'Best Annual Report, average cost of capital increases, from 12.4% in period T-2 to 
14.8% in T-1, falls to 11.1 % in T and to 8.4% in T+1, but it then rises again to 12.1 % 
in T+2. Therefore, even though the level of cost of capital varies more for these 
firms, it also shows a steady decline over the three periods immediately surrounding 
the month of their award nominations. 
In summary and, as I point out in section 7.4.1.1 for the US firms, these findings 
provide preliminary support for the proposition that effective IR is associated with a 
reduced cost of equity. However, any such conclusion for UK firms also depends 
upon any weaknesses in my methodology for calculating the cost of capital and also 
may merely be a result of a more general fall in the cost of equity that is unrelated to 
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IR and I discuss these issues in relation to both the US and UK firms below in 
section 7.4.3. 
7.4.2.2 Results for cost of capital by portfolio 
The results for the portfolios of firms are shown in Table 7.4.2.2, following a review of 
the salient findings. 
BestIR Officer 
For all three portfolios of firms, the average cost of capital across the firms in each 
portfolio falls consistently over the periods T-1 to T+1, which are the three 12-month 
periods immediately surrounding the month of the award nominations. In the periods 
T-1 to T the firms in portfolio I have the lowest average cost of capital compared to 
the other firms nominated in this award. In period T cost of capital for portfolio 1 is 
10.4%, falling to 7.2% in T+1 and in both of these periods the cost of equity of the 
other two portfolios is over 1% higher. 
Best Results Meeting 
The average cost of equity of portfolios 1 and 2 of firms nominated in this IR award 
category also falls over the periods T-2 to T+1 and this is also the case for the firms 
in portfolio 3 (143 firms out of 412) until period T but it then rises from 15.4% to 
17.2% in T+1, although in T+2 it falls again to 14.5%, which is also the lowest results 
in any of the years T-2 to T+2 for this group of firms. Also the firms in portfolio 1 
have the lowest average estimate in all years T-2 to T+1, although in T+2 the firms in 
portfolio 2 have a lower average, at 5.0% compared to 9.9%, but the average for 
portfolio 1 still remains lower than the average cost of capital across all firms in this 
period (9-78%). 
Best Annual Report 
Across firms nominated in this award category there is again a general decline in the 
average cost of capita and once again this is seen especially over the three periods 
surrounding the month of award nomination (T-1 to T+1). However, unexpectedly in 
almost all of these periods the firms in portfolio 1 have above the average cost of 
capital across all firms nominated for this award. Therefore, although the average 
for portfoliol firms falls over the periods T-1 to T+1, from 16.35% to 8.21%, there is 
no evidence that the size of the annual report IR rating within periods is related to the 
cost of capital. 
219 
7.4.2.3 Regression Analysis Results 
The results of the regression analysis for UK firms are shown in Table 7.4.2.3. 
Firstly, theory and prior research indicate that there is a negative/positive relationship 
between firm size/risk and cost of equity. Table 7.4.2.3 shows that in each of the 
periods I test and for all firms, although not significant in all cases, the signs of the 
regression coefficients reflect support these predicted relationships. 
Best IR Officer 
The only significant result is in period T+1, the 12-months immediately following the 
period of firm nominations for the IR awards, when there is a significant negative 
relationship between IR rating and cost of capital (t = -2-50) and the highest rated 
firms have a lower average cost of capital by 11.7%. There are also negative 
coefficients in periods T-1, T and T-2, but these are not significant. 
Best Results Meeting 
Unexpectedly, because this is contrary to theory, there are highly significant positive 
relationships between IR rating and cost of capital in all periods T-1 to T+2 (t= 6.30 
in T+1). This means that the apparent negative relationship between IR rating and 
the cost of capital for these firms that was shown in the analysis of averages by 
portfolio, described in section 7.4.2.2 above, is reversed once the analysis controls 
for market value and risk (equity beta) and that the firms with a higher rating in this 
category have a higher cost of capital. The implications of this finding are further 
discussed below. 
Best Annual Report 
None of the statistical results are significant for the firms nominated in this IR award 
category and this finding is also further discussed below. 
This concludes my description of the test results relating to the cost of equity of the 
UK firms. The tables of the results on the UK firms are set out on the following 
pages. 
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Table 7.4.2.1. 
Results for UK firms nominated 1999 to 2002 descriptive statistics of estimated 
cost of equity capital 
This table show the range, minimum, maximum, mean, standard deviation and percentile 
averages of the cost of equity capital estimates in period T-2 to T+2 of the all the of the UK 
firms nominated for the IR Awards 1999 to 2002 pooled across these years. 
Best IR Officer Award N= 461 
Percentiles 
Period Range Min Max Mean Std. Deviation 25% 50% 75% 
T-2 77.57% 0.00% 77.57% 12.71% 10.83% 5.38% 10.52% 15.70% 
T-I 83.91% 0.00% 83.91% 14.79% 12-37% 7.01% 12.12% 19.07% 
T 74.55% 0.01% 74.56% 10.91% 8.14% 4.63% 10.11% 15.30% 
T+1 62.12% 0.00% 62.12% 7.98% 9.20% 2.06% 4.43% 11.07% 
T+2 99.83% 0.00% 99.83% 11.29% 9.55% 3.18% 11.89% 14.04% 
Averag 11.54% 
e 
Best Results Meeting Award N= 412 
Percentiles 
Period Range Min Max Mean Std. Deviation 25% 50% 75% 
T-2 85.75% 0.00% 85.75% 14.87% 12.79% 6.63% 11.79% 18.48% 
T-I 85.75% 0.00% 85.75% 14.43% 11.88% 7.01% ''11.40% 17.87% 
T 72.31% 0.16% 72.47% 12.58% 9.98% 5.45% 11.17% 16.97% 
T+1 89.34% 0.00% 89.34% 10.93% 12.22% 2.83% 8.17% 14.91% 
T+2 77.70% 0.00% 77.70% 9.78% 8.31% 2.94% 10.34% 13.24% 
Average 12.52% 
Best Annual Report Award N= 381 
Percentiles 
Period Range Min Max Mean Std. Deviation 25% 50% 75% 
T-2 97.32% 0.00% 97.32% 12.42% 10.66% 5.39% 10.47% 15.23% 
T-I 89.53% 0.01% 89.54% 14.81% 12.40% 7.14% 12.30% 18.56% 
T 74.55% 0.01% 74.56% 11.14% 8.76% 4.77% 10.10% 15.31% 
T+1 93.61% 0.01% 93.62% 8.39% 10.11% 2.11% 4.45% 11.04% 
T+2 99.82% 0.01% 99.83% 12.12% 11.06% 3.84% 12.13% 14.34% 
Average 11.78% 
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Table 7.4.2.2. 
Results for large UK firms nominated 1999 to 2002 estimated cost of equity 
capital by portfolio 
This table shows the average estimates for portfolios of UK firms nominated in the IR Awards 
1999,2000,2001 and 2002 over the periods T-2 to T+2. 
The pooled samples of all companies nominated in the IR award in 1999 to 2002 are divided 
into portfolio groups based on their within-year IR rating and the portfolios are then pooled 
across years. 
The Cost of Equity Capital is estimated from 'base years' two year prior to and two years 
following the 12 month period in which the company is nominated for an IR Award, by solving 
the following equation: 
4 
Pt Y-(I+ ri)-'Et(dt, ) + (I+r)-4 EAP41 
estimated expected cost of equity capital for firm i at time t 
Pt share price of firm i at time t 
P4 forecasted share price four periods ahead 
Et the expectations operator, and; 
t0 is at 01/04/1997,1998,1999,2000,2001,2002,2003,2004 
Best IR Officer Award N= 461 
Portfolios T-2 T-1 T T+I T+2 N 
1 13.13% 13.85% 10.35% 7.16% 10.96% 152 
2 12.04% 14.77% 10.76% 8.05% 11.07% 148 
3 12.96% 15.75% 11.61% 8.72% 11.85% 161 
Average 12.71% 14.79% 10.91% 7.98% 11.29% 461 
Difference -0.17% 1.90% 1.26% 1.56% 0.89% 
3 and I 
Best Results Meeting Award N= 412 
Portfolios T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 N 
1 11.29% 11.61% 10.27% 6.92% 9.85% 136 
2 18.01% 15.74% 12.06% 8.67% 4.99% 133 
3 15.30% 15.93% 15.40% 17.20% 14.50% 143 
Average 14.87% 14.43% 12.58% 10.93% 9.78% 412 
Difference 4.01% 4.32% 5.13% 10.28% 4.64% 
3 and I 
Best Annual Report Award N= 381 
portfolio T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 N 
1 13.60% 16.35% 11.71% 8.21% 12.12% 124 
2 11.83% 14.96% 11.25% 8.15% 11.56% 115 
3 11.84% 13.13% 10.45% 8.82% 12.67% 137 
Average 12.42% 14.81% 11.14% 8.39% 12.12% 376 
Difference -1.76% -3.22% -1.26% 
3 and 1 
0.61% 0.55% 
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7.4.3 Addressing the research hypothesis for cost of equity capital 
7.4.3.1 The validity of. my estimates of the cost of equity capital 
Although the theory supporting an expectation that effective IR should be associated 
with a reduced cost of equity is set out in section 7.4.4, it is also possible that the 
apparent fall in cost of equity for the firms with effective IR is simply due to a general 
fall in the market-wide cost of equity or is related to a the general level of interest 
rates that affect the cost of equity for all firms. However, because I have performed 
cross-sectional tests of the average cost of equity of the firms, I intrinsically control 
for any changes in economy-wide and market environment factors that may also 
affect the firms' cost of equity, for example the cost of debt and the level of market 
interest rates. 
Secondly, given that my cost of equity estimates are based on forecasts of stock 
prices and dividends by security analysts it is very likely that they will already have 
factored in their forecasts of other market-wide variables into their price and 
dividends forecasts. 
Further, to provide support for the validity of the cost of capital estimates I calculate 
for the firms with effective IR that comprise my data set, I set out in appendix 3a 
summary of the estimates of the cost of capital in the key existing literature to 
compare with the estimates in my research. As shown in this appendix, the within- 
award range of my estimates is large but appendix 3 shows that the equivalent 
ranges in the prior research is also large and the percentile analysis of my cost of 
equity estimates shows that the averages by 25%/50%/75% percentiles are close to 
the overall average for each period. As can also be seen in appendix 3, the cost of 
equity capital estimates calculated in the existing research vary widely even within 
one study that uses various calculation methods and also between studies. These 
range from a low of 2.1 % for 12,400 US firm-year observations from 1983 to 1993 in 
the study by Botosan and Plumlee (2005), using the OhIson Residual Income 
method to the highest estimate of 22.1% for 62 US firms with low analyst following 
by Botosan (1997) using the Finite Horizon Gordon Growth model. The average 
estimates that I calculate in my research lie between these two extremes (a mean of 
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9.2% for the 3,113 US firms and an average of 11.5% across all of the 1,254 UK 
firms that I test). These results highlight the fact that there appears to be no 'right' 
way to calculate the ex-ante cost of equity, as I discuss in section 3.4, and that it is 
probably more important to use a method that is both robust and consistent in order 
to perform a cross-sectional analysis within any particular sample of firms over any 
particular time period. 
7.4.3.2 Cost of equity results 
The results show that the average cost of capital for 1,059 US large firms with 
effective IR falls over time, suggesting a negative relationship between effective IR 
and the cost of equity capital for these larger sized firms over this period of time. In 
addition, the regression analysis that control for firm size show that in year T+1, the 
period immediately following the award nominations, the cost of capital of the firms 
that had received the most nominations is significantly lower than that for the firms 
with fewer nominations. 
The 2,054 smaller sized US firms have a higher average cost of equity capital 
compared to the large firms in almost all of the 12-month periods spanning two 
periods prior and two periods following their nomination in the IR awards and this is 
by as much as 2% higher during one period. However, as for the large firms, the 
average cost of equity for the small firms falls steadily over time, indicative that good 
IR is negatively related to the cost of capital for these smaller-sized over the time 
periods tested. In addition, the regression analysis shows that for the smaller firms 
the relationship between the number of nominations for Best Overall IR and the cost 
of capital is negative and significant during the 2 periods immediately following their 
nomination (periods T and T+ I). 
The cost of equity capital estimates for the UK firms, calculated using the same 
methodology as for the US firms, are of a comparable magnitude to that of the US 
firms during each of the periods tested. This similarity is perhaps a reflection of the 
weak international boundaries to trading between the UK and US capital markets, 
which allows investors relatively ease of trading arbitrage across national capital 
markets and global diversification of their investment portfolios and funds. 
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Because the UK firms are nominated for effectiveness in specific forms of IR, the 
results also provide some indications that effectiveness in different forms and 
methods of IR may affect the cost of capital differently. Firstly, this is because the 
UK firms deemed to have the most effective IR Officers benefit from a failing average 
cost of capital in the years immediately surrounding their nomination and the 
average cost of equity in each period T-2 to T+2 is lower for portfolios of firms with 
more award nominations in this IR award category. In addition, the regression 
results for the firms with the Best IR Officers show a significant negative relationship 
between the size of the cost of capital and the IR rating of firms during the two 
periods immediately after being nominated for the IR award, implying that the 
activities of the effective IR officers may be instrumental in reducing the size of the 
cost of capital. 
Secondly, although the results show that effective communications during results 
meetings with analysts and fund managers are associated with a continual fall in 
average estimated cost of equity over time, they do not show strong evidence of any 
relationship between the number of award nominations in this category and cost of 
capital. Importantly, the regression results for these firms show a significant positive 
relationship between their ratings for effective communications in their results 
meetings and the size of the cost of capital during all of the periods analysed. This 
finding appears counter-intuitive because it is contrary to theory. However, my 
finding of a positive relationship between effective results meetings and the cost of 
capital is consistent with the findings of some seminal research on corporate 
communications in the more frequent forms. 
For example, Botosan and Plumlee (2002) find a positive relationship between firms' 
AIMR ratings for 'Other Published Information' (which is essentially non-mandatory 
firm information disclosed in-between annual, interim and quarterly reporting dates, 
such as trading statements and news releases) and the cost of capital. Botosan 
and Plumlee suggest that their findings may be because, when firms provide more 
frequent and ad-hoc information to the market, this can have the effect of increasing 
short-term share price volatility and thereby raise the degree of risk attached to the 
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shares, causing investors to require a higher return to equity. Higher share price 
volatility will also directly affect the size of the cost of capital estimates calculated in 
my thesis because they rely on analysts' forecasts of share prices and future growth 
rates and will therefore be higher for firms with lower forecasted future values. 
Finally, the results for the UK firms also show that effective communications in the 
more formal and structured format of the annual report is also associated with a fall 
in the average estimated cost of capital over time. However, the firms with the 
highest number of nominations for Best Annual Report do not have the lowest 
average cost of capital compared to the firms with fewer nominations during any of 
the periods tested and the regression results show no significant relationship 
between the number of nominations and the cost of equity for the firms with effective 
annual report communications in any period. These findings are not easy to explain 
and are contrary to both theoretical predictions and to findings in the existing 
literature. For example, Botosan and Plumlee (2002) find a significant negative 
relationship between firms' AIMR rating for annual reports and the cost of equity 
capital, as I described in section 3.4. My findings may merely be due to differences 
in the methodology used by Botosan and Plumlee (2002). However, they suggest 
that a good annual report is now regarded as only the basic minimum required by 
best practice IR and that any marginal improvements in annual reports have no 
significant effect of the cost of equity, whereas improvements in more discretionary 
and informal forms of IR communications are perhaps now better methods of 
providing cost benefits when competing to raise equity in the capital markets. 
Also, a reason for my findings on effective annual reporting may relate to the findings 
in the research by Lang and Lundholm (1996), who test for levels of analyst 
coverage for firms rated in the AIMR corporate communication surveys. Lang and 
Lundholm find that analyst following is significantly higher for the firms with a higher 
'Overall Rating' and higher ratings for 'Investor Relations' and 'Other Published 
Information', but are not significantly associated with the rating for the 'Annual 
Report'. My insignificant results for any relationship between the cost of capital and 
the rating for annual reports in the IR Magazine IR awards may be due to the same 
reasons as those suggested by Lang and Lundholm (1996) for analyst coverage, 
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who state that, "The annual report, as a form of communication, may be necessary 
but does not contribute significantly to the perceived effectiveness of an overall 
disclosure strategV'. 
This importance of the form and frequency of corporate communications is 
discussed further in chapter 8. 
7.4.4 Theory 
As described in section 4.1, Agency Theory and Information Risk Theory predicts 
that enhanced corporate communications can reduce the level of information 
asymmetry between a firm's inside management and external shareholders, leading 
to a reduced level of information-uncertainty as a source of risk for investors. These 
theories predict that reduced information-uncertainty should reduce the level of 
required equity returns for a firm and result in a lower cost of raising equity finance. 
Overall, my research finds some empirical evidence supporting the predictions made 
by these theories because the firms in both UK and US firms with effective IR across 
a range of formal and informal communication media are found to benefit from a fall 
in their cost of equity capital over time. 
7.4.5 Conclusions on cost of equity capital 
overall, although my findings on any relationships between the size of the firms' IR 
ratings and the cost of capital are mixed, I find compelling evidence that the cost of 
capital of my sample firms falls over the years surrounding their nominations for IR 
awards. Therefore I reject the null hypothesis H04 at normal significance levels; 
there is no significant relationship between effective IR and a future reduced cost 
of equity capitaL 
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7.5. Chapter Summary 
This chapter describes the findings of the tests I perform to explore any associations 
between equity returns, stock liquidity, analyst coverage and the cost of equity 
capital for firms with effective IR. The tests are aimed at addressing my research 
hypotheses, which are based on relationships found in existing literature and on 
outcomes predicted by theory. These hypotheses, together, propose that effective 
IR is associated with prior high analyst coverage and prior excess equity returns and 
with a subsequent increase in analyst coverage, stock liquidity and equity returns 
and also with a reduced cost of equity capital. Based on the results I have described 
above in this chapter, my conclusions on these hypotheses are as follows: 
I find that the null hypotheses HOI and H02 cannot be rejected at normal 
significance levels. This is, firstly, because my findings provide no evidence that the 
firms earn future risk-adjusted excess equity returns, meaning that I cannot reject 
HOI, which proposes that there is no significant relationship between effective IR 
and future excess equity returns. Further, because I do not find that analyst 
following of the firms significantly increases in the periods subsequent to their 
nominations in the IR awards, I cannot reject H02, which proposes that there is no 
significant relationship between effective IR and future increased levels of analyst 
coverage. 
However, based on my empirical findings, the null hypotheses H03, H04, H05 and 
H06 are all rejected at normal significance levels. Firstly, because I find that the 
firms with effective IR have increased stock liquidity and a reduced cost of equity 
capital subsequent to their nominations in the IR awards, I reject H03, that there is 
no significant relationship between effective IR and future increased trading 
volumes of equity and H04, that there is no significant relationship between 
effective IR and future reduced cost of equity capital. Finally, because I find that 
the firms with more effective IR have high prior levels of analyst coverage and prior 
excess equity returns, I reject H05, that there is no significant relationship between 
effective IR and prior excess equity returns and H06, that there is no significant 
relationship between effective IR and prior high levels of analyst coverage. 
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Based on this a summary of my conclusions, which answer the research questions 
that I originally posed in chapter 1, is as follows: 
The following factors significantly determine firms' ratings for effective JR: 
- Prior excess equity returns; 
- Prior high analyst coverage. 
The following factors are associated with firms' ratings for effective IR: 
Continued high analyst coverage; 
A reduced cost of equity capital, and; 
An increase in stock liquidity. 
This concludes the chapter describing the research results. The following chapter 
concludes the main body of this thesis by reviewing how my main findings in the light 
of my research questions and by comparing and contrasting these findings to extent 
they are relevant to those in the existing literature and to the relationships predicted 
by theory. 
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Chapter 8. The Determinants and Effects of Effective IR 
8.1 Aims of this chapter 
In this chapter I review and discuss the findings described in chapter 7 and compare 
and contrast the extent to which they are consistent with the relevant existing 
literature. In section 8.2 1 review the factors that appear to determine which firms are 
perceived to have effective IR and in section 8.3 the factors that appear to be 
associated with firms' ratings for effective IR during subsequent periods. Section 8.4 
summarises and presents some overall conclusions. 
8.2 Determinants of effective IR 
As I explain in section 5.3,1 test two null hypotheses which propose that the prior 
stock performance and prior analyst covera 
* 
ge of the firms with effective IR determine 
that the firms have, or are perceived to have, effective IR. Firstly, I test the null 
hypothesis H05, that there is no significant relationship between effective IR and 
prior excess equity returns and secondly H06, that there is no Significant relationship 
between effective IR and prior high levels of analyst coverage. However, as I 
explain in my summary in chapter 7, and based on the results described in sections 
7.1 and 7.2, these two null hypotheses are rejected at normal significance levels. In 
this section I discuss some reasons that may explain any relationship between prior 
excess equity returns and prior high analyst coverage and effective IR. In addition, I 
review why 'firm size' and the 'form and frequency of corporate communications' are 
also factors that appear to be important in relation to how IR is perceived, as 
indicated by my empirical results. This section is organised into the following sub- 
sections. Section 8.2.1 relates to the firms' prior excess equity returns (HO5), section 
8.2.2 to their prior high analyst coverage (HO6) and in sections 8.2.3 and 8.2.4 1 
discuss the importance of firm size and of the form and frequency of corporate 
Comm unications. 
8.2.1 Prior excess equity returns 
The results described in section 7.1 show that the stocks of the UK firms that are 
given the highest number of nominations by the respondents to the IR awards survey 
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for effective IR earn excess risk-adjusted returns in the year prior to the surveys. 
However, although the smaller sized US firms nominated in equivalent US IR awards 
also shows high prior excess returns, the prior stock returns of the larger sized US 
firms are not abnormal. I discuss any significance of 'firm size' in this relationship 
below in section 8.2.3. Meanwhile, my findings of prior excess equity returns are in- 
line with those of some of the existing literature described in section 3.1 and 4.2.1 
summarise the main findings of this literature here to illustrate how my findings 
contribute to the literature and I also review how the theory described in section 4.2 
can explain my findings. 
Firstly, similarly Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) find that sustained improvements 
in firms' ratings in the AIMR survey of corporate communications are associated with 
an improvement in the firms' industry-adjusted stock returns of a cumulative average 
of 5% over the period two years prior to the first disclosure level increase and two 
years afterwards. In other words, they show that the stocks of these firms were also 
performing well prior to their high ratings in the AIMR survey. Also, in tests of the 
firms comprising the UK Management Today 'Britain's Most Admired Firms'survey, 
Agarwal, Brown and Taffler (2004) find that they earn excess stock returns only over 
the 12-months preceding the survey and not in any subsequent periods. Further, 
Fryxell and Wang (1994) test the firms in the US Fortune Magazine 'America's Most 
Admired' list, and conclude that the 'most admired' index score of the firms is only 
significantly associated with the firms' prior financial performance and not obviously 
related to the more subjective attributes that the Fortune survey categories describe. 
My findings contribute to this body of empirical evidence because, in the same way 
as does this prior literature, they suggest that the respondents to the IR Magazine IR 
awards survey are subject to the bias of representativeness described in the 
literature on behavioural finance. This literature explains that past excess equity 
returns can cast a financial 'halo' over firms, which respondents in firm-surveys 
appear to carry over to their high opinions of the firms in other areas, such as their IR 
performance. 
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8.2.2 Prior analyst coverage 
Secondly, the test results I describe in section 7.2 show that, for both the US firms 
and UK firms, analyst following appears to be higher prior to their nominations for the 
IR awards and my regression analyses show that the relationship between levels of 
analyst coverage and the firms' number of IR award nominations is positive and 
significant in periods both preceding and following the time of the IR awards and in 
my tests of the US firms that are distinguished by size this relationship is particularly 
strong for smaller sized firms. Overall, this suggests the firms that are nominated for 
effective IR are those with which the award survey respondents are already more 
familiar due to their high analyst coverage. Also, combined with my findings of prior 
excess returns of the smaller firms, this also indicates that analysts may behave 
differently towards large versus smaller sized firms. In other words, analysts may 
only be attracted to following smaller firms with effective IR and high stock returns, 
but that larger firms with effective IR attract analysts regardless of their short-term 
stock performance. 
To put my findings in context, I review here some of the most relevant findings in 
prior research on the relationship between effective communications and analyst 
coverage that I have described in section 3.2. Firstly, Lang and Lundholm (1996), 
test the firms included in AIMR corporate communication surveys during the 1990s 
and, similarly, show that the firms' levels of analyst following are significantly higher 
at the time the survey is conducted, for both firms with a higher AIMR 'Overall 
Rating' and those with a higher rating in the separate 'Investor Relations' and 'Other 
Published Information' AIMR disclosure categories that comprise the overall rating. 
Relevantly, Lang and Lundholm find no significant relationship between prior analyst 
following and the firms' ratings for 'Annual Report' disclosure and they suggest that 
this is because analysts prefer to follow firms that are effective in the most 
discretionary and voluntary forms of communications compared to formal reporting 
methods. I discuss the importance of the form and frequency of corporate 
communications below in section 8.2.4. Meanwhile, Chung and Ho (1996) find that 
analyst-following is significantly higher for firms with a higher market value and 
Bhushan (1989b) also finds a significant positive correlation between analyst 
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following and firm size, but that analyst following is also higher for firms with a past 
low equity return variability, less business diversification and for firms with a high 
correlation between their stock returns and market returns, together suggesting that 
more analysts follow firms that are less risky and perhaps easier to analyse and to 
make performance forecasts for. 
Finally, the findings of the study by Botosan (1997) underline the importance of 
analyst coverage in any relationship between effective IR and a reduced cost of 
equity capital. This is because she finds a significant negative relationship between 
enhanced corporate disclosures in annual reports and the cost of equity capital, but 
only for firms with low analyst coverage. Botosan suggests this may be because 
firms with high analyst coverage can rely on their communications with their analysts 
as an effective method of communicating with the market, rather than via their 
annual reports. More generally, this suggests that if analyst following is higher for 
larger firms, it is more effective for larger firms to focus on more informal 
communications with their analysts, whereas it is more effective for smaller firms with 
lower analyst following to concentrate on effectively communicating the information 
contained in their annual reports. To pursue this issue further, I discuss any 
importance of the form, compared to the content, of corporate communications in 
relation to my research hypotheses in section 8.2.4. 
In summary, my findings are consistent with the theories described in behavioural 
finance, which predict that psychological heuristics relied on by analysts when 
assessing firms can lead them to show preferences for firms they already follow 
because these firms are more 'available' and easier to recall. Further, my findings 
are consistent with other research on analyst coverage, which also suggests that 
analysts prefer to follow larger firms, probably because there is more likely to be a 
wealth of existing information on large firms that results in lower information search- 
costs, time and effort on their part of analysts. Finally, I also find that analyst 
coverage is higher for firms with more effective communications, which presumably 
makes the analysts' roles less time-consuming and easier. The following section 
concerns the importance of 'firm size' in relation to effective IR. 
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8.2.3. Firm size 
My tests both show that analyst coverage of smaller firms with effective IR are more 
consistently related to the firms' number of IR award nominations than for larger 
sized firms and also that only the smaller sized US firms that are subsequently rated 
more highly for their IR have excess equity returns. These findings and some prior 
empirical research, which I describe in section 3.2 and of which the most relevant is 
summarised here, support the proposition that analysts appear to behave differently 
towards small firms compared to large firms. 
Firstly, Brown and Kim (1993) find, in interviews with analysts, that they do not 
expect to receive as much voluntary and discretionary information from the 
managers of smaller firms compared to the high level of information they expect from 
larger firms and that any supplementary information from small firms is normally only 
concerning 'good news' and not 'bad news'. Brown and Kim suggest that 
sophisticated short-term investors may also act on this assumption, and that this 
results in a biased attitude of both analysts and investors towards the information 
they receive from smaller firms. Further, Arbel and Strebel (1983) suggest that the 
stocks of smaller firms must generate higher stock returns to gain analyst following 
and investo r-i nte rest that they lack, primarily due to "lower information-availability" in 
the market about them. Arbel and Strebel suggest that lower levels of analyst 
research about smaller firms may be a primary cause of high information-risk that 
investors appear to associate with the stocks of smaller firms. In other words, 
investors demand a 'premium for uncertainty' caused by lack of information, to 
compensate them for the need to do their own fundamental analysis. Finally, my 
findings are also supported by IR industry research and by reports in the financial 
media, which present the view that smaller firms face particular problems in 
attracting analysts, as I have described in section 3.2. In summary, my research 
supports and contributes to this body of empirical and industry literature, by showing 
that firm size is an important factor in the relationship between effective IR and 
analyst coverage and stock pricing, and that some firms only benefit from the 
informational advantages that come from analyst coverage when they differentiate 
themselves by having an effective IR policy. 
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8.2.4. The form and frequency of corporate communications 
My tests of the UK firms nominated in the UK IR awards for 'Best IR Officer', 'Best 
Results Meetings' and 'Best Annual Report' categories, that I describe in chapter 7, 
suggest that the form and frequency of corporate communications are also important 
in any relationship between effective IR and stock liquidity and stock price. This is 
firstly because I find that the stock liquidity of firms nominated for Best IR Officer and 
Best Results Meeting is significantly positively related to their number of award 
nominations, but that there is no such relationship for the firms in the Best Annual 
Report award, suggesting that more frequent and informal effective communications 
have a greater effect in stock liquidity compared to formal reporting methods. 
Secondly, I find that the firms nominated for the UK Best IR Officer and the UK Best 
Results Meeting Awards also have a reduced cost of equity capital over the years 
immediately surrounding their nominations in these awards. However, the 
regression analyses show the relationship between their number of nominations and 
the cost of capital is only significant for firms in the UK Best IR Officer Award during 
the periods immediately after the IR awards, whereas there is a significant positive 
relationship for firms in the Best Results Meeting Award during all of the periods 
analysed and no relationship for firms nominated for Best Annual Report. 
Together, these findings suggest that effective IR in the most informal and frequent 
forms, directly from an IR officer and during meetings between senior managers of 
firms and their investors and analysts, may both have a greater positive impact on 
stock liquidity and in reducing the cost of capital, compared to more formal corporate 
communications in annual reports. It is perhaps in these areas of communications, 
which are above and beyond meeting obligatory and formal reporting requirements, 
where effective IR may provide most value. This proposition is also consistent with 
findings in some existing literature described in section 3.4, of which the most 
relevant I summarise here to for illustration. 
Firstly, Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that analyst coverage is significantly higher at 
the time that firms receive high ratings in the 'Investor Relations' and 'Other 
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Published Information' categories of the AIMR corporate disclosure survey, but is not 
significantly higher for firms rated highly for the 'Annual Report' AIMR category. 
Lang and Lundholm propose that this is because the most discretionary and informal 
forms of communications are more effective in attracting analysts, and that this may 
explain why firms that only focus on formal communications, such as in annual 
reports, have lower analyst coverage. This is important for firms because lower 
analyst-intermediation may reduce the effectiveness of how their annual reports are 
interpreted and understood in the capital markets. This may result in a failure to 
reduce perceived risks associated with a firm or any information asymmetries 
between the firms and their investors, which information risk and agency theories 
predict to should be reduced by effective corporate communications. 
Meanwhile, although my results show -no significant relationship between firms' 
number of 'Best Annual Report' IR award nominations and their cost of capital, this is 
contrary to the findings of Botosan and Plumlee (2002). Botosan and Plumlee find a 
significant negative relationship between firms' ratings in the AIMR 'annual report' 
disclosure category and cost of equity capital. This may be because, as described in 
section 3.4, their study was set in the capital market during the 1990s, whereas my 
research is set in a more recent period and also because Botosan and Plumlee used 
the AIMR rating to measure the quality of firms' annual reports that may be a less 
robust method for rating firms' disclosure quality in particular disclosure categories, 
compared to the IR Magazine IR awards. 
However, Botosan and Plumlee (2002) do find a positive relationship between firms' 
AIMR ratings for 'Other Published Information' and the cost of capital, which is 
consistent with my findings of a positive relationship between cost of equity and 
firms' nominations for the 'Best Results Meeting' IR award. These disclosure 
categories are similar, because they both relate to more informal, frequent and 
discretionary forms of communications. In fact, the AIMR define this disclosure 
category as "non-mandatory firm information disclosed in-between annual, interim 
and quarterly reporting dates, such as trading statements and news releases". 
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Botosan and Plumlee (2002) suggest that these findings for the 'Other Published 
Information' AIMR category is because more frequent and ad-hoc information about 
a firm encourages an 'investor-clientele' effect, whereby more timely disclosure 
attracts a greater proportion of transient, short-term investors whose trading activities 
have a undue volati I ity-i n creasing effect on stock returns. An increase in price 
volatility may increase perceived risk attached to the firms' stocks, causing investors 
to require a higher return. Higher sprice volatility will also directly affect the cost of 
capital estimates calculated by both Botosan and Plumlee (2002) and also those that 
I calculate in my thesis, because our methodology relies on analysts' forecasts of 
share prices and future growth rates which may affected by prior share price volatility 
levels. 
in summary, my findings contribute to a body of existing literature suggesting the 
form of IR communications may be as important as the content of the information. 
This concludes my discussion of the determinants of effective IR. , In the following 
section, 8.3,1 review and expand upon subsequent factors that appear to be 
associated with effective IR. 
8.3 Effects of effective IR 
As explained in section 5.2, in my thesis I also test for any relationship between the 
firms' number of IR award nominations and their stock returns, stock liquidity, analyst 
coverage and cost of equity capital in periods subsequent to the IR awards. 
Firstly, in HOI I propose that there is no significant relationship between effective IR 
and future excess equity returns and in H02 that there is no significant relationship 
between effective IR and future increased levels of analyst coverage. Based on the 
results described in section 7.1 and 7.2, none of the firms have significant excess 
stock returns in the subsequent periods and the firms' level of analyst coverage does 
not significantly rise or fall in the subsequent periods, so there is no significant 
empirical evidence to reject H01 or H02. 
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Further,. in H03 I propose that there is no significant relationship between effective IR 
and future increased trading volume of equity and in H04 that there is no significant 
relationship between effective IR and a future reduced cost of equity capital. Based 
on the results described in section 7.3 and 7.4, null hypotheses H03 and H04 are 
rejected at normal significance levels. 
In summary, I find that the following firm characteristics appear to be subsequently 
associated with effective IR: 
8.3.1. Reduced cost of equity capital (HO4) 
8.3.2. Increased stock liquidity (HO3) 
8.3.3. Continued high analyst coverage 
8.3.1 Reduced cost of equity capital 
Firstly, the results I describe in section 7.4 show that the average cost of equity 
capital of the firms deemed to have effective IR reduces in the periods subsequent to 
the IR awards. Information risk and agency theories together predict that enhanced 
IR should result in a reduced cost of capital but, as described above in section 8.2.4, 
1 find that the sign and strength of any subsequent relationship between the firms' 
number of IR award nominations and their estimated cost of capital depends upon 
the form in which IR is provided by these firms. More specifically, for the US firms 
and for the UK firms nominated for the 'Best IR Officer' award, I find a significant 
negative relationship between their number of nominations and cost of capital in 
periods both preceding and following the month of their nominations. However, for 
the UK firms nominated for 'Best Results Meetings' there is a significant positive 
relationship in periods both preceding and following their nominations, whereas for 
the UK firms nominated for 'Best Annual Report' I find no significant relationship in 
any prior or subsequent period. 
Firstly, I find a negative relationship between my cost of equity estimates and the 
firms' ratings in the Best IR Officer award. Botosan (1997) also finds a negative 
relationship between enhanced communications and the cost of equity capital for 
firms with low analyst following. Although Botosan only measures communication- 
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quality by annual report disclosures she suggests that the disclosure index she uses 
is a valid proxy to measure a firm's overall communications because "annual report 
disclosure levels are positively correlated with the amount of disclosure provided via 
other media", (Botosan, 1997). Further, research by Hail (2002) provides further 
empirical support for a significant negative relationship between enhanced corporate 
disclosure, measured by the Swiss Banking Institute disclosure index, and the cost 
of equity capital based on 73 Swiss firms in one year (2000). 
However, Botosan and Plumlee (2002) find a significant negative relationship 
between the cost of equity and ratings of firms in the AIMR survey 'Annual Report' 
disclosure category, whereas I find that effective IR ratings for annual reports have 
no relationship with the cost of equity. Also, contrary to my findings for the Best IR 
Officer award, Botosan and Plumlee (2002) find no significant relationship between 
cost of capital and ratings for the AIMR 'Investor Relations' disclosure category, 
implying that the quality of investor relations makes no difference to the size of the 
cost of equity capital. Some of my findings are therefore inconsistent with Botosan 
and Plumlee (2002). Reasons for these divergences may lie in some weaknesses 
in the AIMR survey rating to precisely measure effective IR and weaknesses in their 
method for estimating the cost of capital or because their results may only be 
relevant for the US firms they sample and during the time periods they test (1986- 
1996), and these are issues that I have referred to already in section 3.4.1 set out 
any possible weaknesses in my own methodologies that may have resulted in a 
divergence of our findings below in chapter 9. 
However, my other findings on the relationships between effective IR and cost of 
capital are consistent with prior research that I have reviewed in section 3.4 and 
summarise here. Firstly, consistent with my, findings of a positive relationship 
between the cost of capital and the number of nominations for the IR Magazine Best 
Results Meeting award, Botosan and Plumlee (2002) also find a significant positive 
relationship with firms' AIIVIR 'Other Published Information' ratings 1986-1996. 
These two disclosure categories both measure the quality of the firms' corporate 
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communications in forms that are more timely and discretionary compared to annual 
regulatory reporting. 
interestingly though, the empirical results of Gietzmann and Ireland (2004), 
concerning the timely firm disclosures (that I aim to measure in the 'Best Results 
Meetings with Analysts and Fund Managers' IR award) conflict with both my own and 
with those of Botosan and Plumlee (2002). Gietzmann and Ireland find a significant 
negative relationship between the number of Regulatory News Service (RNS) UK 
firms' releases, which they use as a proxy for more "timely disclosure". and the cost 
of capital, although only for firms making aggressive accounting choices (those 
making more discretionary accruals). For more conservatively accounting firms they 
find no significant relationship between timely disclosure and the cost of capital. 
Gietzmann and Ireland suggest that the reason for their different findings is primarily 
that the AIMR rating used by Botosan and Plumlee (2002) as a proxy for the quality 
of disclosure is probably too imprecise to effectively capture some aspects of quality 
of a firm's communications, or that the model Botosan and Plumlee use fails to 
include some correlated variables regarding corporate communications, such as 
accounting method choice. To the extent that this issue also affects my use of the IR 
Magazine IR awards as a measure of effective IR, in chapter 91 suggest some 
possible methods for a more refined measure of IR performance for future empirical 
research in this area. 
Summary discussion on any relationship between IR and the cost of equity 
Overall and in summary, the current literature on the relationship between effective 
IR and cost of capital provides conflicting results, suggesting that any relationship 
between disclosure quality and the cost of capital is complex and perhaps also 
varies in nature according to the time period tested and the state of the market in 
which the firms tested are operating. These diverse research findings may also 
indicate that some of the models used to estimate the ex-ante cost of equity are 
inadequate, that models used in current research omit some correlated explanatory 
variables or due to the difficulties in measuring effective IR. I make some 
suggestions for future research on methods of measuring IR performance in section 
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7.5 and in chapter 9. Meanwhile, measuring expected/ex-ante cost of equity is 
difficult because by its very nature is a future variable and it is hard to know by what 
standards and criteria participants in the capital markets form their expectations of a 
firm's cost of equity. A model to estimate the cost of equity, such as the Gordon 
(1997) finite horizon dividend growth model is only one amongst several possible 
models that can be used and can only be a 'best estimate', based on the 
expectations that are intrinsic in the analyst' stock price and growth forecasts used in 
the estimation model, taken from databases such as I/B/E/S and FirstCall. In the 
following section I discuss my findings from testing the firms' subsequent stock 
liquidity. 
8.3.2 Increased stock liquidity 
As described in section 7.3, my tests also show that stock liquidity of both US firms 
and UK firms with effective IR, using several different methods for measuring 
liquidity, significantly rises over the time periods tested. Perhaps most notably 
though, all of the firms show a significant increase in the 'liquidity ratio, a measure 
that is particularly salient because it measures how equity trading volumes change in 
relation to changes in share price over the same period. The share price-effect of 
how investors trading activity is probably a key concern for the IR manager and for 
senior management of listed firms. My findings are consistent with information risk 
and agency theories, as described in section 4.1, and also with the prior empirical 
research on the relationship between effective IR and stock liquidity described in 
section 3.3 which is concisely summarised by Amihud and Mendelson (1986) when 
he states "A corporation can affect liquidity - and consequently its cost of capital - 
by the amount and quality of the information it releases to investors, Amihud (1989). 
8.3.3 Analyst coverage 
Finally, as described in section 7.2, as well as finding a significant positive 
relationship between the number of nominations that the firms. receive in the IR 
awards and their prior levels of analyst coverage, I find that this positive relationship 
continues to be significant in periods following the IR awards. Because I find that 
analyst coverage appears to both lead and lag effective IR, this suggests that high 
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coverage may both determine and be an effect of effective IR. This proposition is 
consistent with a similar concept established in the existing literature that I have 
described previously in section 3.2 but summarise once more to illustrate. 
Firstly, O'Brien and Bhushan (1990) also find that firms' levels of institutional 
ownership appear to have a simultaneous influence on analyst following. They find 
that high levels of analyst following both lead and lag high levels of ownership and 
vice versa. O'Brien and Bhushan suggest that this is because information contained 
in analysts research influences the investment decisions made by fund managers at 
financial institutions and therefore influences a firm's level of institutional ownership, 
which at the same time increases the demand for the services of security analysts 
and provides a continued motivation for analysts to follow the firm. Further, Hussain 
(2000) also finds a significant two-way positive relationship between the level of 
analyst following and institutional ownership and similarly suggests that increased 
institutional ownership encourages continued analyst following, because increased 
institutional ownership creates a higher demand for information from analysts about 
firms in which financial institutions invest. The propositions that are suggested in this 
prior literature are akin to my putative simultaneous relationship between analyst 
coverage and effective IR. In other words, high coverage encourages a firm to 
maintain to effective IR policy and, in turn, motivates analysts to cover the firm. Any 
endogenous relationship between analyst coverage and effective IR, which my tests 
indicate, may also be due to some of the structural arrangements surrounding the 
capital markets information environment. This is because buy and sell-side analysts 
are normally employed by institutional funds managers and investment banks to 
produce equity research and so they are more likely to follow firms in which fund 
managers already invest and with which they are already very familiar. This 
arrangement may explain why analysts appear to consistently follow certain firms 
over a period of years. In addition, because 'soft commissions' are paid to some 
sell-side analysts, in the form of higher transaction costs by firms and buy-side 
investment banks for additional sell-side research and market data, these financial 
incentives may also encourage analysts to continue to cover firms with which the 
investment bank employing them has an on-going relationship. In summary, based 
244 
on my findings, I propose that firms appear to operate in a form of 'circular 
information environment', whereby analysts can be attracted to follow firms that 
provide effective IR and then consistently follow these firms, but that firms that fail to 
attract analysts may remain outside this 'virtuous circle' and fail to benefit from the 
advantages that increased exposure from analyst research may reap. 
8.4 Chapter summary 
In my thesis I propose that there are relationships between effective IR and prior 
excess equity returns and prior high analyst coverage and that effective IR is 
associated with increased liquidity, a reduced cost of equity and future high analyst 
coverage. The following diagram provides an overview of the findings of my 
research upon which I base these propositions, whereby the activities of research 
analysts appear to play a pivotal role in a putative 'circular information environment' 
in which firms appear to operate: 
The Circular Information Environment 
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This flow diagram provides a diagrammatical overview and summary of my thesis. 
At the centre it shows a firm with effective IR that operates in a framework of 
regulation governing its external communications. My thesis finds that firms with 
effective IR have recently high-performing stocks and/or high analyst coverage. 
These two attributes are likely to simultaneously both motivate the senior managers 
of firms to adopt an effective IR strategy and at the same time probably assist firms 
in communicating effectively, through a pre-existing network of analysts who supply 
a ready and willing investor-audience. These attributes may also be psychological 
4signals' to investors and analysts, which behavioural finance predicts can increase 
firms' availability and become representative of firms and so cast favourable 'halos' 
over firms in the minds of their investors and of the analysts producing forecasts and 
analysis on the firm. My thesis also shows that firms with effective IR simultaneously 
have increased subsequent stock liquidity and continued high analyst coverage. 
Increased liquidity probably results from enhanced information-availability from 
analyst' research, which reduces information asymmetry and information-related 
perceived equity risk. Finally, firms with a high market valuation and liquid stocks, 
which are well-known due to the large amount of information about them in the 
market, are more likely to benefit from a low cost of raising equity finance and be 
able to generate higher stock returns that attract investors and analyst following. 
These interacting causes and effects form the 'circular information environment', in 
which firms appear to operate and which largely relies upon effective IR. 
Summary discussion on measuring IR performance 
The validity of the findings in this thesis all rely upon the methodology I have used to 
measure IR performance. However, it should be noted that my use of the number of 
nominations in the IR Magazine IR awards to measure IR performance can only be a 
'best estimate'. This is because IR is a very difficult concept to measure because it 
is more of a 'process' than an 'event', is a subjective construct and can probably only 
be judged relative to the (changing) expectations and judgemental benchmarking by 
the audience of an IR function. This issue is further discussed in section 9.2.1 
below. This concludes the main body of my thesis. The following chapter sets out 
some unanswered questions and some suggested areas for future research in IR. 
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Chapter 9. Review of the thesis 
9.1 Summary of the thesis chapters 
In this thesis I set out to test associations between the equity returns, cost of equity 
capital, stock liquidity and analyst coverage and a proxy measure for the 
effectiveness of the investor relations of a sample of US firms and UK firms 
nominated for the IR Magazine IR Awards 1999-2002. In chapter 21 describe the IR 
industry to establish the context in which this thesis is set and section 6.1 explains 
how I construct my samples of firms with effective IR. 
Chapter 3 reviews the existing literature to the extent it relates to relationships 
between effective IR the variables that I set out to test. It is to this wide body of 
literature that this thesis contributes. I then describe the framework of theories in 
chapter 4, which together support my research hypotheses developed to test for the 
firms with effective IR. Based both on relationships predicted by these theories and 
on the findings in the existing empirical literature reviewed in chapter 3,1 develop the 
research hypotheses in chapter 5. 
Chapter 6 explains the methodologies I employ to test these hypotheses and chapter 
7 describes the results of the tests performed on the sample firms and how these are 
related to outcomes predicted by relevant theory. Chapter 8 reviews each of the 
factors that this research shows to be determinants and effects of effective IR and 
the extent to which my findings are in-line with, or contradict with, those in the 
relevant prior research. This chapter presents a concluding proposition that the 
information search and dissemination activities of security analysts, who are an 
important link in the chain of communications between firms and their investors, 
appear play a pivotal role in any link between the determinants and effects of 
effective IR in the circular corporate communications environment. 
9.2 Unanswered questions 
This section discusses some recognised areas of weakness in the methodologies 
employed in this thesis, which future research on IR may seek to address. 
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9.2.1 Reliability of the measure of effective IR 
Although section 6.1 explains the reasons justifying the use of IR Magazine's IR 
Awards number of nominations per firm as a proxy measure of effective IR, there are 
potential weaknesses in this approach. The first issue concerns whether effective 
IR is actually a time-specific 'event', which is at all amenable to a time-specific rating 
or measure, or whether it is only realistic to measure IR performance over a longer 
time period that the procedural nature of IR, i. e. IR is an on-going process rather 
than an event. Although the respondents to the IR Magazine IR Awards are asked 
to assess firms' IR performance over the previous 12-months, it is impossible to 
know whether they actually do this and whether done consistently across all the 
different respondents in any one year or over periods of time. Secondly, the degree 
by which a firm's IR policy is effective is probably not an objective fact because it is 
by definition assessed according to the subjective perceptions of its audience. 
However, it is probably impossible to know what these 'true' perceptions are for a 
large sample of firms. Although the IR Magazine IR Award respondents may, in 
effect, be expressing opinions based on their own perceptions of firms IR, it is not 
however possible to verify whether their expressed opinions are a true reflection of 
their actual opinions. 
Finally, the period over which my tests are performed (1999 to 2002) is noted for the 
occurrence of several corporate 'accounting scandals' (i. e. the 'Enron era') and so 
may not be representative of a 'normal' time period over which to test IR 
performance in a more general sense. This is also a period spanning the events of 
September 11 th, which probably also had a major effect on stock market pricing and 
behaviour and, crucially, on investors' attitudes to risk. All of these factors may 
therefore have affected the size and direction of the empirical results in my thesis. 
9.2.2 Analyst bias 
The possibility that analysts have biased opinions and that they may be biased in 
their research activities may affect my research is several ways. Firstly, a large 
percentage of the respondents to the IR Magazine IR Award survey are analysts (the 
break-down of respondents is shown in tables I and J in appendix 1). These 
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analysts may nominate firms for the IR Magazine awards for reasons other than that 
they actually consider the firms to have the most effective IR. For example, they 
may name a firm simply because they are more familiar with it through their research 
role as a sell or buy-side analyst. However it is any biases resulting from high 
familiarity that underlies the bias of representativeness, which is one of the main 
behaviours; that can affect decision-making, described in the behavioural finance 
literature in section 4.2. Therefore I explicitly recognise the potential for any such 
bias to affect the results of the tests that I perform. 
Further, there is the potential that sell-side security analysts may be influenced to 
nominate firms with which the investment banks or other institutions employing them 
have other corporate business. Analysts may be more or less favoured towards 
firms about which they have access to other information or subject to biases due any 
liaisons between firms and their employing institutions. However, the risk that this 
may bias their nominations in the IR awards is minimised to a degree by both the 
legislation governing such activities described in chapter 2 and because, as shown in 
the statistics in appendix 1, the respondents for the US IR awards in fact are only 
30.1% sell-side analysts and the UK only 44.8%, the balance being employed in the 
buy-side (either as brokers or fund managers). A final issue relates to whether 
analyst' bias affects the share price and dividend forecasts used to calculate the cost 
of equity capital measure. As described in section 6.5, my cost of equity capital 
measure is calculated using data from the Thomson Financial FirstCall database, 
using analyst' consensus forecasted price, dividend and growth rates. Although this 
follows an established research methodology, for example Botosan and Plumlee 
(2005), if the data published in this database is biased then the cost of equity 
calculations will incorporate this bias. In addition, the number of analysts making 
forecasts published in this database is the basis for measuring analyst coverage, as 
explained in section 6.3. To any extent that the database does not reflect the true 
number of analysts covering a firm, then the results of my tests concerning analyst 
coverage may be spurious. 
9.2.3 'Noise' in the data 
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This concerns the potential that the source data used in the tests in my thesis 
include a large amount of systematic 'noise' that systematically affect any of the 
variables used in my methodologies. Although I have attempted to minimise 'noise' 
by adopting established methodologies used in the existing literature any remaining 
noise in the data, which is not explicitly recognised as an endogenous correlated 
variable in my research methodologies may render the test results spurious. 
9.2.4 The 'ex-post' versus the 'ex-ante' cost of equity capital 
The aim in this research is to test the relationship between IR performance and the 
ex-ante cost of equity capital, being that which reflects the consensus of investors' 
current expectations about a firm's cost of equity. Therefore, as explained in section 
6.5, it is intuitively incorrect to use ex-post stock prices to estimate this future value. 
For this reason, and based on an established research method, I calculate the ex- 
ante cost of equity by relying on analysts' forecasts about firms future performance 
to represent market' consensus expectations of future performance. Any 
weaknesses involved in using these forecasts are discussed above in section 9.2.2. 
Problems with using past realised returns is the same conundrum discussed by 
Black (1993), in discussing some existing research that tests the relationship 
between equity beta and expected equity return and that finds that the relationship is 
weaker than that predicted by CAPM model. Black (1993) attributes these findings 
to either "data-mining" by the researchers, or as being due to the research using 
realised returns as an imperfect proxy for future expected returns, stating that "Using 
data on realised returns is limited and noisy'. Any problem due to "noise inherent in 
using realised returns" is also discussed by Shefrin and Statman (2004), when they 
seek to explain their regression results that test the relationship between 
sexpectations of returns' and 'realised returns', which show a negative coefficient 
over the whole period tested, but a positive coefficient in some discrete years and 
that the coefficients change from sign from one year to the next. 
9.2.5 A 'triple test' 
The findings of my research are a result of a 'triple test' of: 
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The efficiency by which market prices and volumes react to new information from 
the IR function of the firms; 
The validity of the models used to measure the relationship between effective IR 
and equity pricing, liquidity and analyst coverage (the 'bad model' problem), and: 
The validity of my measurement tool of effective IR: The IR Magazine IR Award 
survey nominations. 
Therefore the validity of my test results may be compromised by weaknesses in the 
any of these areas. In my thesis I have provided support for my chosen method for 
measuring effective IR and for the models I use in my empirical tests, but make 
some suggestions to address remaining weaknesses in these areas in section 9.3 
below. 
9.2.6. Data mining 
The findings of this research may be the result of 'chance' or may only be specific to 
the sample of firms tested or during the time periods analysed and this may reduce 
the ability to generalise from my findings. 
9.3 Suggested areas for future research 
9.3.1. A control sample of matched firms with 'non-effective IRI 
The aim of my thesis is to test a pre-defined sample of firms with effective IR for 
characteristics that prior research and theory indicate may be determinants and 
effects of effective IR. Because my measure of effective IR is based on the number 
of nominations received by firms in annual IR awards, this means I can test for 
changes in levels of the firms' characteristics between periods prior to and 
subsequent to the awards and also for any relationships between the firms' number 
of nominations and these characteristics during individual years, which provide the 
empirical evidence to meet the precise aims of my thesis. However, further empirical 
research on any relationships between stock pricing, stock liquidity and analyst 
coverage and effective IR could include additional tests of a control sample of firms 
with 'non-effective IR', although it is not clear how firms can be objectively divided 
into those that have effective and non-effective IR. In other words, although the 
firms nominated for IR awards presumably are those that are deemed to have the 
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most effective IR when they are nominated, this does not necessarily imply that other 
non-nominated firms actually have ineffective IR or merely less effective IR and 
whether the nominations simply reflect the stated and subjective opinions of the 
parties making the nominations. This is the same problem I discuss above in sub- 
section 9.2.1 and in the following sub-section, that IR is a procedural and qualitative 
construct that is hard to measure. 
9.3.2. Measure of effective IR 
As alluded to above, future research on IR could make use of additional or 
alternative methods to measure IR performance, which could include sources such 
as IR ratings from Extel and Standard & Poor's (S&P). Researchers could also give 
consideration to incorporating 'softer' IR measures, such as feedback from the 
investors and analysts who are the main audience of IR audience, although access 
to the necessary data may be difficult. Future research could also test the effect of 
IR longer periods in order to explore more sustained levels of IR performance. 
9.3.3. Liquidity 
In my thesis I measure stock liquidity using levels of, and changes in, the firms' 
equity trading volumes. However, future research may attempt to replicate my 
analyses using alternative established liquidity measures, such as the bid-ask 
spread. or by modifying the models I employ. 
9.3.4. Cost of equity capital 
Further research on assessing the validity and robustness of estimates for 
calculating the ex-ante cost of equity capital is required because despite the 
overwhelming consensus in the literature I described in chapter 3, which finds that 
estimates of the cost of capital based on realised returns are inadequate, at present 
there is insufficient academic consensus over which forward-looking valuation 
methodology to use. Research such as by Guay, Kothari and Shu (2003) , which 
attempts to improve on methodologies are encouraging in this direction. Because 
analysts' price and earnings forecasts may be biased because some analysts fail to 
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update their forecasts in the light of very recent share price movements, Guay, 
Kothari and Shu adjust the forecasts in two ways. Firstly, they include recent price 
movements as a control variable and, secondly, they so not include "stale" analyst' 
forecasts in their valuation models, finding that both of these methods improve the 
strength of the relationship between ex-ante cost of capital estimates and realised 
equity returns. 
Such issues have not, heretofore, been addressed in the literature. 
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Appendix 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Sample Firms 
This appendix shows the details of the final samples that form the basis for all of the 
tests in this thesis. The tables below show the following: 
- All IR award categories in the UK(1999-2002) and US (2000-2002) IR Magazine; 
- The number of nominations in UK and US IR award categories I test in my thesis; 
- The numbers of firms in each portfolio of UK and US firms by IR award category; 
- The total numbers of buy and sell-side respondents in the UK and US IR award 
surveys by year. 
UK IR Magazine IR Award Categories 
As shown below, although the number of UK IR awards and the IR categories are 
fairly consistent across 1999 to 2002, some new award categories were made in 
2002 and since 2001 some of the key IR categories are awarded for FTSE 100 and 
Non FTSE 100 firms separately. 
Table A UK IR Award Categories 
1999 and 2000 
1 Best IR Officer 
2 Best Results Meeting 
3 Best Annual Report 
4 Best Communication of Shareholder Value 
5 Best Board Communications 
6 Best IR for a New Issue 
7 Best IR Website 
8 Best IR During a Takeover 
9 Best IR for a Loss Maker 
10 Best IR for an AIM Company 
11 Best IR During a Crisis 
12 Best IR Progress 
13 Best IR for a FTSE 100 Company 
14 Best IR for a FTSE 250 Company 
15 Best IR Smaller Company 
16 Best IR US Company 
17 Best IR European Company 
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Table B 
2001 
I Best IR Officer FTSE 100 
2 Best IR Officer non FTSE 100 
3 Best Results Meeting FTSE 100 
4 Best Results Meeting non FTSE 100 
5 Best Annual Report FTSE 100 
6 Best Annual Report non FTSE 100 
7 Best Board Communications 
8 Best Board Communications non FTSE 
100 
9 Best IR for a New Issue 
10 Best IR Website 
II Best Internet Communications 
12 Best. IR During a Takeover 
13 Best Shareholder Value FTSE 100 
14 Best Shareholder Value non FTSE 100 
15 Best IR for a Loss Maker 
16 Best IR During a Crisis 
17 Best IR Progress FTSE 100 
18 Best IR Progress non FTSE 100 
19 Best IR for an AIM Firm 
2002 
1 Best IR Officer FTSE 100 
2 Best IR Officer non FTSE 100 
3 Best Results Meeting FTSE 100 
4 Best Results Meeting non FTSE 100 
5 Best Annual Report FTSE 100 
6 Best Annual Report non FTSE 100 
7 Best Board Communications 
8 Best Board Communications non FTSE 100 
9 Best IR for a New Issue 
10 Best IR Website 
11 Best Internet Communications 
12 Best IR During a Takeover 
13 Best Shareholder Value FTSE 100 
14 Best Shareholder Value non FTSE 100 
15 Best IR for a Loss Maker 
16 Best IR During a Crisis 
17 Best IR Progress FTSE 100 
18 Best IR Progress non FTSE 100 
19 Best Corporate Advertising 
20 Best Mgt Disclosure 
21 Best Social Reporting 
22 Best IR for an AIM Firm 
23 Best IR US Firm 
24 Best IR European Firm 
25 Best IR Asian Firm 
26 Best IR Emerging Country 
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Table F 
UK Firms Pooled Sample Sizes by Portfolio Across Years 
Portfolio Best IR Best Results Best Annual 
Off icer Meeting Report 
1 153 136 126 
2 147 133 121 
3 161 143 134 
Total 461 412 381 
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Table G 
2000 
2001 
2002 
US Firm Portfolio Sample Sizes By Year 
Portfolios Large Small Total 
1 76 229 305 
2 93 184 277 
3 188 615 803 
357 1028 1,385 
Portfolios 
1 98 63 161 
2 36 82 118 
3 82 264 346 
216 409 625 
Portfolios 
1 128 93 221 
2 117 123 240 
3 241 401 642 
486 617 1,103 
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Table H 
US Firm Sample Sizes by Portfolio Across Years 
Portfolios Large 
1 302 
246 
511 
Large and 
Small Small 
385 
389 
1,280 
1,059 2,054 
687 
635 
1,791 
3,113 
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Appendix 2 
Table K 
Descriptive Statistics of US and UK IR Award Firms Market Values 
This table shows the average market value (LOOOs) across all firms nominated in 
each IR award at 31st March of the year in which the firms are nominated. 
UK Firms 
Best IR Best Results Best Annual 
Officer Meeting Report 
N 461 412 381 
V000 E1000 E1000 
Mean 10,810 11,748 13,734 
Std. Deviation 34,071 30,637 55,386 
Minimum 560 890 1,070 
Maximum 512,833 258,188 896,756 
Percentiles 25% 558 25% 671 25% 510 
50% 2,141 50% 2,745 50% 2,138 
75% 7,601 75% 8,632 75% 8,424 
US Firms 
Large Firms 
N 1,059 
EIOOO 
Mean 19,320 
Std. Deviation 45,873 
Minimum 3,000 
Maximum 465,627 
Percentiles 25% 3,000 25% 
50% 4,555 50% 
75% 15,167 75% 
Small Firms 
2,054 
Elooo 
685 
776 
100 
2,990 
100 
282 
1,046 
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